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Abstract 
National minorities, who claim autonomy and self-government rights, have always 
been a controversial problem in the fields of international law, political theory and 
nationalism. Multiculturalism and egalitarianism are two approaches that have long 
been discussed in all of these fields and implemented in various contexts. The 
success of policies that seem to be associated with these two approaches, however, 
has varied from one case to another. This study asks if failures of these approaches 
have anything to do with the contexts in which they take place. If so, what is the 
context in which these approaches prove to be futile? Theorists themselves explain 
aspects of an ideal context under which their theories can become fruitful. These 
ideal contexts and circumstances are, however, unrealistic; and their assumptions 
about the nature of social relationships do not always correspond with the reality. This 
study aims to find a more reliable criterion to assess the applicability of 
multiculturalism and egalitarianism. The thesis explains the relationship between 
national minorities and the state through a phenomenological paradigm. In this 
paradigm national minorities, the thesis argues, vary according to the state 
nationalisms they have experienced in the past. The thesis analyses the relational 
nature of minority and state nationalisms from this inter-subjective perspective. Within 
this framework, this study posits the hypothesis that multiculturalism and 
egalitarianism cannot produce viable solutions to the problems of national minorities 
who were persistently exposed to the policies of forced assimilation and civic state 
nationalism. The study reveals that a certain strand of multiculturalism that is 
ethnocentric cannot come to terms with such national minorities under the 
integrationist civic state nationalism because, from an inter-subjective perspective, 
the boundaries between the majority and the minority communities in this context are 
more fluid and diverse than they would otherwise have been. In such cases, resorting 
to ethno-centric multiculturalism and promoting the ‘authentic’ ethnic identities 
hampers the very diversity it seeks to promote. The thesis suggests that difference-
blind egalitarianism is equally problematic in such cases because it cannot come to 
terms with the systematic injustice and the concomitant conflict that the policies of 
forced assimilation have created. As such its implementation weakens the very 
equality it seeks to promote. In order to explore and test this hypothesis, the 
dissertation makes use of a single in-depth case study of Turkey. In the period of 
candidacy for accession to the EU, Turkey is currently experimenting with ethno-
centric multiculturalism to accommodate its Kurdish population more equitably. In 
Turkey, however, neither the contemporary discourse of ethno-centric multiculturalism 
nor the historical implementation of difference-blind egalitarianism seems to be a 
viable option from a liberal perspective. Observing the reasons for this failure enables 
the reader to develop a new insight to identify the cases where those theoretical 
perspectives could be more successful. Mindful of the fact that generalizing from a 
single case study is difficult, the case of Turkey will also be situated within a study of 
comparative cases to test the consistency of the hypothesis in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
National minorities2 who claimed autonomy and self-government rights have 
always been a controversial problem in the fields of international law, political theory, 
nationalism and conflict studies. In each one of these fields scholars have raised 
different points that need to be considered in attempts to accommodate minority 
claims under a political system where equality, peace, and freedom can be jointly 
achieved. The issues elaborated by liberal theories include how to approach the 
national minorities and what role the state should have in dealing with citizens coming 
different backgrounds. In this thesis I will focus mainly on two liberal approaches that 
have different answers for the problems in question. These are the multiculturalist and 
the egalitarian approaches that have respectively defended cultural group rights and 
individual human rights for the members of national ethnic groups (Jones 1999, 
Donnelly 1990, Galenkamp 1998). 3 
 For the first category, members of a national ethnic minority should have 
differentiated group rights that would emanate from their membership of the cultural 
community. In a general sense this is necessary to rectify unjust practices that have 
neglected, excluded, discriminated against or forced the minorities to assimilate to the 
                                                
2 This study uses Capotorti’s definition of minority as ‘a group numerically inferior to the rest of 
the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the 
state—possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of 
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion or language’ (Jackson Preece 1998:28). This definition does 
not include migrant minorities but only focuses on national minorities that inhabited a given 
territory and have already been accustomed to using their own languages before their 
involuntarily subordination to the state project.  
3 I will examine multiculturalism and egalitarianism because these two are the mainstream 
approaches that have informed actual existing political institutions and actors who deal with 
the problems in question. Uses of these two by international organizations can also be seen 
from the following account.    
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majority in the past (Kymlicka 1995). In response to the inevitability of cultural 
diversity, the classical liberal view emphasized the significance of liberal toleration, 
freedom of association and the liberal state’s neutrality. This view is supported by 
Kukathas, who thinks that 
 
 [The toleration] neither forbids outsiders from entering nor forces them to join… At the 
same time it will not give special protection or advantages to any particular group or 
community… It will not deter anyone from pursuing particular goals or from trying to 
sustain particular traditions, yet neither will it promote others, or subsidise ones that are 
specially preferred  (Kukathas 2008: 39).  
 
This view of approaching diversity, however, is simply utopian because given the 
obligation of using at least one language at the state level, no political community can 
remain culturally neutral. Having considered this deficiency of tolerance-based 
neutrality in classical liberalism, the strong view of multiculturalism argues that if 
representing culture at the state level is inevitable, then representing the cultural 
identities, not only of dominant groups, but also minorities, would lead us to a fairer 
society. 
  Like-minded scholars have gathered under the banner of liberal culturalism, 
according to which, groups should have differentiated rights and therefore become 
arbiters on issues related to their own community. For them, the state should make 
adjustments and apply positive discrimination in regulating the rules to be imposed on 
these groups, because some rules are more compatible with the cultural norms of the 
majority. State policies may have an unequal impact on different cultures and put 
different groups in a disadvantaged position. From this perspective it is suggested 
that members of religious groups should be exempted from laws infringing their 
beliefs; linguistic minorities should be exempted from mandatory use of the official 
language that is not their own. Within this framework, Kymlicka (1995) claims that 
national minorities, who historically inhabited a given territory and were accustomed 
to use their own language before their subordination to the state, should now be 
entitled to self-government rights just like the majority, who have had the right to 
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decide which language is to be officially used in relation to the state. For him, these 
self-government rights, like regional autonomy, multi-national federalism or the right 
to use their own languages in public life can increase the cultural freedom of 
minorities whose will was previously ignored and oppressed in the nation-building 
process of the dominant ethnic core (Smith 1986). Although multiculturalism is a 
contemporary political theory that only emerged in the 1990s, its fundamental 
premises had previously been accepted by the League of Nations and its national 
minority guarantees between 1919 and 1939. 4 
 
At this time, distinct linguistic and cultural characteristics were widely accepted as 
proof of nationhood. If the peoples inhabiting a particular area had a unique 
language and culture then they could legitimately claim a right to national self-
determination… if an ethnic nation was unable to form its own independent 
political unit and instead was forced to exist as a national minority within another 
ethnic nation’s state, then this minority nation was entitled to preserve its own 
distinct identity as reflected in its language and culture (Jackson Preece 1998:73). 
 
However this principle created many problems.  National minorities stirred a wave of 
conflicts between their kin states. Germans who had been mistreated in Poland gave 
Germany a reason to treat its Polish minority badly. A chain of revenge had started a 
game in which the kin states used their ethnic fellows in other countries to justify their 
irredentist5 policies. The League of Nations’ “minority guarantees” championing an 
ethnic conception of nationhood, provided an ideological base for Nazism that Hitler 
would later use to justify his irredentist policies abroad and racism at home.  
                                                
4  Before the League of Nations was established in 1919 ‘the most detailed consideration of 
national minority protection was conducted by certain private organizations. Two noteworthy 
examples are the Office des Nationalités and the Central Organization for a Durable 
Peace.The Office des Nationalités held two conferences in 1915 and 1916, which culminated 
in a Draft Declaration of the rights of Nationalities. This document laid down general principles 
of racial, religious, and linguistic freedom and recognized the rights of homogeneous 
nationalities to independent statehood wherever possible and, failing that, to local, religious, 
and educational autonomy in states where they formed a significant national minority. The 
Association for a Durable Peace took these ideas one step further. In 1917, it released a Draft 
International Treaty on the rights of National Minorities. This proposed treaty gave national 
minorities civil and political equality as well as control over educational and religious 
institutions and proportional representation in government’ (Jackson Preece 1998: 71).  
5 ‘Irredentist nationalism occurs with the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a state 
by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals (as in the 
case of the Sudeten Germans)’. (Hechter 2000: 17). 
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  In contrast to this differentialist, ethno-centrist perspective, the egalitarians 
stressed individual equality that is blind to cultural differences. For this second 
category, members of any cultural group should have the same rights before the law 
and everyone should be equally entitled to live and perform their cultural practices in 
the private sphere so long as these practices do not infringe upon the rights of other 
individuals. This latter category represents the idea that injustices of the past cannot 
be rectified through granting underdog groups differentiated rights like self-
determination, or exemption from citizenship law. This is because bringing cultural 
identities of descent to the forefront in politics would not only violate the equal 
opportunities of individuals in various ways but would also fuel the mobilization of the 
conflict between ethnic groups (Barry 2001, Benhabib 2002, Okin 1999). How the 
League of Nations and its minority guarantees escalated the conflict between 
ethnically separated groups was a proof of this. In less than 200 states there are 
about 600 language groups and 5000 ethnic groups (Gurr 1993).  Quinn (2008: 37) 
states that only 174 out of these 600 language groups are in struggles for self-
determination. The explanation for this is that not all groups have the same capacity 
to mobilize and claim autonomy. From the egalitarian perspective, the liberal state 
loses its neutrality if it recognizes the groups that are most able to mobilize for 
claiming the right to self-determination. Those critiques of multiculturalism are 
grounded in three points that follow. First, the multiculturalist politics of recognition 
would violate the neutrality principle of liberalism. Second, it would have negative 
effects on vulnerable members within the minority like children, women, or political 
dissidents who are maltreated by their own cultural traditions. Third, it would increase 
the cost of exiting from such traditions, from which vulnerable individuals should be 
protected by the liberal state even at the expense of the cultural freedoms of those 
who violate the principle of equality.  
  This second way of thinking has long dominated the framework of international 
law. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The UN 
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Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and 
Linguistic Minorities (1992), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1969), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1955) did not attribute any normative value to cultural identities but only 
valued equal rights of free individuals to live their cultural identities without being 
exposed to discrimination. As Claude (1955) stated, and Donnelly (1990, 2003) 
further supported,  ‘The doctrine of human rights has been put forward as a substitute 
for the concept of minority rights, with the strong implication that minorities whose 
members enjoy individual equality of treatment cannot legitimately demand facilities 
for the maintenance of their ethnic particularism’ (Claude 1955: 211). All these 
conventions and declarations have identified the individual as the only legitimate 
agent of liberal rights. In this framework, minority rights were simply subordinated to 
human rights that grant minority members the freedom of association (Higgins 
1994:119-121). 
The first category of political thought–multiculturalism or liberal culturalism– 
however, started to earn credibility in the international agenda6 since the sources of 
human rights mentioned above in the latter category proved, in time, to be insufficient 
to settle ethnic conflicts and rectify the injustices of assimilation or exclusion. In 
accordance with the 1990 Copenhagen criteria and the 1992 European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, the protection of linguistic minorities in candidate 
and member countries became more important, and members of the European Union 
were advised to allow the use of minority languages in public education and services. 
According to article 15 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
                                                6  See National Minority Standards published by OSCE (2007); Weller, M. (ed) (2007) 
Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and 
Treaty Bodies (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press); Pentassuglia, G. (2002) Minorities 
in International Law (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing); Phillips, A. and Rosas, A. 
(eds). (1995) Universal Minority Rights (London, Turku/Abo: Institute for Human Rights Abo 
Akademi University and Minority Rights Group); Fottrell, D. and Bowring, B. (eds.) (1999) 
Minority and Group Rights in the New Millennium (Hague: Kluwe Law International).  
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Minorities ‘states should endeavour to ensure adequate opportunities for being taught 
in the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language’. Moreover, in 
1993, the EU found it necessary to extend these to self-government rights, which 
would generate regional administrative units for minority communities. Along with this 
requirement Article 10 (2) of the same convention states that 
In areas inhabited by national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, and 
only if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real 
need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions 
which would make it possible to use the minority language in relations between 
those persons and the administrative authorities (Wright 1998:11). 
 
The EU minority norms have been created with reference to best practice 
cases like the Catalans in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, the German-speaking 
minority in South Tyrol in Italy and the Alanders in Finland. All of these cases were 
used as examples to show that the problems of national minorities can be solved 
through granting minorities differentiated group rights that in some cases can be 
extended to include self-government rights. These success stories encouraged 
international and supranational organizations to export the same policies to solve the 
national minority problems in other contexts and countries. 
However, during the process of incorporating the multiculturalist paradigm7 
into the European Union legal framework, we witnessed that the compatibility of 
multiculturalist policies with some cases was considered doubtful. In some instances 
it was unsuccessful in promoting equality or pacifying ethnic conflicts, and in some 
cases it could not even be put into practice despite government attempts to do so.  
The Roma people in Hungary who were given self-government rights to educate in 
their own language still suffer from inequalities that even a multicultural discourse 
could not rectify (Koulish 2005). In France, the idea of legalizing Corsu as the 
language of public education in Corsica could not be achieved, despite the French 
                                                7 As this study is related to the problems of national ethnic groups, the term multiculturalism 
will primarily refer to the views of Kymlicka, who clearly described the way in which national 
minorities should and would be treated in compliance with the general lines of the liberal 
multiculturalism perspective as summarized above. 
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government’s intention to do so when posing the referendum in 2003 (Benedikter 
2009).  In Turkey, Kurdish identity started to be officially recognized in the 2000s and 
Kurds were gradually granted simple cultural rights like state broadcasting and private 
language education in Kurdish (Kurban 2003, Ozbudun & Yazıcı 2004). Nevertheless, 
this raw inclination of the Turkish government to adopt the weak multiculturalist 
policies in the period of accession to the EU could not evolve into the strong 
multiculturalism policy of the EU that requires the state to provide the Kurds with 
state-funded education in their own language (ECRI 2005). The multiculturalist idea of 
differentiation between ethnic groups created a great turmoil among people who 
thought it would lead to further inequalities. Moreover, minority radicalism has long 
prevented the state from maintaining negotiations with political parties who did 
condemn the violent tactics of the insurgent organization PKK–Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Tezcur 2010]). 
Mindful of this preliminary evidence it is apparent that the applicability of these 
approaches in real politics varies from one instance to another. I should clarify that 
this thesis does not intend to defend one over the other; the aim of this study is not to 
find out which one of these two approaches, egalitarianism or multiculturalism, offers 
a truer answer (if there is one at all) that then might be generalized in dealing with the 
whole range of problems about national minorities.  
Rather, the aim of this thesis is to discover if these approaches’ deficiencies 
have anything to do with the contexts in which they take place? If so, what is this 
context in the face of which these approaches then prove to be futile? In other words 
what types of national minority are less likely to be led to the results of equality, peace 
and freedom through the employment of multiculturalist or egalitarian policies?  
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1.1 Applied Political Theory and Political Sociology of National Minorities 
 
The applicability of those theories to real world cases is usually judged by looking at 
their success in creating the fundamental principles of equality, liberty and peace in 
diverse societies. Theorists themselves explain the ideal context under which their 
theories can become fruitful. For instance, Kymlicka (2004), makes it clear that self-
government rights can only be proposed for national minorities who are sizeable 
enough, geographically concentrated to a degree, and not on the road of assimilation. 
He also argues that ethnic conflict driven by such groups cannot be resolved by any 
means other than regional autonomy (Kymlicka 2004 [b]: 5, 13).  Barry (2009) argues 
that his own arguments favouring the principle of equality can be viable only if the law 
commanding the principle of equality ‘can be justified as advancing some legitimate 
public objective’.  
 These ideal contexts, however, are not easily found. As concerns 
multiculturalism, the ideal context, one in which the given minority should have an 
institutionally developed societal culture, cannot be found without difficulty. This is 
mainly due to Kymlicka’s problematic conceptualization of societal culture. Kymlicka’s 
definition of societal culture does not say anthing about the political behavior of 
minority members and the level of their cultural institutionalization (Young 1997). For 
example, some members of sizeable and demographically concentrated groups may 
fight for cultural autonomy and give the message that they have not assimilated to the 
dominant majority. However, the same minority may lack institutionalization in a way 
that regional autonomy would decrease the opportunity of its members to ‘make good 
choices over good lives’ in their own vernacular. In this framework, Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism does not precisely explain what to do when a radical sub-group within 
the minority is in ethnic conflict but the minority as a whole is lacking an 
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institutionalized societal culture. Neither can it come to terms with a national minority, 
where most of its members have voluntarily assimilated into the majority and do not 
share the nationalist sentiments of its radical factions.  
 As concerns the egalitarianism of Brian Barry (2009), the ideal context is the 
one in which ‘a law commanding the principle of equality must be justified as 
advancing some legitimate public objective’. Regarding this idea, we have to consider 
whether there is a universal source of legitimacy and if there can be a public objective 
that is legitimate for both a national minority and the majority within the same state. 
Sources of legitimacy are different for groups whose interests are driven by different 
concerns that vary depending on the context. This echoes Hume’s ‘depiction of 
circumstances of justice which plays an essential part in his account of what justice is 
and why it is valuable’ (Miller 2008: 36-37).  Moreover, the implications of a particular 
context might be different for different groups. This is usually the case in the state 
where the minority’s cultural freedom was restricted for the sake of the nation building 
process.  While the majority sees the state as the guarantor of their rights, some 
minority members can see it as the violator of their most fundamental freedom. This is 
to speak their own language in every phase of life, including both the public and the 
private sphere. What these suffering groups understand from the legitimate public 
objective is usually quite different from how the majority perceive it.   
 According to Habermas, drawing on Barry’s views, different cultural groups find 
the justification of a law reasonable if the law’s ‘burden appears reasonable 
[preferable] to them in comparison with the burden of the discrimination which is 
thereby eliminated’ (Habermas 2005: 13). Granting official status to the language of 
the majority and forcing minority members to learn it may be justified–for an 
egalitarian–on the grounds that knowledge of the official language provides members 
of all ethno-cultural groups with equality of opportunity and higher levels of mobility 
outside the limitations of their own cultural group. Nevertheless, this might not be the 
primary concern of minority members who want to speak their own language in a 
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public discourse more than anything else. They might not care for equality, but only 
freedom. It does not make any sense to talk about a public legitimate objective as a 
justification for any decisions that the state can make, if some minority members do 
not even share with the majority a sense of belonging to the same public.  
In this framework, I argue that assessing the applicability of multiculturalism 
and egalitarian approaches requires a further elaboration of circumstances that 
Kymlicka and Barry did not take into consideration when defining the ideal context for 
their own theories. This thesis aims to reveal under what circumstances these 
theories are unlikely to promote the liberal values of freedom, peace and equality that 
they defend. 
For this reason this study can be categorized as being with the field of 
applied political theory, yet it also falls in the category of political sociology as 
the evidence against which these theories are tested is drawn from social-
political dynamics. As Miller argues, ‘political theory should aim to engage with the 
political issues that arise in contemporary societies, in circumstances that are usually 
far from ideal’ (Miller 2008:30).  As Kymlicka (2010:260) listed ‘Sociologists such as 
Brubaker (2006), Joppke (2004); political scientists such as Laitin (1998) and Jung 
(2007); and anthropologists such as Turner (1993) or Cowan (2001)’ followed a 
similar line of argument with Miller (2008).  They all argued that theories should pay 
more attention to ‘evidence about their underlying assumptions about human 
behaviour ~ or about the strategic and political context in which cultural claims are 
formulated’ (Kymlicka 2010: 260). 
At this point it is important to stress that both Barry and Kymlicka have also 
been informed by realities under which, their theories, they supposed, would be 
consistent. The problem with the applied political philosophy of both Barry and 
Kymlicka, however, has been selection bias. Aiming to inform the policy directives in 
practice, they explain and justify their position with examples that would best support 
their arguments. Kymlicka’s (1998) theory of multiculturalism in his work Finding Our 
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Way is generated from the case of Canada8 where state–minority relationships have 
been exceptionally peaceful (Choudhry 2007:623).  Although he is positive that his 
model of multiculturalism can be safely exported to all national minorities with a 
‘mature’ societal culture, he avoids providing much information on cases where his 
multiculturalism in different forms and degrees does not seem to be able to resolve 
violent conflicts or rectify the problems of inequality. Corsica in France and the Kurds 
in Turkey are the cases in point which I will later both expand upon and explain.  
Similarly, as Arneson (2007:393) argued, Brian Barry ‘brushes aside empirical 
facts that are in fact problematic for the policies he wants to defend’. His fundamental 
principle of equality is merely considered to be the equality of opportunity. Without 
accounting for the inequality of outcome and its causes, Barry closes his eyes to what 
he does not want to see.  As such, he neglects cases in which the recognition of 
cultural rights is necessary to guarantee a fair start for those who would have 
otherwise been put in a disadvantaged position. For instance, Brian Barry never 
considers that pupils from a minority background may need a bilingual education in 
school so that their cultural disadvantage is compensated.  For him, ‘the on-going 
promotion of a minority language – that is, a language with less power and prestige in 
a given (national) context – is actively detrimental to the mobility of minority language 
speakers’ (May 2005:1560). He thinks that education in minority language only works 
against the minority’s equality of opportunity to participate in socio-economic life in 
the broader state.  In defence of his argument that bilingual education decreases 
people’s potential to succeed in the majority language he gives the example of Puerto 
Rican students in the USA. ‘In New York, only 16 per cent of Puerto Rican students 
earned academic high school diplomas, qualifying them for admission to college – 
The situation was much the same for Puerto Ricans in Boston and Chicago’ (Barry 
                                                8 Kymlicka (2004 [a]:13) states that  ‘I should acknowledge the right away that the origins of 
my reflections on these issues lie in Canada, and I suspect that the Canadian experience 
continues to shape and influence my theorizing, perhaps even in ways that I am unaware of’. 
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2001). He blames it on the bilingual education that hampers the prospects for Puerto 
Rican students in America.  
 
 
The archetypal example of this thinkinng is best represented by the judge in 
Amarillo Texas who ordered a mother as a condition of keeping custody of her 
child not to speak Spanish to that child at home on the grounds that this was 
equivalent to a form of ‘child abuse’: If she starts [school] with the other 
children and cannot even speak the language that the teachers and others 
speak, and she’s a full-blooded American citizen, you’re abusing that child… 
Now get this straight: you start speaking English to that child, because if she 
doesn’t do good in school then I can remove her because it’s not in her best 
interests to be ignorant (May 2005: 1561).  
 
 
In short, both ethno-centric multiculturalists and civic egalitarians look at the 
supportive cases and circumstances under which their propositions are verified.  They 
do not consider ‘how the selection of cases for study on the basis of outcomes on the 
dependent variable biases conclusions’ (Geddes 1990: 131).  For example, Kymlicka 
chooses cases where the model of multinational federation works with relative 
success; by glorifying these cases he concludes that national minorities with a 
‘societal culture’ should follow the same route. In this proposition, he assumes that 
most ethno-national minorities that possess this societal culture want autonomy. He 
never looks at cases where ethno-nationalist parties are not widely supported by their 
ethnic constituency. ‘Apparent cause(s) that all the selected cases have in common 
may turn out to be just as common among cases in which the effect they were 
supposed to have caused has not occurred’ (Geddes 1990:149). Ignoring this, 
Kymlicka never controls for the cases where multiculturalism does not seem to be 
working despite having a ‘similar’ national minority. He never verifies the reliability of 
his argument in cases that contradict his explanation. Kymlicka then generalizes a 
false proposition about the causal relationship between his variables: the societal 
culture of the national minority generates minority consent to ethno-nationalist politics 
and the consent upon which the solution of autonomy is founded justifies the 
normative applicability of his multiculturalism theory. 
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Departing from this self-fulfilling prophecy and the method of using supportive 
cases and ideal contexts in the applied political philosophy of both Kymlicka and 
Barry, this thesis instead focuses on circumstances under which neither of these two 
approaches works.  I anticipate that exploring why they do not work in some cases 
will sharpen our understanding of why and where they are more likely to work.  In the 
above section, I proposed that the ideal contexts for multiculturalism and 
egalitarianism are not easily found. It became clear that the politics of recognition, as 
the multiculturalism argument promotes it, is incapable of dealing with past injustices 
when the national minority in question is politically divided. When the most minority 
members are not in agreement with the more radical and nationalist factions in their 
own group, the multiculturalism argument seems rather insufficient to address which 
segment of minority’s choice is legitimate and which one should be decisive. 
Multiculturalism that is based on a differentiation of cultures in the public domain is 
also problematic in cases where there is no clear cut division between the majority 
and the minority; where the equality of opportunity is the norm and minority members 
are more likely to enjoy it. This is observable in countries such as Turkey9, America10 
                                                
9 In 2007 41% of South Eastern Kurds supported the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi : Justice 
and Development Party) instead of  pro-Kurdish DTP (Demokratik Toplum partisi, Democratic 
Society Party (Schleifer 2009). This has also been supported by the Konda Research survey 
(2010) conducted with more than 10,000 people in 59 cities of Turkey. Findings reveal that 
only 16.8% of Kurds in the South East want the Local administration to be autonomous and 
make its own decisions. A similar trend has continued in the 2011 general election as well. 
The Kurdish nationalist party BDP claims rights to autonomy and state funded education in the 
Kurdish language in 15 East and South-East Anatolian cities with a significant Kurdish 
population. In the 2011 general election, however, the independent candidates supported by 
the BDP could only win the majority of the votes cast in 5 out of these 15 cities (Hurriyet: the 
2011 General Election Results). 
10 ‘The Puerto Rican question remains a conundrum.  These are a people who have been 
American citizens since 1917 and have been under American rule since 1898.  Who, when 
asked what status they wanted for their future, in three referenda, over the course of the 20th 
Century,  have not so far been able to give a definitive majority answer.  Commonwealth 
status has always won, statehood has been gaining considerable ground, but it is far from the 
two thirds majority, while the choice for Independence has remained very low’ (Brau-Cebrian 
2004). 
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and France11. They all have adopted a conception of civic inclusive nationalism and 
assimilation was the only method they used in relation to their national minorities.  
Egalitarianism, on the other hand, seems to be in a hard position in cases 
where there is a clear cut distinction between the minority and the majority; where the 
minority has a shared sense of belonging and political orientation when it comes to 
decisions about the future of their community.  The actual problem is that although 
the decisions of the state are based on an objective of public legitimacy, ethnic 
groups may not have the sense of belonging to the same public as the majority in the 
country. This is the case in Canada, Belgium, and Spain. However this is also 
relevant for the above cases like Turkey and France where the radical factions of both 
the Kurdish and the Corsican minorities detach themselves from the majority along 
the lines of ethnicity.  In these cases, the problem is more that the assimilation is 
forced for those who resist and that it is very likely to radicalize those who are 
affected by the policies of forced assimilation.  Consequently, the radical-nationalist 
factions in these minorities do not share the same objectives with the state, and they 
do not even identify as belonging to the same public domain with the majority.  
While the multiculturalism of Kymlicka is problematic in cases where the 
segmented forms of assimilation are prevalent and integration is the norm, as in 
France, America and Turkey, egalitarianism is problematic in cases where there is no 
consensus on the terms of the common good or the shared public realm.  
1.2 Hypothesis Based on this preliminary observation this thesis argues that 
neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism is likely to promote the liberal principles of 
equality, freedom and peace in cases where the national minority were consistently 
exposed to the integrationist ideal of a civic state nationalism and forced to assimilate 
                                                11 ‘A total of 114,970 voters cast their ballots on July 6 in a referendum that would allow the 
island of Corsica to exercise a degree of autonomy. The referendum asked voters whether 
they would accept a new territorial assembly and executive body that would manage more of 
the island’s affairs.  Based on the results released by the French Ministry of the Interior, 
57,180 voted against limited autonomy compared to the 54,990 who voted in favor of a new 
government structure’ (Election Guide–Country Profile: Corsica. 07.08.2003). 
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into the majority culture. In these cases, multiculturalism cannot cope with high levels 
of heterogeneity, while egalitarianism will not be accepted by minority members 
whom the forced assimilation has radicalized and who do not share the same public 
realm with the majority on practical and ideational levels.12 
 
1.3 Contextualization and Empirical Case Study Since the next step is to 
operationalize the argument between egalitarianism and multiculturalism and show 
that neither of these works in the above-mentioned context, I will use the case of the 
Kurds in Turkey.  I am choosing the case of Turkey because the relationship between 
the Kurds and the state in Turkey has been portrayed to be representative of the 
above-mentioned context. Turkey is somewhat distinct in practicing both assertive 
assimilation and being relatively open to Muslim minorities that take part in the civic 
nation. 
 
                                                
12 It should be clarified that neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism is used as a generic 
concept in this thesis. The former of the two refers to Kymlicka’s approach of ethno-centric 
multiculturalism and the latter refers to Brian Barry’s difference blind egalitarianism. As David 
Miller (1995:131) suggests ‘multiculturalism implies some views about the nature of cultural 
differences and about how we should respond to them individually and politically. This means 
that there can be different versions of multiculturalism (and of the corresponding policies such 
as multicultural education) , and the question is not whether one wants be a multiculturalist at 
all but the kind of multiculturalist one wants to be’. The primary task of this thesis is to show 
that ethno-centric multiculturalism put forward as a solution by Kymlicka for the problems of 
national minorities is a viable solution for only those ethnic groups whose members had been 
consistently differentiated by the state. In cases where neither difference-blind egalitarianism 
nor ethno-centric multiculturalism is able to promote the values of equality and freedom, a third 
way seems to be the most optimal solution. This third way is identified by Kukathas as ‘weak 
multiculturalism’. The weak multiculturalism ‘begins by accepting the reality and desirability of 
cultural diversity’ (Parekh 2000:340) yet it also puts emphasis on equality, individual rights and 
freedom of exit. Although not explicitly specified as weak multiculturalism the emphasis on 
these three points will also be explained with reference to the liberal culturalists in chapter 3 
and to post-multiculturalism literature in chapter 5. Chapter 3 and 5 will discuss that ethno-
centric multiculturalism, in its attempt to recognize authentic identities, has the potential to 
generate isolationism and polarization between ethnic groups while the difference blind 
egalitarianism is likely to cause excessive interventionism to achieve equality between people 
with disparate capacities. The weak multiculturalism stands against both isolationism and 
interventionism (Kukathas 2008) in doing so it makes sure that the liberal solution for the 
problems of national minorities will not be informed predominantly by concerns with either 
cultural freedom or individual equality.   
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 The hypothesis in this study suggests that this context of forced assimilation 
radicalizes some segments in the group who now disagree vehemently with centralist 
state nationalism, yet at the same time the system incorporates those who voluntarily 
assimilated into the majority and provides a base for heterogeneous practices that 
cross ethnic boundaries. This disagreement about the way in which the nation is 
defined on the one hand, and the heterogeneity that the policies of assimilation and 
integration facilitated on the other, explains why neither multiculturalism nor 
egalitarianism is likely to be a solution for the problems of national minorities. In the 
literature there is a consensus that the Kurds have been exposed to the policies of 
assimilation and integration; and that those who resisted were forced to follow this 
line. This creates a context that is exactly in parallel to the one mentioned above. 
Tezcur (2009), Heper (2007), White (1995), Cornell (2001), Yegen (2011) all argued 
that the Kurdish community in Turkey is deeply divided in terms of their cultural 
practices and political orientations. While the multiculturalism that is based on an 
understanding of minorities as a monolithic category seems non-operational, there is 
also a huge literature on the ethnic conflict between the radical Kurds and the armed 
forces in Turkey that the stringent interpretation of egalitarianism cannot come to 
terms with (Akcam and Asal 2005, Kirisci and Winrow 1997, Barkey and Fuller 1998, 
Mango 2005, McDowall  2000, Olson 1989). 
By focusing on this case study, I will inform the Kurdish question from these 
theoretical approaches. This thesis will explain principles deriving from both 
egalitarianism and multiculturalism, with concrete examples from the Kurdish case. It 
will also demonstrate that one-sided actors defending the principle of either cultural 
autonomy or egalitarian individuality unknowingly perpetuate the problems in Turkey. 
I will explain how the political actors and state policies defending the egalitarian 
position are violating the freedoms of radical nationalists, and how the nationalist 
minority parties, freedom fighters and ‘liberal’ multiculturalists defending the principle 
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of autonomy are so blind to the potential that their demands are in conflict with the 
individuals’ equality.  
Two out of seven chapters in this study will be about this single case. This is 
because the illustration of how the core values supported by different theoretical 
perspectives were deployed by political actors would not be possible without deeply 
tracing the process in an historical context. Investigating the circumstances under 
which theoretical approaches are tested requires both historical and sociological 
analysis, which also enables me to take into consideration some other relevant 
factors that have not been considered so far. As I am mainly focusing on why current 
theoretical arguments that inform political institutions cannot promote equality, I 
should clearly show how these theoretical values were employed by political actors in 
discussing the issues in question, and how the policies representing these 
perspectives resulted in further inequalities, increased conflict, and led to the violation 
of freedoms. This observation requires a concentration on studying speeches, news, 
political party manifestos, and public opinion. Such an observation of complex 
relationships and materials in their historical order cannot be made by using any 
method other than the approach of process-tracing through an in-depth single case 
study.  
 
1.4 Data Collection and Analysis To be able to contextualize the use of 
multiculturalism and egalitarian approaches, I have analysed the relevant articles of 
the Turkish Constitution, state legislation proposals, draft bills, decisions and 
discussions from sessions of the Turkish parliament. The European Union’s 
recommendations to Turkey and its reports on the progress were also investigated 
and considered. In respect to public opinion, there is a vast number of surveys that 
provide us with valuable information about people’s perceptions of their own identity 
and their different attitudes towards possible solutions in respect to the problems of 
the Kurds in Turkey. These survey findings are priceless in terms of the demographic 
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information they provide.  These surveys also informed me about Kurds’ group 
cohesion, heterogeneity and societal culture. I have also visited the eastern provinces 
of Turkey, and have had open-ended discussions with people from different economic, 
educational, and religious backgrounds. I have consulted the digital archive of the 
newspaper Hurriyet, which chronologically lists relevant news, to detect the extent of 
group polarization, public tension and democratic initiatives. How radical minority 
members reacted to the weak multiculturalist policies was ascertained by comparing 
chronological lists of terrorists’ violent activities that followed the government’s 
‘democratic’ initiatives. Needless to say, all these resources were used to assess the 
viability of the theoretical argumentation that required me to engage with the vast 
number of theory papers. Moreover, the context under which the theoretical 
argumentation takes place required me to read historical materials, which enabled me 
to explain precisely the problematic relationship between the Kurds and the state in 
Turkey. 
1.5 A Comparative Perspective In order to comprehend a complex issue like this, 
an in-depth case-study research is essential; however, this study is supported by a 
variable-oriented comparative case study. My aim is not only to contextualize the 
theoretical argument and inform the solution in Turkey, but also to reflect back on the 
theories by looking at the reason why they have failed to induce the fundamental 
principles of liberalism in Turkey. As I explained it before the earlier studies in the field 
of applied political philosophy only followed one direction in a two-way street, in the 
sense that they only used theories to inform the solution of minority problems in 
specific cases. They have frequently indicated the difficulties with these theories in 
their examples, but they have hardly used their examples to generate an explanation 
as to where these theories can or cannot work.  By looking at why the extremes of 
ethno-centric multiculturalism and difference-blind egalitarianism fail to work in Turkey, 
this empirical study will provide a basis to reflect back on these theories, explaining 
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where they can be applied and where they cannot be applied, how they might be 
refined.  
Since the applicability of the current theoretical perspectives under a given 
context, clarified in the hypothesis, is tested over one single in-depth case study, 
making generalizations related to the applicability of this theory is difficult. Mindful of 
the limitations of this methodology, to be able to validate the hypothesis I have to look 
at other cases to illustrate the relationship between the variables of this study. Mindful 
of the fact that ‘the variable-oriented strategy is incapacitated by complex, conjectural 
causal arguments requiring the estimation of the effects of a large number of 
interaction terms or the division of a sample into many separate sub-samples’ (Ragin 
1987:69), I will use this method in the final part to find further evidence for testing my 
argument and to allow a reasonable generalization about which theoretical 
perspective is more likely to be viable in which context.  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
 
Chapter 2: National Minorities under the Civic Assimilationist-Ethnic 
Exclusionist Dichotomy of State Nationalism.  
 
Objective: The objective is to conceptualize the context under which I will question 
the applicability of the theoretical approaches. I will mainly talk about varieties of 
nationalism with reference to the civic-ethnic dichotomy, the methods used in these 
different constructions of the community, and their implications for national minorities.  
The conceptualization will be made in a manner that is sensitive to the layers of 
exclusion and different methods of assimilation, like forced assimilation and a passive 
neglect of cultural differences.  I will conceptualize the nature of state nationalism 
depending on its relationship with the minorities in question because it is not possible 
to categorize an entire movement of nationalism as civic or ethnic.  
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Link to the Overall Research: As I will be arguing that the different types of national 
minorities can be accommodated best by different methods; this chapter enables me 
to clarify in what ways these minorities differ from each other depending on the 
different constructions of the community and the state in which they live. As the 
hypothesis includes the variables of civic state nationalism and assimilation I will 
conceptualize these phenomena.  
 
Chapter 3: A Context-Sensitive Approach to Difference-Blind Egalitarianism and 
Ethnocentric Multiculturalism  
 
Objective: The objective is to give a detailed theoretical background and my own 
argument in relation to the best way to accommodate national minorities.  With this 
purpose I will explain Will Kymlicka’s multiculturalism and Brian Barry’s egalitarianism 
as theoretical approaches that seem to inform most states and international and 
supranational organizations in their efforts to find a liberal democratic solution for the 
problems of national minorities.  Throughout the chapter, I will explain what they have 
to say for the solution of the national minorities problem; elaborate on the remaining 
problems with these theoretical approaches; and show why we still need a new 
insight to deal with problems of national minorities. In what follows, the chapter will 
focus on my argument with reference to the context that, I suggest, explains the 
failures of these specified theories.  
 
Link to the Overall Research:  The main aim of this research is to show that 
egalitarianism as described by Barry and multiculturalism as described by Kymlicka 
are not viable options in a certain context that has been dominated for a long time by 
the policies of forced assimilation and the integrationist ideal of civic state nationalism.  
This chapter will therefore allow me to explain both the substance of these theoretical 
approaches and my argument about their viability under the contexts I specified in the 
second chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma  
 
 
Objective: The objective is to illustrate my argument with an in-depth single case 
study. For this reason, the historical context will be explained through depiction of the 
history of Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis Kurdish identity from the foundation of the 
Republic of Turkey up until the 2000’s.  Both the heterogeneity problems with regard 
to the Kurds in Turkey and the absence of ideal contexts that are pre-conditions for 
the success of specified theoretical approaches will be explained as the result of this 
historical path of forced assimilation and civic state nationalism in Turkey. 
 
Link to the Overall Research: This chapter will take on the conceptual discussion 
between civic and ethnic state nationalisms and their impacts on national minorities. 
Chapter III has discussed that the theories of multiculturalism and egalitarianism are 
at odds with cases that represent civic state nationalism and forced assimilation. This 
chapter will operationalize this context in the case of Turkey and familiarize the reader 
with its implications on Kurdish community in the country.  
 
 
Chapter 5: When Multiculturalism Does not Fit. Kurds and Turkey in the 2000s  
In this chapter I will apply the arguments from the second chapter to the 
contemporary relationship between the Kurds and the state in Turkey.  I will 
demonstrate how egalitarianism and multiculturalism have been represented by 
political institutions and the political actors who appeal to these ideas, while 
discussing the problems in question in Turkey.  I will also explain that the 
implementation of the given approaches–ethnocentric multiculturalism and difference 
blind egalitarianism–in Turkey results in further inequalities, violation of freedoms and 
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ethnic conflict under the conditions that the state nationalism created in Turkey as I 
have explained in chapter IV.  
 
Link to the Overall Research: Why neither egalitarianism nor multiculturalism can 
promote liberal democracy in a context identified with historical assimilation and 
putatively civic nationalism will be explained by the inequalities that they create in 
Turkey. How the institutions and political actors, whose ideas seem to be correlated 
with the given theoretical perspectives, indeed exacerbate the problematic 
relationship between the Kurds and Turkey, and how this process results in further 
violations of freedom and equalities, will be explained under the guidance of the 
theoretical discussion that is given in the third chapter. This chapter therefore is 
intended to provide key empirical evidence for my hypothesis. 
 
 
Chapter 6:  A Comparative Outlook: The Francophone in Canada, The Flemish 
in Belgium and the Muslim Turks in Greece  
 
Objective: The thesis argues that ethno-centric multiculturalism is problematic only in 
cases where the minority was previously exposed to the policies of forced 
assimilation and ‘open’ integrationist civic state nationalism at the same time. In 
order for my hypothesis to make sense, I will support it with evidence from the 
‘contrast spaces’, which are the cases that lack either one or both of the factors 
(forced assimilationist policies or an integrationist ideal of civic nationalism) that 
define the context under which my hypothesis would maintain its validity. I will explain 
why it is easier to justify normatively – from a liberal egalitarian perspective – the 
rationale behind Kymlicka’s multiculturalism in cases whose history characterizes an 
ethnic state nationalism or civic ideals with some layers of exclusion, but not forced 
assimilation.  I will also suggest it is much easier and more possible to develop the 
societal culture of the minority in a manner that would not violate the freedoms of its 
own members in cases where forced assimilation was never aimed at absorbing the 
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minority into the mainstream community rather than intimidating or forcing the 
minority to leave.  
 
Link to the Overall Research: Some contextual and theoretical explanations with 
respect to the contrast spaces will have been made briefly throughout the previous 
chapters, but this chapter will allow me both to demonstrate the consistency of my 
argument in the contrast space and to rule out some alternative explanations, like the 
necessity of the region’s economic development for multiculturalist policies to be both 
justified on a normative basis and to be proven practical. The hypothesis of this study 
is further supported by evidence from Turkey. The implementation of these theories is 
really not likely to promote the fundamental principles of liberalism they defend in 
Turkey where integrative assimilation is the only option and ethnicity has been 
discarded from public life and politics. This comparative part will then provide a basis 
to test this argument and see if multiculturalism is really able to work in contrast cases 
where ethnicity has historically been a relevant source of social and political division 
between the majority and the minority, unlike the intermingled Kurds and Turks in 
Turkey.  
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
This concluding part will have three functions: (1) summarizing the findings, (2) 
explaining theoretical and case specific contributions, and (3) projecting policy 
implications. 
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Chapter 2: Civic‐Ethnic State Nationalisms and National 
Minorities 
  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how civic state nationalism and ethnic state 
nationalism have impacted upon national minorities in different ways. The broader 
aim of this thesis is to show that national minorities vary from each other in many 
respects and that their differences are of the utmost importance to political theorists 
who dwell on ‘the minorities problem’. This chapter argues it is impossible to 
understand different problems of national minorities without looking at different state 
nationalisms that they have experienced in the past. In what follows, I will therefore 
provide the reader with a rigorous discussion on this matter and contextualize the 
conditions of national minorities against which the theories of multiculturalism and 
egalitarianism will later be tested.   
The study of nationalism can at times seem like a minefield. The factors that 
underlie its emergence as well as its passionate, often violent, expression have led 
scholars to seek out models and categories by which to simplify their task. The civic-
ethnic distinction of nationalism has been the most important of these categories in 
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dealing with the problems of national minorities. It is so because the dominant state 
nationalism, and its conception of nationhood13 in the country, informs the prospects 
for its national minorities. It informs the state in its decisions as to how minorities will 
be treated: whether they should be assimilated or differentiated. As an outcome of 
this variation, problems with national minorities vary too. For some national minorities, 
the problem is discrimination and dispossession of equal citizenship rights and for 
some, the problem is that the state forces them to assimilate.  
It is obvious that both civic nationalism and the ethnic nationalism raise 
particular problems.  Scholars in the field, however, have refuted the dichotomy on 
conceptual, empirical and normative grounds. In what follows I will elaborate on how 
the dichotomy has been used; what the problems with its scholarly usage are; how it 
should be qualified further to make it analytically useful and, most importantly, why it 
is still crucial for the study of national minorities.  
 
2.1 The Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy: False Opposites? 
 
The differentiation’s origins can be traced back to the 1870s, as public 
controversy grew over the Alsace region of France. At the time, Germany disregarded 
the will of the Alsatian majority, which wanted to become citizens of France, by not 
accepting their wish on the basis of ‘language, blood and soil’ (Zimmer 2003:175). 
The French scholar Renan (1882) argued against this claim, maintaining ‘that the 
nation was essentially a voluntary community whose continued existence depended 
on a recurrent civic plebiscite’ (cited in Zimmer 2003:175). This provoked a reply from 
                                                
13 As I will later explain in detail the state’s conception of nationhood is not a static notion 
neither does it stem from one particular understanding of what nation is. It is relational and 
changeable; and the relationship of the state with national minorities as Harris (2007: 46)  
suggested ‘are fluid and depend on many variables: the policies of the residence state, the 
political, historical and socio-economic position of the minority, the political environment in the 
‘external’ homeland and international position of both’. However, no matter what the driving 
source for its occurrence, in its final formula, the relationship between the state and the 
national minority is always formed through either civic inclusive or ethnic exclusionist policies. 
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the German historian Friedrich Meinecke, who introduced the distinction between the 
cultural nation (Kulturnation) and the political nation (Staatsnation) (Alter 1994:8). In 
the classic version of the argument, the ethnic conception of the nation purports that 
national identity is inherited rather than a matter of choice. The nation is a fact of 
nature. The German romantic Johann Gottfried Herder argued that nationality is ‘”as 
much a plant of nature as a family, only with more branches”’ (Zimmer 2003:175).  A 
German cannot not be German. A Turk cannot be German, whatever his grasp of the 
German tongue. Nationhood is less a matter of political voluntarism and more of 
organic determinism. Human will is subordinate to naturalistic criteria. Whatever one’s 
migratory movements, the individual remains ‘ineluctably, organically, a member of 
the community of birth, [being] for ever stamped by it’ (Smith 1998: 180). 
Orthodoxy has it that the civic nation meanwhile derives its ‘legitimacy from its 
members’ voluntary subscription to a set of political principles and institutions’ 
(Zimmer 2003:175). Ignatieff, meanwhile, conceived of the civic nation as ‘a 
community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared 
set of political practices and values’ (Yack 1996:195).  Ernest Renan (1882 [1995]) 
famously described the nation as ‘un plebiscit de tous les jours’ (a daily plebiscite), 
suggesting voluntary association is the cornerstone of national identity. According to 
this view, ‘man is the slave neither of his race, nor his language, nor his religion’, 
leaving ‘man, with his desires and his needs’ to determine his national belonging 
(Renan 1882 [1995]: 154).  Those scholars who support the use of this model see 
civic nationalism as built upon the foundations laid down by the French Revolution; 
this nationalism comes after, or coincides with the development of a politically and 
territorially defined unit and has inclusive and voluntarist characteristics. However, 
whilst there is much evidence to distinguish nationalisms based on these categories, 
it is difficult to find one nation that exclusively embodies these prerequisites.  The 
reason is conceptual and empirical.  
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2.1.1 The Conceptual Critique 
 
First of all much significance is attached to common origin by some ethnicities; 
however, it is clear that the term suggests a much wider social identity.  The concept 
of ethnie, according to Smith, for example, cannot be limited to its primordial-
ascriptive characteristics like genealogy, blood and colour of skin. For him ‘ethnic 
community is a type of cultural collectivity… recognized by one or more cultural 
differences like religion, language, customs and institutions’ (Smith 1991: 20).  
Brubaker (2004) similarly attempts to incorporate culture into the definition of ethnic 
nationalism, yet finds this endeavour problematic. If one stresses a common culture, 
a common language, for example, surely we are crossing the line into the territory of 
civic nationalism. The reason for this is that each civic nation, no matter how much it 
claims to be acultural or free from descent, is to some extent carrying cultural 
components and is therefore ethnic at the same time.  
The term ‘civic’ has not been given any enduring meaning in the context of 
nations and nationalisms either. Scholars explaining this type of nationalism often 
highlight the important role of choice in the deciding of one’s nationality. Renan, as 
mentioned earlier, used the metaphor of a ‘daily plebiscite.’  He defined civic nation 
as the ‘voluntary association of culturally unmarked individuals’ (cited in Brubaker 
2004:137). However, in the same work Renan also placed significance upon 
‘possession in common of a rich legacy of memories’, suggesting that the choice is 
only open to those who were not ‘given’ this nation at birth and the one that does 
choose it will not possess this ‘rich legacy of memories’ (Brubaker 2004:138).  Yet 
once one removes any idea of history, purporting a civic nationalism based upon a 
politically defined territory, it is difficult to attach the term ‘nationalism’ to whatever 
loyalty this fact evokes. Once one expands this to include common institutions, 
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culture, and a national language, such characteristics attached to ethnic nationalism 
are being trespassed upon.   
In short the conceptual ambiguity inherent in the civic and ethnic distinction 
generates a problem to categorize nations along this dichotomy. Some claim that 
most modern nation states are civic because they allow the integration of those who 
are willing to adopt their political project. Some on the other hand may call them 
ethnic because their political element of nationhood is only communicated in the 
language of the dominant ethnicity and that the civic concept exhibits its own brand of 
ethnocentrism and superiority. So the irony is that in disputing a romantic (ethnic) 
explanation of nationalism, proponents of the civic model reflect a rose-tinted ideal-
type as lofty as anything from the German romantic tradition. As Yack (1996: 198) 
suggested ‘a purely political and principled basis’ for national solidarity is the stuff of 
fairy-tales. 
 
          2.1.2 The Empirical Critique  
 
Brubaker’s ‘case study’ of the ethnic-civic division in nationalisms is useful for 
moving beyond the theoretical grappling that is unavoidable when addressing this 
debate. For Brubaker (1992: 1-17), the French nation, ‘conceived in relation to the 
institutional and territorial frame of the state’ embodies ‘civic’ nationalism, whereas 
the German national sentiment which, unlike its French counterpart, emerged prior to 
the formation of its own nation-state, is a prime example of ‘ethnic’ nationalism. 
Brubaker attributes this to a cultural particularism engendered by German 
intellectuals in the nineteenth century in response to French universalism. Whereas 
French national feeling developed along with the emergence of the territorial state 
and its institutions, the German nation was conceived outside of the framework of the 
state, and eventually became opposed to its construction as it was (Brubaker 1992).  
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One suggests that a person’s nation is predetermined, the other, that it can be 
chosen.  The assimilationist and inclusive policies of France, and the exclusive, 
particularistic approach of Germany can be seen in the historical immigration policies 
implemented in each state. Whereas France has an expansive definition of 
citizenship and a relatively open immigration policy that has been fervently preserved 
despite the growing impingement of the European Union on national sovereignty, 
Germany’s borders remain relatively closed, importantly, to non-German speaking 
people (Brubaker 1992).  
However, whilst as a general principle this example of the civic-ethnic 
distinction is useful, it could be deemed over-simplistic. Empirical examples suggest 
that this dichotomy is unable to put Germany and France into respective categories of 
ethnic exclusion and civic inclusion. For example the apparent  ‘civic’ French nation 
warranted the expulsion of supposed political opponents in the wake of the 
Revolution, whilst ‘enemies of the Reich’ were forced out of Bismarckian Germany for 
their apparent political threat, despite their shared ‘ethnicity’ with the elites (Brubaker 
2004:142). John Breuilly also points out that major territorial and civic elements 
existed in mid-19th century Germany, while French nationalism often suppressed 
regional languages in favour of Parisian French (Smith 1998: 126).  
Having considered the indefinite place of culture in each type of nationalism, 
by which both ethnic and civic values were used to exclude the opponents, Brubaker 
suggests that, ‘it is often impossible or at best problematic to characterize an entire 
state or an entire national movement simply as civic or ethnic’ (Brubaker 2004: 135).  
It is clear that not even the terms, let alone the nations that they are supposed 
to describe, can be sufficiently pinpointed, and the line between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ 
cases remains blurred. 
2.2. From Understanding Nations to Analysing Nationalisms 
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I argue that use of the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms proved to be 
limited only because the above critiques (both empirical and conceptual) have used 
the terms of nation and nationalism interchangeably and in a freewheeling fashion. 
Instead of focusing on nationalism, they all employed it in their attempts to define 
nationhood and nationality or categorize nations and nation-states. Based on these 
careless empirical and conceptual critiques many scholars found the dichotomy 
problematic and discredited it as a whole. Kuzio’s (2000) work ‘The Myth of Civic 
state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn's framework for understanding nationalism’ and 
Yack’s (1996) ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation ’ are just two examples. It is misleading to 
analyse states and nations and then reach the conclusion that civic and ethnic 
nationalisms are false opposites. What follows will give three reasons to explain why 
this way of approaching the dichotomy obscures more than what it could have 
explained.  
First, the nature and the definition of nation changes depending on what the 
social actors and proponents of the nationalist movement understand it to be. It 
changes depending on which element of identity is idealized and energized by the 
given nationalist movement. Nations may possess the ethno-cultural (Smith 1986, 
Hutchinson 2001), genealogical, objective (Shils 1957), civic territorial (Kohn 1944, 
Muller 2007), subjective imagined (Anderson 1983) and political plebiscitary (Renan 
1882) elements at the same time. However, it is the ideology of nationalism that 
usually prioritizes one or more than one of these elements either to create (Gellner 
1983) and redefine the nation or to attain and maintain its autonomy (Smith 2001) at 
some point in history. Therefore it is not nation but only the ideologies of nationalism 
prioritizing either civic or ethnic sources that can be placed along the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy.  
Second, the idealization of one, or more than one, of these sources of 
nationhood cannot be used to describe the state’s relation to all groups in a generic 
sense. As the empirical evidence suggests, the same state can promote different 
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sources of nation in its relation to different groups. In relation to some groups, political 
elements of the nationhood and integration can be idealized by the state; and 
accordingly the method of assimilation is put into practice. In relation to some other 
groups, ethnic and organic sources of the nation are energized and those who do not 
fit can be excluded.  In Greece the Muslim Turks have been excluded from the nation 
on the basis of ethnic and religious differences, whereas the Macedonians have been 
forced to assimilate (Kalampakou, 2009). The Kurds in Turkey were forced to 
assimilate in a consistent way whereas the non-Muslim Greeks and the Armenians 
were excluded from the nation, deported and decimated. At this point Zimmer’s 
approach appears to be far more rooted in the reality of a constantly altering political 
and social landscape, which the national movements must respond to; in comparison, 
the views of other scholars on the subject seems far too benign and one-dimensional. 
He demonstrates that depending on domestic and international circumstances, 
nations rely on different resources to express their nationhood, often drawing from 
both the civic and ethnic arsenal. Apparently, it is not the nations but only the 
individual relationships of the state with particular groups that can be categorized 
through these ethnic and civic lenses of nationhood.   
Third, it is also etymologically confusing to use voluntary-organic signifiers of 
nationhood to make a distinction between ethnic-civic nationalisms. It is not 
nationalism, but nationality and citizenship that can be inherited in an organic way by 
birth or acquired by voluntarily choosing it.  Different nationalisms, as I explained, 
have more to do with the idealization of different–organic and/or voluntary–
characteristics of the nationality. It is a conscious choice to idealise something and 
follow it. Although the culture of birth is given, this by no means implies that the 
people of particular cultures will follow it as a political cause. Anti-Zionist Jews who 
challenge the legitimacy of Israel are not uncommon. The number of liberal and 
secular Jews is not small. Similarly half of the Corsicans identify more with the civic 
French nationality than their Corsican ethnicity (Sanchez 2008). Civic and ethnic 
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nationalisms are the outcomes of the nationalists’ conscious decision to idealize civic 
and ethnic elements of the nation. As such, neither can be understood as an organic 
phenomenon. Nationalism, like any other ‘ism’, is always chosen and so it does not 
make any sense to conceptualize the civic-ethnic nationalisms through the voluntary-
organic dichotomy.  
 
2.3 The Civic–Ethnic Dichotomy as an Independent Variable 
What is it then, if it is not the voluntary-organic terminology and the political-cultural 
distinction that can be used to point out the dichotomy of civic–ethnic nationalisms? 
I argue that the most relevant dimension of the dichotomy is about the 
inclusive–assimilationist and exclusionist–differentialist methods that the civic and 
ethnic nationalisms have used respectively.  
This is in agreement with Zimmer (2003: 181) who suggests that ‘what matters 
with regard to the construction of national identities is less what resources political 
actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical use’ (my emphasis 
added).  Each nation comes with its cultural baggage; as Yack (1996:196) notes, civic 
identities cannot escape the fact that they too are loaded with ‘cultural baggage’. 
However what matters more than culture is the way and direction in which it is used.  
In Keating’s words, ‘It is not the existence of language and culture policies, which 
determine whether a nationalism is ethnic or civic, but the uses made of language 
and culture, whether to build a civic nation or to practise ethnic exclusion’ (Keating 
1996:10).  
Brubaker (2004), however, highlights, whereas one basis of this differentiation 
is inclusivity versus exclusivity, whether a nation is built on civic or ethnic foundations, 
nationhood is, by definition, always exclusive to a degree.  It is exclusive in the sense 
that the nation provides its members with opportunities that are not available to the 
members of other nations (Tamir 1993). 
                                                                                                                
 40 
Civic nation is based on citizenship and on a global scale, citizenship is an immensely 
powerful instrument of social closure… citizenship is everywhere limited; even it is 
open, in principle, to persons regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those 
excluded from citizenship, and even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by 
being excluded from the territory of the state (Brubaker 2004:141).  
 
Moreover, it is claimed that, when the opportunities are limited there will always be 
exclusion and the civic nationalism that is founded on the idealization of civic values 
will be used to exclude those who do not share them.  Inclusion and assimilation in 
civic nationalism is a distant possibility to many immigrants. A contemporary example 
came from a recent study on civic nationalism and exclusion.  Halikiopoulou, Mock 
and Vasilopoulo (2013) suggested that the radical right parties in Europe, at times of 
economic crisis, used the rhetoric of civic nationalism to exclude immigrants. The anti-
immigrant propaganda of radical right parties has not been founded on the idea that 
immigrants are ethnically different. Instead they have been excluded from nationalist 
projects of the radical right parties on the grounds that Muslim immigrants, because of 
their religious culture, are unable to adopt the civic values of tolerance, equality and 
freedom. Surely this is not the first time that the inclusive characteristic of civic 
nationalism has been challenged.  Similarly in America  
 
the earliest leaders were opposed to immigration. George Washington fervently 
believed that immigration would have a deleterious effect on the country’s national 
character and should be discouraged because immigrants ‘retain the language, 
principles and habits (good or bad) which they bring with them.’ Similarly John Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson both opposed immigration from absolutist monarchies because 
they argued that such would bring their antidemocratic beliefs to the United States and 
undermine the country’s government (Motyl 2000:16)  
 
The argument, that civic nationalism is exclusive, is flawed because of two 
reasons. First, Halikiopolou, Mock and Vasilopoulo (2013) dwelling on this argument 
use an outdated conception of what civic nationalism is. Second, Brubaker uses the 
term ‘civic’ to examine if there is a civic state that is not exclusive; as such his focus is 
not on nationalism but on the state; based on his analysis on the state however, he 
makes a generalization about the nature of civic nationalism. He is, too, confused 
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about the unit of analysis in his inquiry. What follows is an elaboration of these two 
points.  
First, as explained earlier, the character of nationalism is ‘less about what 
resources political actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical 
use’ (Zimmer 2003: 181). Nationalisms of the above-mentioned radical right parties in 
Europe and conservative leaders in early America still fall in the category of ethnic 
nationalism no matter how they use the rhetoric of civic values. They still qualify as 
ethnic nationalists because their assumption is based on the belief that Islam is by its 
very nature incompatible with the civic values.  In radical right party manifestos, which 
suggest that Muslims are unable to integrate, lies exactly the same exclusionist 
principle as ethnic primordialism according to which the boundaries between ethno-
cultural identities are authentic and fixed. What makes them ethnic nationalists is not 
the civic values they use to describe their own nation but this primordialist and 
essentialist mentality that freezes Islam and Muslims into particular traits, practices 
and values. This conservative and exclusionary logic becomes even clearer in 
manifestations of the radical right party of Le Pen in France who stated ‘it is we, the 
real French, who have our own right to be different, our own right to preserve our own 
‘identity’ from unwanted admixture’ (Brubaker 2004: 122).  At the cost of repeating 
myself, I should emphasize that whether a nationalism is civic or ethnic is not about if 
the nationalists use ethnic or civic elements of nationhood; it is about whether they 
use them to differentiate or assimilate people. The mentality of ethnic nationalism 
prevails and thrives as long as the civic-cultural, political values or ethnic or religious 
identities are used in a way that differentiates between people as if the boundaries 
between them are natural and cannot change. If this is a ‘civic zeitgeist’, one can 
safely assert that it amounts to nothing else than a ‘socially constructed idea of race’ 
(Eriksen 1993:7). Despite adopting a constructivist civic notion of nationality within a 
changing environment, for all practical purposes radical right wing parties assume this 
primordial mentality of exclusion. This can also be observed in many examples; the 
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exchange of Muslim and Orthodox populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923; 
Stalin's deportation of ethnic Germans in the USSR in 1941; the partition of British 
India on the basis of religious demographics in 1947; and the split of Czechoslovakia 
in 1993 all reflect this mentality. 
Second, it is not useful to make the argument that civic nationalism based on 
citizenship is always exclusive because citizenship, in practice, is an ‘instrument of 
social closure’ (Brubaker 2004:141). Such a generalization cannot account for the 
reality of some national minorities. The reason for this is methodological.  The 
problem with Brubaker’s method is that his primary concern is to examine if there is 
any civic state that is not exclusive. His focus is still on the state and nation, not on 
nationalism. Although he is aware of the problem, Brubaker himself falls into the 
same trap as others who interchangeably used the terms of nation and nationalism in 
their analyses. As suggested earlier, it is not useful to employ the dichotomy when 
endeavouring to understand what the nations and the states are or what they are not. 
I argue that the dichotomy of civic-ethnic nationalism is useful only if it is used as an 
independent variable. This methodology as Wimmer (2008:981) argues ‘can lead us 
away from the somewhat romantic pre-occupation with the question what is the nation 
to the more analytical question of how to comparatively explain the varied 
manifestations and diverging consequences of nationalism’. From this perspective I 
argue that civic nationalism’s existence is a matter of whether or not it is utilized by 
the state or political actors. My aim is rather to focus on and understand how it 
impacts upon national minorities when it is used. Lacking this perspective, the 
simplistic conception of ‘exclusive citizenship in civic state’ cannot capture the 
problems of ethno-national minorities. The reason for this is that most minorities at 
stake are the groups who already survived the political or cultural citizenship barriers 
in their states of residence. National minorities are citizens of the ‘nation-state’ in 
which they reside yet they still remain differentiated and excluded at the margins of 
the majority or suffer from the integrationist policies of forced assimilation. The idea 
                                                                                                                
 43 
that nationhood is based on citizenship and therefore inclusive is more than a 
symbolic ‘consolation’ to national minorities. It has been the reality and was even an 
obligation for some minorities such as the Kurds in Turkey, Corsicans in France and 
Aboriginal People in Canada.     
 
2.4 National Minorities under Civic and Ethnic State Nationalisms 
 
For national minorities, what makes the dichotomy between civic and ethnic state 
nationalisms relevant is the difference between their respective policies of forced 
integrationist assimilation on one hand and social-political exclusion-differentiation on 
the other. Actually this is an accepted difference with respect to the ways in which the 
state approaches its national minorities.  However this time political theorists and 
post-modernist historians alike find the methodological difference between the civic 
policies of forced assimilation and ethnic policies of social exclusion-differentiation 
barely useful. 
From the normative perspective, the phrase 'nationalism' has developed 
negative connotations over recent years. This is particularly emphasized due to the 
frequent occasions of ethnic discrimination and violence related to ethnic nationalism 
that took place throughout the twentieth century. The Holocaust in Germany, the East 
Timor genocide and Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia are just a few 
examples. Kymlicka (1995), however, suggests that instead of denoting one type of 
nationalism as negative and the other positive, neither implies that the society will 
take on a liberal form. Furthermore, Kreuzer (2006) in his ‘Violent civic nationalism 
versus civil ethnic nationalism: Contrasting Indonesia and Malay(si)a’ demonstrates 
that the ethnocentric bias does not always apply as in this case the ethnic nationalism 
of Malaysia was peaceful, whilst Indonesia was brutally and violently consolidated on 
the basis of a civic nationalism (Kreuzer 2006:141-142).  Forced assimilation 
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deployed in France, as the prototype of a civic nation, was as violent and oppressive 
as the policies of discrimination and genocide in Germany. In French Algeria, which 
was once regarded as an indivisible part of France, the authorities suppressed 
Algerian independence movements with shocking brutality. It is fair to say that the 
French authorities would never have been able to get away with exerting the same 
brutality on ethnically French citizens (Kymlicka 1995: 233). For these reasons 
political theorists tend to think that it does not matter whether the source of injustice is 
forced assimilation or social exclusion as in both cases state nationalism is by no 
means tailored to generate equal citizenship or freedom. In both scenarios it is in 
contradiction with toleration, one of the foundational principles of liberalism that, for 
Kukathas (2008: 39), ‘neither forbids outsiders from entering nor forces them to join’. 
As such, political theories are not concerned with, or intended to account for varying 
implications of the forced assimilationist or the exclusionist versions of state 
nationalism.  
Post-modernist historians, too, ignore the distinction but from an empirical 
perspective. They argue that politicians selectively pick up on diverse historical 
symbols, and political values depending on what they need the most to legitimize their 
decisions, and mobilize the masses in the present. Within this dynamic process, one 
stream of nationalist movement or ideology in power replaces one another. None of 
them, it is asserted, stays in power long enough to shape and dominate the entirety of 
the state’s relation with one national minority on either a purely assimilationist or an 
exclusionist basis. Zimmer’s contention, for example, is that ‘particular definitions of 
national identity rise to prominence in particular historical situations where they serve 
to address specific political problems’ (Zimmer 2003:182). Similarly, Hutchinson (2001) 
points out that the emphasis on organic principles becomes ‘energised’ in times when 
the state seems vulnerable. Within this dynamic environment, minority members who 
were socially excluded from the nation in the past may get to be recognized as full 
members of the body politic and society later in time. ‘The centennial of the US 
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revolution in 1876 [for example] ignored blacks, new non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, 
Native Americans, and women as not being part of the nation. The nineteenth century 
US republic had no room for Native Indian, black, Spanish or French culture’ (Kuzio 
2000:16).14 American nationalism gradually proceeded in time to be an example of 
the most inclusive and assimilationist nationalisms in the world. Social exclusion, 
however, has never ceased to be a problem in the States. Although the USA has an 
inclusive definition of citizenship and a multicultural society, American nationalism 
remains to be defined in relation to other ethnic, national, cultural or ideological 
groups.  USA citizens, who are also members of ethnic, cultural or even political 
groups, against which American nationalism justifies itself, became automatically 
subjected to the hostility of the rest of the American community (Schildkraut 2002).  
For instance, after 9/11, the radical Islamic groups’ terrorist attacks on the USA, Arab 
Americans were marginalised within the country (Jamal and Naber 2008).  The 
State’s nationalist policies, which had targeted the Islamic radicalism abroad, 
consequently derogated the social status of its own domestic Muslim population in the 
country (Leonard 2002, Agathangelou 2005).  
As the example of American nationalism suggests, the subject of exclusion in 
a country is volatile and it is determined by the ever changing ‘us’ vs. ‘them,’, ‘self’ vs. 
‘other’ structure. The ‘other’ is usually perceived as having an association with a 
historical rival, enemy or an external threat. This threat can be genuine or fabricated. 
Some groups are excluded even in the absence of a danger posed to the majority of 
the community. Non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants and blacks in 19th century America for 
example were excluded when they posed no real threat to the security of the country. 
Reasons for exclusion can be internal contestations, competition for economic 
resources; and cultural incompatibilities that are all open to change. It is the politics 
                                                
14 For exclusive nature and ethnic elements of American nationalism, see also Eric Foner, The 
story of American Freedom (London: W.W. Norton, 1998), Rogers M. Smith , Civic Ideals. 
Conflicting visions of  Citizenship  in USA. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997)  
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that creates, maintains and promotes certain categories of minorities for various 
reasons.    
I agree with both normative and empirical critiques. From the empirical 
perspective we should elaborate on the fluidity of political structures and expediency 
of the political actors. It is the political structure that creates minorities, initially 
excludes and then tries to integrate or assimilate them later when the power-relations 
shift or conditions change. Neither is it of any use to make a normative judgment 
between the policies of civic inclusion and ethnic exclusion. As the evidence supports, 
they both can be illiberal especially when the former is forcibly imposed on national 
minorities and when the latter is associated with negative discrimination or 
extermination.  
I argue, however, that the dichotomy between social exclusion-differentiation 
and forced assimilation becomes much clearer, more consistent and, most 
importantly, useful when the focus is on its impact on national minorities that have 
been consistently affected by one of these two types of policies. Although nationalism 
is a dynamic phenomenon, I argue that some national minorities have been 
consistently exposed to the ethnically exclusionist, differentiating policies while some 
others to policies of assimilation.  Just because nationalism is a dynamic 
phenomenon, as the post modernists have proclaimed, does not necessarily mean 
that it has always changed and that there is no such thing as continuing nationalism. 
As the following account will show, it is quite possible to trace some continuing 
nationalisms in the relationship between national minorities and the state. 
As concerns the state nationalism and boundary making mechanisms that 
national minorities have experienced, we can identify three different categories. The 
first group is minorities who were forced to assimilate into the dominant ethnic core of 
the majority in the state. The Kurds in Turkey, the Corsicans and the Bretons in 
France, as well as the First nations in Canada and Native Americans are examples in 
this category.  The prohibition of the use of minority languages in education 
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(Aboriginal people of Canada until the 1980s), punishment of the use of such 
languages in public as well as in the private sphere (Kurds in Turkey until 2000s), 
resettlement of minorities from their historical homelands, state policies that are 
completely blind to ethnic differences (Corsicans in France until the 1990s), are 
examples of the policies that minorities have experienced under this category. Such 
minorities became relatively mobile after the forcible displacement of their populations. 
Today for example, almost 40% of the Kurds in Turkey live across the country rather 
than their historical homeland.  Having experienced state policies punishing the use 
of their languages in public, and banning ethnic associations, members of such 
minorities are usually found deprived of a sense of shared belonging or political 
orientation.  
Today’s Aboriginal people in Canada have always been divided as Inuit, Metis, 
and First Nations (that fracture further into Beothuk, Maliseet, Innu Abenaki and 
Micmac along the Atlantic Coast; Tlingit, Slavey, Tutchone and Tli Cho Athapaskan 
speaking people in the Northwest; Blackfoot, Kainai, Sarcee and Northern Peigan in 
the plains; the Cree and Chipewyan in the Northern Woodlands; the Anishinaabe, 
Algonquin, Iroquois and Wyandot around the Great Lakes; and the Haida Salish, 
Kwakiutl, Nuu-chah-nulth, Nisga’a and Gitxsan along the Pacific Coast) (Morrison and 
Wilson 1986).  In these cases, the state has refused to use ethnicity to draw a 
boundary between the majority and the minority. Their religious particularities, sub-
cultures and class divisions remained to be more relevant than what could otherwise 
have developed to become their unified ethnie. The Indians’ initial lack of unity had 
nothing to do with government policy.  The thesis argues the reason they could not 
eventually develop a shared sense of common ethnic identity can partially be 
explained by their never having had the opportunity to do so. Canada has not 
genuinely empowered the Indians to institutionalize their culture. The prohibition of 
Aboriginal languages in education until the early 1980s was a barrier to their cultural 
institutionalization. In the light of this information it would be wrong to argue that the 
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government policies have had no role in their lack of unity. (The same argument also 
applies to the Kurds in Turkey).  
In most cases, under this category, state nationalism has long denied and 
ignored minorities. It has been suggested by scholars such as Horowitz (1985) and 
Gurr (1993) that forced assimilation is a source of radicalization and this radicalization 
has typically translated into politics, if not violence. While we have nationalistic groups 
who turned radical after having been forced to assimilate, the same system also 
accommodates the people who voluntarily assimilate. In such cases most national 
minority members require the rectification of economic and social inequalities more 
than the political rights that their radical fellows think primarily derive from ethnicity.15  
It seems to be a hard case to recognize the national minority when it is deeply 
fragmented in cultural, economic and political respects. In such cases there are so 
many possibilities and options for the minority members to benefit from in the society. 
There are evidently some minority members who are primarily concerned with their 
material well-being and they are convinced that only assimilation into the majority can 
guarantee this. Some other minority members take pride in, or benefit from, their 
cultural distinctiveness and resist assimilation for various reasons.  In such cases it 
remains a question of whether the economic opportunities of voluntarily assimilating 
groups or cultural freedoms of ethno-nationalists who resisted the assimilation should 
rule over the other when the two are in conflict about the future of their community. 
What demands are legitimate and who should be listened to?  
The persistence of cultural, political and social boundaries between ethnic 
groups, on the other hand, is stronger and more solid in cases where and when the 
integrationist assimilation has not been an option for the members of national 
minorities. This second group comprises minorities who survived the barriers of 
                                                
15 Self-government rights of Aboriginal people in Canada, for example, is in the form of land 
rights and exemptions from seasonal limitations to commercial activities that are associated 
with their culture such as fishing and lumbering. Similarly the majority of Kurds in Turkey 
according to a research survey done in 2010 by Konda, think that their problem and 
concomitant demands are mostly economic.  See  Chapter 5 pp.178-183. 
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exclusionary citizenship regimes yet have been socially and politically excluded from 
the majority on a consistent basis. The reader should be reminded that assimilation 
does not always mean inclusion. Many ethnic exclusionists are also assimilationist 
even as they continue to exclude.  Uyghur Turks in China (Becquelin 2004), Muslim 
Turks in Greece (Alexandris 2003), non-Muslims in Turkey (Heper 2007), Indian 
Tamils of Sri Lanka (Edrisinha 2005), and Hungarians in Slovakia (Gyurcsik and 
Satterwhite 1996) are examples of this category. Although they experienced policies 
of assimilation in the sense that they were not allowed to use their own languages in 
most public spheres, they were never accepted as members of society in the fullest 
sense of the term.  Discrimination against these groups was historically evident in job 
applications, university admissions and class divisions. In such cases, differentiated 
and marginalized, the minority members are positioned against the majority along 
ethnic lines. Although internal divisions remain, members of such minorities have 
typically united also as a political group around this ethnic line. As the first category 
suggested this was not the case for minorities who had an option to assimilate, cross 
the ethno-cultural boundaries and fully integrate into the majority.   
The third group consists of national minorities who have been given the 
options to assimilate and integrate into the majority, or remain to live in their own 
vernacular through special arrangements such as language rights and federalism. 
Quebecers in Canada and Flemish in Belgium are examples of this category. 
Although assimilation was an option the minority has never been forced to assimilate 
like those in the first category were. Kymlicka suggests that the ‘British in Canada 
stripped the Quebecers of their French language rights and institutions, and redrew 
political boundaries so that the Quebecers did not form a majority in any province’ 
(Kymlicka and Opalski 2001:25).  This reductionist account of Canadian history, while 
true to some extent especially between 1840 and 1867, omits a very important fact 
that ‘although the Canadian Model continued to evolve well into the 1980s, many of 
its key features had been in place since the mid-nineteenth century’ (Choudhry 
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2007:619).16 French culture was never thought to be a part of English Canadian 
culture, whereas the Kurdish culture was believed to have originated in ancient Turkic 
history. On the contrary, historical rivalry and enmity between French and English 
since the Battle of Hastings in 1066, has echoed throughout history and the boundary 
between the two communities has persisted in Canada.  The French-speaking people 
have never been exposed to the policies of assimilation in the way that Aboriginal 
people were forced to assimilate to English culture in Canada (Battiste and 
Henderson 2000).  The 1876 Indian Act that banned the use of Aboriginal languages 
in education has never applied to the Francophone.17 They have always had the right, 
albeit limited, to use their language in a whole range of activities including education 
and administration. The idea of being the same was not evident in Canada, there was 
always the split English and French. For these, the historical relationship between 
Francophone and British in Canada can be defined as ‘domination’ and not the 
‘forced assimilation’ as we have seen in the first category.  
 
2.5 What Does It Have to Do With Political Theory? 
 
The dichotomy between civic-inclusion and ethnic-exclusion is an important analytical 
tool to understand why and how this variation exists between national minorities. 
Understanding of this variation as a reality becomes even more important, insofar as 
the concern is about what to do with national minorities whose characteristics vary 
from each other depending on policies that they have experienced. In the first group 
                                                
16 The details of the historical relationship between Francophones and the state in Canada can 
be found in the sixth chapter of this study. Similarly the information regarding the other 
examples in this part of the study can be found in later chapters. This only is to familiarize the 
reader with typologies of national minorities along the lines of the civic assimilationist and 
ethnic differentialist state nationalisms that they experienced. 
17 For a detailed account of assimilationist policies imposed on Aboriginal people of Canada, 
see Woods (2012), The Anglican Church of Canada and the Indian Residential Schools: A 
meaning Centered Analysis of the Long Road to Apology. Doctoral thesis submitted to the 
Department of Government of the London School of Economics.  
                                                                                                                
 51 
there are national minorities like the Francophone in Canada and the Flemish in 
Belgium that have been accommodated by federalism and language rights for a long 
time. They have institutional facilities to maintain a modern education, economic 
networks, and job opportunities in their own language. In the second group there are 
national minorities like Muslim Turks in Greece, Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, and 
Hungarians in Slovakia. Compared to Quebec and Flanders, economic networks of 
the national minorities in this second group are relatively backward because of 
institutional barriers and discriminatory policies. Nevertheless this second group of 
minorities, similarly to ones in the first group, have a shared sense of discrimination 
against their ethnic-religious group members and now asking to be granted autonomy 
and allowed to use their own language in all spheres of public life with no further 
hindrance or question.  
In the third group, differently from the first and the second groups, there are 
national minorities who were forced to assimilate and integrate. Their radical factions 
have similar demands as those minorities that have been differentiated and 
discriminated against in the first and second group. The majority of such minorities in 
the third group however, choose to opt into the language of the majority in the state 
where everyone is accepted to be undifferentiated citizens. Corsicans in France and 
Kurds in Turkey are such minorities whose members are divided as to whether to 
vote for ethnic nationalist factions within their ethno-cultural community or integrate in 
the mainstream where opportunities are far too many to turn back. 
 It is hardly possible to approach all these different national minorities in a 
standard way. In contemporary political theory liberal multiculturalism, however, has 
come to inform the liberal paradigm. It has focused on the possibility of solving the 
problems of all national minorities through ethno-national autonomy mechanisms like 
federalism and the devolution of power, as we have respectively seen in Canada and 
the UK. Based on these examples it is suggested that minorities should be given self-
government rights and territorial autonomy within the state, provided that they 
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comprise the majority in their historical homelands and they are not on the road of 
assimilation (Kymlicka 1995).  Kymlicka suggests that indigenous people and  
‘national minorities have typically responded to majority-nation building by seeking 
greater autonomy which they use to engage in their own competing nation-building, 
so as to protect and diffuse their societal culture throughout their traditional territory’ 
(Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 23) This line of argument was also suggested by 
Brubaker (2006) who thinks that the policies of forced assimilation ‘rarely work, they 
are indeed more likely to strengthen than to erode differences, by provoking a 
reactive mobilization against such assimilatory pressures’ (Brubaker 2004: 119).  
Furthermore, citing Smith (1993: 131) and Connor (1972: 350-51) Kymlicka suggests 
that ‘whenever and however a national identity is forged, once established, it 
becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible, (short of total genocide) to eradicate’ 
(Kymlicka  2004: 26). 
This line of argument is, however, at odds with the conditions of national 
minorities who were subjected to the state’s assimilationist policies and integrationist 
ideal of the civic state nationalism for a long time. The multiculturalism theorists are 
unable to respond to the heterogeneity of minorities such as Kurds and Corsicans. 
Neither can they ‘explain how millions of Kurdish speaking citizens [in Turkey] 
voluntarily adopt Turkish identity and avoid any identification with Kurdish nationalism’ 
(Tezcur 2009: 4).  
I argue that Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is unable to explain these 
cases for two reasons.  Both of these reasons, I argue, stem from the fact that 
Kymlicka and likeminded scholars neglect the categorization of national minorities 
under the dichotomy of civic assimilationist and ethnic exclusionist state nationalisms.  
 First of all, in his interpretation of Smith (1991), Kymlicka (2004) mistakenly 
treats national identity independently from its agents whose beliefs decisions and 
interests are actually open to change with indefinite possibilities. Furthermore, the 
national minority is not one person who can make individual decisions for her\himself. 
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It is a collection of people whose interests may lie in different causes. Moreover, as 
Hutchinson (1987) suggested, cultural ‘national identity’ does not necessarily 
translate into the kind of nationalism that Gellner (1983:1) defines is ‘primarily a 
political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent’. For these reasons this picture of national minority-state relation is too 
simplistic to capture the complexity of a national minority group some members of 
which may choose to resist, while some others voluntarily assimilate. This is evident 
in many examples, such as Corsicans in France (Sanchez 2008), the Kurds in Turkey 
(Tezcur 2009), and the Scottish in the UK (Keating 2001). Kymlicka’s theory of 
multiculturalism presumes that ethno-cultural distinctiveness is all that matters in 
defining and catalysing the political nationalist aspirations of minorities. He does not 
attempt to focus on various circumstances under which ethnic cultures are translated 
into the politics of ethno-nationalism and supported by masses in a consistent manner 
(Reitz 2009:2). I argue that there is nothing inherently deterministic in the culture 
informing its members to make certain political decisions. What people make of their 
culture varies depending on options as to what they can do with it, and those options 
have been dominantly limited to the decisions of the modern state, which is still the 
ultimate arbiter in world politics. It is, therefore, important to examine the nuanced 
state policies and options that the state makes available to national minorities before 
making overarching presumptions about the reactions of national minorities to the 
state’s nation building project. 
Second, this account of Kymlicka and other like-minded scholars such as 
Young (1990) and Connor (1972) is also problematic in the sense that they define 
assimilation as the equivalent of cultural annihilation. Young (1990: 179) states that 
the ‘norm of the homogenous public is oppressive… [as] it requires that persons 
transform their sense of identity in order to assimilate. Self-annihilation is an 
unreasonable and unjust requirement of citizenship.’  Their interpretation is based on 
an assumption that for people to become American they have to stop being Spanish, 
                                                                                                                
 54 
Italian or Arabic. The difference between additive assimilation and absorptive 
assimilation is absent from their analysis. (Zolberg 1997, Baubock 1998: 43, Barry 
2001: 81).  The first category refers to the assimilation into a culture while preserving 
one’s own culture of birth. The latter implies the kind of assimilation that requires one 
to give up on his or her culture of birth in order to acquire a new one. While the first 
category is especially relevant to linguistic minorities who can develop bilingual 
identities, the latter is more about the mutually exclusive groups of religious minorities 
who cannot be both Muslim and Christian, or Protestant and Catholic at the same 
time. When the assimilation is additive, as is usually the case with linguistic minorities, 
it is hard for multiculturalism approach to locate individuals at one side of the line 
between resistance and assimilation. In such cases people may resist to preserve 
their native culture yet voluntarily assimilate into another at the same time. So 
portraying the reaction of most national minorities to assimilation as resistance does 
not represent the reality in such cases where boundaries are permeable and 
assimilation is additive.  Some members of the minority choose to embrace 
assimilation like Bretons in France; some resist against assimilation in any form and 
generate concomitant conflict as illustrated by radical Chechens in Russia; and some 
others develop hyphenated national identities like British Scots, Latino Americans or 
Catalans in Spain.18 At this point the dichotomy of civic and ethnic state nationalisms 
becomes important in terms of the options that they make available to national 
minorities. When assimilation was not an option, when it was not aimed at integration, 
or when differentiation between ethnic groups has strongly persisted and facilitated 
discrimination in social life, national minorities did not have many options other than 
choosing to opt into their own ethno-national communities. The policies of 
segregation, discrimination, and differentiation along ethnic lines seem to be the most 
relevant sources of motivation for people to develop a shared sense of belonging and 
                                                18 For example,  ‘In an opinion survey taken in Catalonia in 1982, 26% of the population 
considered itself Catalan; 40% felt dual Catalan-Spanish identity; and 30% felt primarily 
Spanish’ (Miller 1995:117). 
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claim ethno-national autonomy. Wimmer, drawing on Weber, stated that ‘ethnic group 
formation is a process of social closure [and that] high degrees of closure imply that 
the boundary cannot be easily crossed’ (Wimmer 2008:977). This view is relevant to 
explain why differentiation and segregation increase support for ethno-nationalism. I 
will elaborate on this later in Chapter VI. Before that, I will point out the difficulty with 
multiculturalism in cases where it is hard to find a monolithic group of national 
minority whose majority support the political autonomy solution as seen in Canada or 
Belgium (Keating 2001). In such cases of heterogeneity, there is a problem in 
representing a deeply politically divided minority.  As such, multiculturalism theory 
that is primarily concerned with minority demands lacks the capacity to answer the 
following questions.  What should the state do if members of such minorities are not 
in agreement about what political form that this recognition of their culture should take? 
What happens to the demands of ethno-nationalist factions of those minorities in 
countries where the integration is the norm for the majority within the minority? 
Should the nation state be reformulated and the national minority recognized in a way 
to create a solution like Québec where French is the compulsory medium of 
instruction for children of Francophone families? Should the solution resemble more 
the case of Catalan where education is bilingual? Should it be like Scotland where the 
compulsory language of education in school is English and Gaelic is only an optional 
course? The next chapter will offer a theoretical discussion which deals with these 
problems.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The significance of this chapter for the thesis is that it defines the varieties of national 
minorities that emerge depending on the state policies they have experienced in the 
past. As the thesis argues, the applicability of the theories of multiculturalism and 
egalitarianism is contextual, this chapter fulfilled the task of defining what these 
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varying contexts are.  It is the convention in the literature that civic and ethnic 
nationalisms are false opposites for the two have so much in common, they both are 
illiberal, political and cultural at the same time. At the same time however, it is also 
true that all sub-state groups have become minorities through the lenses of either 
ethnic or civic state nationalisms. Some were assimilated and some were 
differentiated or discriminated against.  This chapter argued that all the criticisms 
directed towards the dichotomy are concerned with the definition of what nation is or 
what states can be categorized through this dichotomy. Departing from this 
methodology this chapter used nationalism as an independent variable and analysed 
its impacts on national minorities.  In this chapter the further qualification of the terms 
‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’, and their association with nationalism has been made with the help 
of earlier critiques. I concluded that the dichotomy is useful only if the three conditions 
are satisfied:  1) only when it is used as an independent variable not to understand 
whether a nationalism is political, cultural, voluntary or liberal; 2) only when the ethnic 
nationalism is associated with discriminatory exclusion and policies of differentiation, 
whilst the civic is associated with integrationist ideal and the practices of forced 
assimilation; and 3) when it is used to understand its impacts on national minorities 
and not to label the state itself, which practices different policies in relation to 
individual minorities.  In the rest of the thesis when I use the terms civic or ethnic 
state nationalism it will only refer to the phenomenon that is founded on these three 
conditions outlined above. Neither will imply a normative presupposition. Although it is 
not possible to create a normative hierarchy between civic and ethnic nationalisms, 
they have analytical power to explain why some liberal approaches are very 
problematic in some cases but not in others. The thesis argues that Kymlicka’s 
approach is problematic only among the ‘open’ subtype of the civic nationalist side of 
the dichotomy.  Before the thesis explains this relationship thoroughly, I will first 
explain what particular approaches are in place to solve these varying problems of 
national minorities.  
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Chapter 3: A Context‐Sensitive Approach to Egalitarianism and 
Multiculturalism 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background of the liberal 
approaches of multiculturalism and egalitarianism that inform solutions for national 
minorities in real world cases. The previous chapter has contextualized the problem 
and explained the varieties with respect to its occurrence in different cases. The 
variety of conditions and problems raise the question of whether it is possible to have 
one solution that fits in all cases. The chapter will first familiarize the reader with what 
the theories of multiculturalism and egalitarianism have to offer for the solving 
national minority problems; I then situate my argument about the applicability of these 
two approaches in different contexts. The context-sensitive argument will examine 
which approach is more likely to correspond to the conditions of different types of 
national minorities.  To this end, I will first explain the view of multiculturalism and its 
critique of classical liberalism, which is more associated with the egalitarian 
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perspective. Later on, I will explain the egalitarian perspective and its critique of 
multiculturalism. In what follows, I will argue that the inability of these two approaches 
to promote the principles of equality peace and freedom in some cases mainly stems 
from the absence of ideal contexts.  In the last part of this chapter I will show that the 
absence of these ideal contexts is strongly associated with historical assimilation of 
minorities that had to live under a civic state nationalism. Therefore I will suggest that 
it is not rational to expect that either would offer mechanisms that would be able to 
democratically settle the problems of national minorities who have been marginalized 
by the policies of forced assimilation in civic state building.  
 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
 
 3.1.1 Political Liberalism and Civic Nationalism  
 
The solution of minority problems has been seen in attempts to enhance the 
inclusiveness of polities that have so far excluded minorities from the body politic and 
public life on the basis of their race, religion, gender, language or cultural practices.  
In order to raise the inclusive nature of the body politics, civic nationalism has 
been idealized.  Hans Kohn (1944) who defined this as the nationalism in which 
‘political reality was based on individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism and the 
government was considered to be dependent upon trust from freely consenting 
citizens’ (Kuzio 2000:2-3). From the same perspective Michael Ignatieff (1993) and 
William Pfaff (1993) saw liberalism compatible with only this type of civic nationalism. 
From the same perspective political theorists like Muller (2007) and Habermas (1998), 
who called themselves constitutional patriots, defended that the criteria upon which 
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political legitimacy is based should be different from ethno-cultural affiliations, 
ascriptive characteristics and descent. This means that the state should acknowledge 
and respect all individuals as citizens, no matter what their ethnic identity is, so long 
as they commit to the civic values of the shared political community. Similarly, in his 
Political Liberalism, Rawls (1993) argued that those civic values, upon which the 
construction of the body politic is to be based in a liberal state, should stem from and 
evolve around the concepts of overlapping consensus and public reason on common 
goods that will be considered in the decision-making process.   
 
3.1.2 Multicultural critique of Political Liberalism and Civic nationalism  
 
The Multiculturalist approach questions if there is such a common good or whether it 
is possible to reach such an overlapping consensus through the public reason as 
Rawls assumed.  Starting from this point the multicultural critique of political liberalism, 
and of so-called civic nationalism, revolves around four main points. 
First, Kozma (2006) drawing on Raz and Margalit’s (1990) argument, indicates 
that liberalism is arrogant as ‘it presumes the perpetual inclusion of minority nationals 
in an on-going civic project that is not their own. By couching their theories in the 
language of social contract theory, political liberals act as if there is a universal 
agreement to build an ideal state, and so the inclusion of minority nations in this 
project is unproblematic’ (Kozma 2006: 2). 
Second, in deeply diverse societies, where the conflicting interests of the 
groups in the public discourse leave no room for finding a common good, Kohn’s civic 
nationalism, Habermas’ constitutional patriotism and Rawls’ political liberalism can 
only be an elusive ideal which is hardly possible to realize. Claims of national 
minorities over the body politic and their unending demand for autonomy are clear 
indicators of the impracticality of an overlapping consensus in civic nationalism. In the 
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application of political liberalism to the real world this consensus was taken for 
granted, national minorities were never asked if they had really wanted to be part of 
this consensus. This is why they have been problematic from the outset of civic 
projects and will remain so, unless their desired will is taken into consideration. 
Third, scholars like Gutmann (1992) and Young (1990) have also pointed out 
the elusiveness of this ideal by referring to the on-going correlation between descent 
and the socio-economically undermined status of minorities in putatively civic nation 
states. Moral membership in the community and legal citizenship are two different 
concepts that need to be carefully elaborated. Tunisians who became citizens of 
France but not French (Bassino and Dormois 2006), Pakistani and Bangladeshi who 
became British by citizenship but not English, mostly remain in the lowest income 
groups in these countries (London Poverty Report 2009). For the proponents of liberal 
culturalism, the role of culture in making use of the available options is important.  
The unfair start of minority pupils at schools has a great impact on their motivation 
and successes for their future life. Moral membership of a different culture may 
prevent group members from making use of the available options that seem to be 
more compatible with the culture of dominant groups.  
Fourth, Brubaker (2004), Kymlicka (1989), Young (1995), Taylor (1992) and 
some others argued that Kohn’s (1944) idealization of civic Western nationalism as 
opposed to the exclusive Eastern ethnic nationalism does not make any sense since 
civic nationalism, just like the ethnic one, employed the ‘cultural heritage of dominant 
ethnic core’ (Smith 1986).  As a consequence, it has not been free of unegalitarian 
outcomes for cultural ethnies who were not in the dominant position. These scholars 
emphasized that ‘Kohn’s division of nationalism into two groups idealises nationalism 
in the West as a community that was always fully inclusive of all social and ethnic 
groups’ (Kuzio 2000:7). When the issue was about the use of language in recreating 
a common national identity, even the nations who claimed to be civic and inclusive 
could not avoid choosing the official language that was to be used by its subjects in 
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relation to the state. France used French to create a common national identity and the 
consciousness among Corsican and Breton peoples, whose mother language were 
thereby oppressed (Jacob and Gordon 1985).  It was also the case in Turkey. After 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the administrative power was concentrated in the 
hands of an elite group who identified the new Turkish nationality on the basis of its 
citizenship and commitment to the liberal political values of the new state. Turkish 
was declared as the only official language of the country and all citizens, no matter if 
they came from different linguistic backgrounds like Kurdish or Arabic, have since 
been required to use Turkish in public discourse (Kushner 1977, Canefe 2002). Even 
American nationalism, known to be the most inclusive and civic, forced non-English 
speaking Hispanic people to learn English. Reactionary Puerto Rican nationalism 
(Guerra 1998) is proof of how the imposition of a dominant culture on national 
minorities was evident even in the most ideal example of civic nationalism as 
described by Ignatieff (1993), Kohn (1944) and Pfaff (1993). That said, assimilation 
has been the most problematic aspect of the civic nationalism and political liberalism, 
which requires every single person to learn and use the official language as the 
common tool of communication in the public sphere.  
 In the presence of distinct cultural traditions defining the different groups in 
one territory, as is the case in the real world, the nation building, according to Smith, 
has become a process that ‘welded together different peoples into a single 
community based on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic core’ (Smith 
1991:68). Therefore most civic forms of nationalism indeed employed the culture of 
the dominant ethnic core to unite people around a common sense of belonging. 
Maybe not the ideal goal of creating the shared sense of belonging, but the tool–i.e. 
the culture of the dominant ethnic core employed to this end–was excluding for 
minorities whose cultural practices diverge. 
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3.1.3 Multiculturalism as Liberal Culturalism   
 
In response to the internal inconsistencies and inegalitarian outcomes of allegedly 
inclusive civic trajectories that I discussed above, Kymlicka and some other scholars 
such as Iris Young (1990, 1995), Charles Taylor (1992), and Bikhu Parekh (2000) 
have claimed that cultural groups should be treated differently and given special 
rights to remedy their disadvantaged position in the communities in which they live. 
Young argued that ‘‘inclusion and participation … in full citizenship remains the goal 
but ‘differentiated citizenship’ now presents itself as a better route to that goal than 
equal treatment for all groups…Equality, defined as the (equal) participation and 
inclusion of all groups in institutions and positions is sometimes better served by 
differential treatment’ (Young 1995:176,195). Parekh explained the rationale behind 
multiculturalism. He argued that providing people with undifferentiated rights and 
duties cannot achieve equality of opportunity in any real sense. For him ‘opportunity 
should be understood as subject-dependent and a facility, a resource, or a course of 
action is just a mute and passive possibility and not an opportunity for an individual if 
she lacks the capacity, the cultural disposition, or the necessary knowledge and 
resources to take advantage of it’ (Parekh 2000:241). From this perspective it does 
not mean anything to have the opportunity if their cultural practices prevent them from 
making use of these opportunities.  In civic polities, people of a particular identity are 
not systematically prevented from being entitled to the same opportunities with 
everyone else. The context in which these opportunities are offered, however, 
indirectly causes discrimination between people who are fully capable of participating 
in this context on the one hand and those who have cultural preservations that put 
them off on the other.  For example, Sikhs who have the equal right to apply for 
construction work indeed are not equally treated if the construction job requires them 
to wear a helmet instead of the turban, the use of which is a part of their cultural 
practice. Similarly females who are required by their belief to wear the hijab are not 
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equal and free in France where the education system requires girls to remove their 
hijab. Again, in putatively civic nations, no matter how the same opportunities are 
offered, linguistic minorities cannot take advantage of these opportunities without 
leaving their own language behind, at least while participating in the public sphere, 
where everyone is required to use the official language of the state.  
   
On the face of this argument the liberal culturalists’ position seems to be informed by 
the positive and negative freedom distinction that Isaiah Berlin made in his work Two 
Concepts of Liberty (1958).  In his distinction, negative freedom refers to the absence 
of coercion while positive freedom implies an active effort to enable the individuals’ 
capability of using the freedom (MacCallum 1967). From the view of scholars who 
adopt the latter as a more inclusive definition of liberty, those who lack the capacity to 
take advantage of opportunities are not free even in the absence of any coercion. 
Adopting this view Parekh, and like-minded colleagues like Young and Kymlicka, 
defend their multiculturalism by which the ‘understanding of freedom is repositioned 
from negative to positive, that is, from protecting against coercion to providing the 
context of autonomy’ (Silian 2002:36).  
  There is this common rationale in the minds of scholars who label themselves 
multiculturalists.  Nevertheless multiculturalism, understood as liberal culturalism, is 
not a unified perspective and the proponents of it differ from each other on some very 
important points.  The most important aspect of all is which groups should be entitled 
to what types of differentiated rights. ‘Who is going to get what rights?’ is an important 
question that liberal culturalists answer differently.  
According to this view, an extensive variety of state measures can be devised 
to facilitate the values and distinct ways of life of such groups. For example, the 
‘group’s members might be exempted from certain laws, or the group’s leadership 
might be awarded some degree of autonomous jurisdiction over the group’s members’ 
(Shachar 2000:65). Modood (2007), for instance, argues that multiculturalism should 
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be concerned with any group of people with a ‘stigmatized or marginalized’ identity.  
On the other hand Kymlicka’s multiculturalism has a monistic notion of group or 
culture, meaning that the cultural context that is capable of generating self-respect 
and dignity would be found only in the societal culture ‘which provides its members 
with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and 
private spheres’ (Kymlicka 1995:76).  The societal culture mainly refers to institutional 
completeness and the common economy, and on these grounds resembles Smith’s 
(2001) definition of nation.19 Kymlicka valued ethno-national identities with reference 
to their capacity to provide their members with life opportunities; and he justifies his 
over-emphasis on societal culture by arguing that it is the most comprehensive 
context that can offer opportunities for people and ultimately all other non-societal 
cultures themselves are already and inevitably reliant on the existence of a wider 
societal culture (Watson 2009).   
 
3.1.4 Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism and Its Flaws   
 
At this point, Kymlicka differs not only from cosmopolitan scholars like Jeremy 
Waldron (1992) who positioned against ethnic boundaries, but also from his liberal 
culturalist colleagues, like Modood and Young, who saw not only national minorities, 
but also other marginalized cultural identity groups, as the ones that should be 
entitled to differentiated rights.  One more important critique of Kymlicka came from 
Joseph Carens (2000), who critiqued his argument with the following statement:  
                                                19   Smith revised his perspective and dropped the common economy from his definition of 
nation. Nevertheless, Kymlicka still seems to be standing very close to the ethno-symbolists’ 
perspective while bringing the definition of nation much closer to that of ethnie.  For him 
nations are reflection of ethnies more than they are of anything else; the modernist project of 
constructing civic nations on political values beyond ethnicity is a fallacy; yet ethnically defined 
communities can be civic as long as they do not close their doors to strangers. I will later 
explore this view with reference to the concept of ‘liberal ethnicity’ that was defined by 
Kaufmann (2000). 
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Instead of claiming (as is plausible) that the language and national culture of 
the place where one lives will normally play an important role in shaping the 
sorts of choices one faces, Kymlicka presents societal culture as if it were the 
sole and comprehensive determinant of one’s context of choice. Societal 
culture is what makes freedom possible (Carens 2000: 69).  
 
Having focused on national minorities, Kymlicka turned out to be defending 
particularly the rights of ethno cultural groups within his broader argument for 
multiculturalism.  
Within the framework of this perspective, Kymlicka defined two different 
categories of minority rights that he thinks would be more convenient for two different 
types of minorities. These are self-government rights for national minorities and poly-
ethnic rights for immigrant minorities.  
 Kymlicka argues that an immigrant minority group needs the state’s 
differential policies to help its members integrate into the societal culture of the host 
country. He indicates that immigrants ‘have accepted the assumption that their life 
chances and even more the life chances of their children will be bound up with 
participation in mainstream institutions operating in the majority language’ (Kymlicka 
2001: 30). He, however, argues that this integration process still continues to be a 
source of unequal outcomes for the minority members unless the state does not 
employ some accommodation policies that comprise poly-ethnic rights. (Kymlicka 
1995:38).  Minority religious holidays, new work-shift scheduling, can be counted 
among these poly-ethnic rights of immigrant minorities. Citizenship rights for 
immigrant minorities who clearly contributed to the history and development of those 
countries is another type of the poly-ethnic rights that, Kymlicka argues, can increase 
the immigrant’s sense of belonging to the country in the process of integration.  
On the other hand he claims that national minorities, who inhabited a given 
territory and have already been accustomed to use their own languages before their 
subordination to the state, should now be entitled to self-government rights, just like 
the majority who have had the right to decide which language is to be officially used in 
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relation to the state. For him, these self-government rights like regional autonomy or 
the right to use their own languages in public life can increase the cultural freedom of 
those minorities whose will was previously ignored and oppressed in the nation 
building process of the dominant ethnic core (Smith 1986). Along with this argument, 
according to Kymlicka, equality can be achieved only if these national minorities who, 
insist on living in their own societal culture, are given equal chances to voice their 
demands through acquiring self-government rights. 
According to Kymlicka, self-government rights are not feasible and cannot 
increase the equality for immigrant minorities because these immigrants lack a 
concentrated population and a socio-economic network, which are deemed to be 
important elements of the societal culture that in every aspect can accommodate its 
own members. In the absence of this societal culture, any right to get education and 
government services in their own languages would be likely to prevent immigrants 
from learning the language of the dominant socio-economic network which seems to 
be the only option for them to adopt within the borders of the states in which they now 
reside.  
  Kymlicka also accepts that, as with immigrants, ‘the extent to which national 
minorities have been able to maintain a separate societal culture also varies 
considerably’ (Kymlicka 1995:79). Having considered post-communist Eastern 
European countries, Kymlicka shifted his argument to the extent where he expressed 
that having the right to enjoy one’s culture instead of having self-government rights 
can be more realistic for national minorities ‘in countries which are essentially 
ethnically homogenous–e.g. where the dominant group forms 90-95% of the 
population–and where the remaining ethnic groups are small, dispersed, and already 
on the road to assimilation…’ (Kymlicka 2004 [b]: 13). He accepts that ‘none of the 
minorities in these countries are in fact capable of exercising regional autonomy, or of 
sustaining a high degree of institutional completeness (e.g. of sustaining their own 
universities), and most already show high levels of linguistic assimilation’ (Kymlicka 
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2004 [b]: 13). The case of the Roma people in Hungary provides empirical evidence 
for the argument that self-government rights would not increase the equality between 
the majority and the minority, if the national minority was not concentrated and lacking 
an institutionally mature societal culture.  
 The on-going inequality between the national Roma minority and non-Roma 
citizens who form the majority in Hungary is a clear indication of the fact that self-
government rights are not the right prescription for those minorities who could not 
develop a single institutionalized economic unit. Segregated minority education did 
not become successful as there was no qualified human resource to maintain a good 
quality education in the Romani language, although the number of minority students 
in segregated elementary schooling increased, disadvantaged minority pupils’ 
educational quality profile remarkably decreased and correspondingly the 
unemployment rates among Roma people increased (Koulish 2005). The majority’s 
prejudices against the Roma people who were known for their unqualified profiles 
remained unchanged and recognition of their differences in public discourse did not 
raise the mutual respect between non-Roma and Roma citizens in Hungary as Raz 
(2001) and Tamir (1993) claimed.  
Although Kymlicka accepted that not all national minorities could generate 
societal culture as discussed before, he sees no reason not to give self-government 
rights to national minorities who are sizeable and territorially concentrated like the 
Flemish in Belgium, the Catalan in Spain and the Quebecers in Canada (Kymlicka 
2004[b]: 9). He argues that such national minorities have the capacity to offer all 
types of socio cultural institutions in which their own members would have the ability 
to make ‘good choices amongst good lives’ (Kymlicka 2001: 21). 
However his perspective is insufficient because, ‘whether a cultural group can 
be thought of as a societal culture, which Kymlicka calls a nation, whose practices 
and institutions cover a full range of human activities, is certainly a matter of degree, 
rather than the either/or distinction Kymlicka makes it’ (Young 1997:51). 
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 Kymlicka also emphasizes that national minorities who enter into conflict to 
gain autonomy should be given self-government rights, too, simply because those 
minorities cannot be satisfied with poly-ethnic rights like the people’s right to practice 
their own culture within their community. 
This view is also flawed in terms of his assumptions. Kymlicka interprets the 
subject of assimilation as an undivided group and therefore overlooks how different 
group members, contrary to what separatists claim, might have different interests and 
may well be willing to integrate with the dominant community while enjoying their 
culture in the private sphere. Kukathas (1992) states that ‘cultural groups are not 
undifferentiated wholes but associations of individuals with interests that differ to 
varying extents’ (Kukathas 1992:114). For instance in the referendum of 2003, the 
majority of Corsicans with a narrow margin voted against the proposal of the radical 
Nationalist Liberal Front group that demanded education in the mother language. The 
majority of the people in Corsica did not want education in Corsu to be made 
obligatory, as it would be against their children’s interests that, they considered, could 
be better pursued by being educated in French (Sanchez 2008). 
 Moreover, seeing ethnic conflict as a war that is driven by the minority’s 
desire to rectify injustices is not always true, as sometimes the injustices are just used 
as a justification for the violent movements of those whose primary goal is indeed to 
maintain the survival of their organization (Scott 1992:9, 23), and the distinctiveness 
of their ethnic identity at any cost (Byman 1998). In support of this view, Abrahms  
(2008) argues that radical aggressive groups ‘routinely engage in actions to 
perpetuate and justify their existence, even when these undermine their official 
political agendas’ (Abrahms  2008: 102).  
All cultural relativists’ arguments, other than those of Kymlicka, emphasized 
that the idea of multiculturalism based on the availability of a societal culture is flawed, 
as there are other elements of identities through which people choose to identify 
themselves. If the culture sets the limits of what is imaginable, it might be the culture 
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of homosexuality, or it might be the culture of a religious belief, too.  The culture is not 
as monistic as Kymlicka assumes in his studies.   
Secondly, the idea of taking the societal culture as a dichotomous variable that 
either exists or does not, is flawed because it is a continuum. At some specific point 
on this continuum one can possibly find the traces of habitual unity, the shared 
vernacular, high population and concentrated settlement, but not the 
institutionalization, common expectations from the polity, similar experiences and 
shared memories which are also important to the definition of societal culture that 
Kymlicka calls Nation.  I suggest that most of the egalitarian critiques of 
multiculturalism, as I will later explain, are valid, when the given minority is on the 
lower side of the societal culture continuum. Before elaborating on this claim, I will 
explain why Kymlicka still insists on the significance of a national or a societal culture 
in spite of those critiques coming from his culturalist colleagues.  At this point, the 
arguments of the liberal nationalists, according to whom the national bond is crucial to 
the functioning of liberalism, become relevant.  
 
3.1.5 Multiculturalism as Liberal Nationalism 
 
According to the proponents of this view (Miller 1995, Tamir 1993) nationalism 
provides us with three important elements that are crucial to the maintenance of 
liberalism. These three inter-dependent components of liberalism that would be 
promoted by following the liberal nationalism are deliberative democracy, individual 
freedom and the social justice.  
 
As concerns social justice  
Most Liberals like Smith, John Stuart Mill (1861 [1991]), Jurgen Habermas 
(1990) and Cohen and Rogers (1995) referred to the significant role of solidarity 
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amongst people in the process of making democracy smoothly operate and of 
ensuring that social justice remains.  From this perspective, if the sense of solidarity 
disappears, democracy cannot function properly and social justice is then diminished. 
This problem is convincingly explained by Stilz (2009), who draws on Rousseau’s 
view on the role of solidarity within the liberal state. 
Rousseau claims that in order to legislate generally and impartially on one another’s 
behalf, the citizens of a democratic state must share a special bond of identity, one that 
motivates them to show concern for the freedom and welfare of their compatriots. In 
Rousseau’s view, in order to legislate impersonal laws—laws that will truly protect each 
citizen’s freedom equally—each citizen must be capable of taking up the viewpoint of 
the general interest or common good, a perspective that requires solidarity with her 
fellow citizens (Stilz 2009:23). 
 
 
In the view of Liberal nationalists, this solidarity can only be possible when people 
share the same national identity, which cannot be simply discussed like other 
normative issues.  
 
Concerning Deliberative Democracy  
‘Deliberative democrats claim that parties to political conflict ought to 
deliberate with one another and through reasonable agreement try to come to an 
agreement on policy satisfactory to all ’ (Young 2001: 671). In order for parties to be 
able to reasonably argue and to come such an agreement in deliberative 
democracies there are three preconditions. These are as follows; 
• In order to be able to deliberate, counterparts need a common 
language. Mill (1861 [1991]: 428)  
• Reasonable argument (Rawls 1993, Brock 2002) can be possible only 
when parties to deliberation share the same understanding of the 
terms. 
• Agreement requires reciprocal trust (Brennan 1998). 
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According to liberal nationalists, all these three requirements of deliberative 
democracy can be found in a national community as it provides its members with a 
common language, common past and shared memories of what is good or bad.  In 
respect to the third point, national community defines itself in relation to others who 
are excluded on the basis of this definition (Tamir 1993), and therefore generates 
trust between nationals who are assured that their own interests, no matter how 
internally conflicting, would be protected and prioritized against those of other nations.  
  
  
 Concerning Individual Freedom  
 From the liberal nationalists’ perspective, nationalism is an ideology that serves 
individual freedom because nationalism is a form of ideological commitment to the 
preservation of a national culture which would provide its members not only with a 
shared vocabulary for evaluating and understanding their life options, but also with 
opportunities to make choices amongst them (Kymlicka 1995: 83, David Miller 1995: 
86, Raz 1994: 83). Cultural nationalism promotes the context where rules, duties and 
rights are compatible with the beliefs and the cultural practices of its subjects so that 
nationals can become free to make good life choices without having to face any 
cultural barrier (Patten 1999). In this sense, the subject-dependent view of opportunity 
and positive freedom also seem to be informing the rationale behind liberal 
nationalism.20 
 With reference to these three important points, Kymlicka explains how the 
national culture is important to the conservation of a liberal polity.  If the national 
culture is really that important then this brings us back to the questions that Kymlicka 
tackled in the first place: how are we going to protect the national culture and how will 
we elevate national unity and make it politically relevant to the deliberation process as 
                                                20 See p.62 
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to make liberal democratic government a reality? 
 For Kymlicka, undoubtedly the answer is self-government rights.  However with 
this approach Kymlicka differs from Miller who supports the state’s nation-building 
projects that would ease the pursuit of liberalism and who (Miller 1995: 153-154) 
‘pretends that the dialogue nationalism can be made non-exclusive’ (Silian 2002: 28).  
For Kymlicka, liberalism should not justify the nation-building project of the state that 
indeed consists of more than one nation, but acting as if there were only one within its 
boundaries. Kymlicka (1995) drawing on Connor’s argument emphasized that liberal 
nationalism cannot survive under a polity where the majority nationalism is either 
implicitly-unintentionally or explicitly-deliberately inclined to destroy the minority 
nationalism within the borders of the state (Connor 1972). Peace, equality and 
freedom can be achieved only within the framework of liberal nationalism not within 
the elusive ideal framework of civic nationalism that seems to be serving the human 
rights but indeed proves to be working in favor of the majority nationalism. 21 
Kymlicka’s position on liberal nationalism can be located against that of Appiah 
(2005), and Levy (2000) who thought that ‘Nationalism and policies of minority 
cultural preservation gain the most plausibility when the alternative to some particular 
national or cultural community is imagined to be either undifferentiated humanity or 
alienated individualism. In fact, however, the alternative is often some other 
community to which persons also have some attachment’ (Levy 2000: 71). At this 
                                                 21 In resembling the liberal culturalists to an extent the communitarian scholars including Van 
Dyke (1977), McDonald (1991) argued that the liberalization of this persistent context that has 
been so far associated with the concept of nation state could not be achieved by simply 
respecting  the  universal human rights regime that was designed to protect the individual 
liberties. From this perspective, only the additional collective minority rights could enable 
groups to survive the gradual assimilation implied by the state that could not avoid 
representing the culture of the dominant ethnic core in the public sphere. Kymlicka (1995) 
shows that human rights cannot protect the survival of minority culture as they cannot solve 
the problems stemming from the absence of such governmental rights to which national 
minorities should be entitled in the liberal state. For instance the centralized homogenizing 
official-language policies and decisions on internal migration and settlement issues being 
made by the state that respects human rights like freedom of residence and travel would 
nevertheless gradually lead to the evaporation of minority cultures, Kymlicka argued. When 
national minorities are not allowed to decide who can immigrate to their historical territories 
they would at the end usually face the danger of being outnumbered in their own territorial 
communities. 
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point the national culture that Kymlicka has in his mind seems to be deriving from 
ethnic identity, which cannot be left in the name of assimilating to another community 
that provides an alternative healthy cultural context.  
 
3.1.6 Multiculturalism as Liberal Ethnocentrism? 
 
As explained above, the nationalism that can be of help in easing the pursuit of 
liberalism, according to Kymlicka, is the nationalism of people who share the ethno-
cultural identity not of the state that tries to create one national identity around the 
dominant ethnic core. Self-government rights in this project were seen as the tool that 
is to be used not only in protecting minority nationalism and its societal culture but 
also in attributing political autonomy to this societal culture that provides the only 
context where freedom and equality can be achieved. 
Yet, what he understands from nationalism in supporting the minority 
nationalism as compatible with liberalism in this framework requires clarification. I 
suggest that his understanding of nationalism cannot be perceived as entirely civic or 
ethnic nationalism since in his studies he refers to nationalism as an ideology that 
seems to be combining both civic and ethnic elements of the national community.   
As concerns the ethnic elements, he argues that ethno-cultural identities 
should be recognized in the public sphere. ‘Liberal nationalism is non-aggressive and 
does not seek to dismantle the self-governing institutions of other national groups 
within the same state…  People are free to urge the adoption of a different national 
language, or even to seek the secession of a region to form a separate state’ 
(Kymlicka 2001: 40-41). So, in his defence of the state formation by a nation that is 
defined on the basis of ethnicity, he differs from his liberal colleagues who argue that  
‘cultural membership cannot be the basis for determining membership in the polity. 
Our political responsibilities to each other must be based on a concept of justice as 
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fairness that transcends all cultures, as opposed to one that is mediated by culture’ 
(Harty 1999: 676). 
Concerning the civic elements of nationhood, Kymlicka argues ‘Liberal 
nationalisms as a rule have a more open definition of the national community. 
Membership in the national group is not restricted to those of a particular race 
ethnicity or religion’ (Kymlicka 2001: 40). At this point, he should accept that any 
willing person would indeed be able to develop a feeling of membership to a civic 
national community and that therefore identity does not necessarily and always has to 
be dominated by an ethno-cultural descent that nevertheless remains relevant. It is 
possible for people to live equally and freely in a community, even when the body 
politic in this community does not use their mother language in the public sphere 
(Kymlicka 2001: 245). Tamir, as another proponent of liberal nationalism, makes a 
more constructivist assumption by stating that ‘membership in a nation is elective, 
since individuals can leave the nation of their birth and create new national affiliations, 
and this turns the adherence to culture and the assumption of national obligations into 
the voluntary acts rather than inevitable consequences of fate’ (Tamir 1993: 87).  
 Kymlicka, however, does not go that far. Neither does he approve of the idea 
that national identity can always be chosen or left as Tamir argued.  On the contrary, 
he states ‘We can't just transplant people from one culture to another, even if we 
provide the opportunity to learn the other language and culture. Someone's 
upbringing is not something that can just be erased; it is, and will remain, a 
constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural membership affects our very sense of 
personal identity and capacity’ (Kymlicka 1989: 175). 
In this ethno-culturalist approach to identity he seems to be departing from his 
own ‘constructivist interpretation of ethnic behavior’ (Kaufmann 2000: 1096) and the 
civic conception of a national community that also recognizes strangers as capable of 
learning and living the language and culture of any community that allows them to do 
so. Nevertheless his detachment from the constructivist-instrumentalist model does 
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not make him one of the primordialists (Connor 1972, Shils 1957) who are inclined to 
think that nations are communities of fate, and identity is just a matter of descent not 
a choice.22  He rather seems to be accepting ‘the uniquely human capacity for 
additive learn and use more than one language, and for transforming many aspects of 
the self’ (Zolberg 1997: 151). Yet, Kymlicka’s strong inclination to prize the ethno-
cultural approach to identity in his demand for self-government rights to national 
minorities seems to be deriving from his observation that most of the time most of the 
national minority members are just unwilling to relegate their ethnic particularity to a 
private discourse (Kymlicka 1995: 90, Levy 2000). It raises the question: if not all the 
time, not all national minorities prioritize their ethnic identity in defining the polity 
under which they want to live then, when and which national minorities do not develop 
such a particularistic pan-ethnic orientation? This is the question I will later endeavour 
to answer with reference to the implications of ethnic exclusionist-civic assimilationist 
policies to which minorities have been previously exposed, but before that I will touch 
upon the egalitarian group whose critiques of multiculturalism will be reference points 
for explaining the inapplicability of multiculturalism under certain circumstances. 
3.1.7 Egalitarianism and ‘Civic Nationality’ 
 
We saw that Kymlicka’s constructivist view of ethnic behavior that stresses the 
concept of ‘willingness to engage’ (Ulf Hannerz 1990: 239) gets him back closer to 
the vantage point of civic nationalism. However, he keeps attributing utmost 
significance to the use of an ethno cultural identity in drawing political boundaries 
which indeed is against the very civic nationalism that attempts to make the ethnic 
boundaries indistinct within the state (Hollinger 1995). Kymlicka’s attempt to combine 
the liberal values of civic nationalism and ethnic communitarianism can best be 
                                                22 For a detailed discussion on primordial approach see David Ray Griffin and Huston Smith, 
Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1989). 
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explained by the term ‘liberal ethnicity’ 23  (Kaufmann 2000), which varies from 
traditional ethnicity on some important points.  Kaufmann explains, ‘barriers to entry 
to the [liberal] ethnic community would be minimal…Ethnicity is not a source of 
exclusive membership but only a beacon or resource of identity and the liberal 
ethnicity would treat all groups as equal’ (Kaufmann 2000: 1086-1119).  
 Egalitarian scholars like Barry (2001), Benhabib (2002), Okin (1999) and 
constitutional patriots like Muller (2007) and Habermas (1995) suggest that it is 
inevitably problematic to bring together the liberal universalism and politicization of 
ethnicity since no matter how open it is to strangers, an ethnically defined polity would 
be necessarily excluding for members of another ethnic group and would be 
restrictive to even its own members when the survival of group identity is threatened.  
Moreover, in the case of granting autonomy to ethnic groups that need 
protectionist measures for their own survival, liberalism cannot be achieved, as the 
need to protect the survival of ethnic identity inevitably leads to the violation of the 
fundamental freedoms of individuals who should also have the right to exit from it. 
Any concern to protect and promote ethnic values may freeze the culture of group in 
a way that the future chances of its members to make different choices become 
limited.  As Kukathas drawing on Brian Barry’s view explained ‘Given that many forms 
of association such as group membership, are unchosen, the critical issue is whether 
or not individuals can exit from an association’ (Kukathas 2002: 186). 
Aside from this, according to the civic egalitarian perspective, nation-building 
on the basis of ethno-cultural membership, as recommended by Kymlicka’s liberal 
nationalism, disregards and underestimates the extent to which minority groups are 
                                                
23  Alternatively Thomas König used the concept ‘quasi-primordial’ to define Kymlicka’s 
conceptualization of the nation. By this term König means ‘a nominally constructivist notion of 
nationality, which for all practical and theoretical purposes assumes primordial properties’ 
(König 2001: 51).  
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fragmented in their own vernacular.24 In such a realm ‘for those national minorities 
that are linguistically defined, the lingua franca argument would not lend itself to the 
multiculturalist policies Kymlicka style, but to the state nationalism of the XVIII century 
France’ (König 2001: 54).  
For instance the Tamil nationalism that has been mostly defined by language 
has never been successful in Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan Tamils are segregated 
by religion. ‘The Hindus constitute 85% of the Tamil community. A well-organized and 
well-funded Tamil Christian minority also exists. The Moors define themselves by the 
Muslim religion, not by language’ (Jayaratnam, February 17, 2010). The group of Sri 
Lankan Tamils that is captured by Kymlickas’s definition of national minority lacks a 
consensus and for this reason Tamil nationalism is not likely to guarantee a 
deliberative democracy. The idea that people can more easily compromise just 
because they are members of the same ethnic group overestimates the coherency of 
national culture.  
Furthermore, Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism foresees that the liberal 
democracy can exist only if distinct societal cultures are allowed to live the life in their 
own vernacular and only if they are represented as a separate entity, whose leaders 
would have the right to protect the interests of their group’s members. This type of 
democracy is not free of critiques.  Reynolds (2000: 169) emphasizes that by 
congealing distinct groups into place, the system strengthening the nationalisms of 
                                                
24 Indeed one of the most important critiques of group rights is about the individuals who would 
be systematically maltreated by the autonomy of their illiberal cultural community. Okin  (1999) 
argued that if the state accommodates such a politics of difference, in patriarchal groups 
where female identity is systematically undermined and discriminated against in violation of 
the equal citizenship law, female group members’ demands for equal treatment and protection 
by the state authority are denied and those female members who tacitly or expressly advocate 
an intra-group change may become vulnerable to the accusation of cultural treachery, and 
may accordingly be punished or shunned. Nevertheless I do not touch upon this issue here as 
Kymlicka makes it clear that ‘From a legal point of view, policies of multiculturalism operate 
within the larger framework of liberal constitutionalism, and as such any powers devolved to 
autonomous minority institutions are typically subject to the same common standards of 
respect for human rights and civil liberties as any other public institution’ (Kymlicka 2007: 93).  
This view is also criticized on the grounds that it is in contradiction with the liberal tolerance 
and neutrality, as this would mean privileging one kind of lifestyle (liberal) over other cultural 
identities. However this problem is intrinsic to the liberalism itself and therefore it should be 
studied under another study, which is concerned with the limits of liberal toleration.  
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two different groups, no matter how liberal they are, may in fact strengthen the conflict 
it is designed to settle. In Barry’s words: 
What we might find out by experience is that institutionalizing group representation 
offers opportunities and incentives for political entrepreneurs to whip up intragroup 
solidarity and intergroup hostility in the pursuit of power. And indeed this has 
happened all over the world virtually every time group representation has been 
introduced (The Northern Ireland ‘ power-sharing system is simply the latest 
illustration of this process of polarization) (Barry 2002: 211).25 
 
 Especially if parties to the deliberation in a democratic system have a history 
of conflict this isolation may exacerbate the prejudices of distinct cultural 
constituencies against each other. ‘Deliberation confined within segments succumbs 
to Sunstein’s (2002) ‘law of group polarization’ (Dryzek 2005: 223).  Such a 
polarization of groups may damage the social status of minority members who 
dispersedly reside within the majority community. In this respect, recognition of their 
cultural identity in a pejorative way might turn minority members into a target of the 
majority’s anger instead of providing them with dignity and self-respect. Aside from 
this, group polarization may also have negative implications for the social justice.  
In his argument that self-government rights, like having an education in one’s 
mother tongue, can be granted only to the national minorities who could develop 
societal cultures, probably Kymlicka was assuming that those societal cultures would 
be materially rich enough to provide their members with economic welfare in their 
own vernacular. If not, then he seems to be neglecting to explain how the group 
polarization in consociational democracies may harm the wellbeing of those minority 
members who are primarily concerned with their economic prosperity. In cases where 
the national minority suffers an economic disparity due to various reasons the state 
should consider increasing its budget to develop the regional economy.26 To be able 
                                                
25  This is not to say that the polarization started with the peace process, the group polarization 
in Northern Ireland long preceded the institutionalization of the group representation. However 
what was stressed in this sentence is that this multicultural solution to the problem has not 
decreased the polarization as assumed by Kymlicka but ‘whipped up’ it to a greater extent. 
26 For similar arguments see Aaron Wildavsky.1985.  ‘Federalism means inequality’ Society 
Volume 22 (2): 42-49; and Michael Keen and Christos Kotsogiannis. 2002. ‘Does Federalism 
Lead to Excessively High Taxes? The American Economic Review 92(1): 363-370 
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to do so in a democratic state, the consent of the majority is required. This majority 
consent, however, might not be obtained in a multicultural discourse where the sense 
of solidarity would be derogated by allowing subgroups to live in their autonomous 
regions (Stilz 2009: 23). 
 Another important standpoint of Barry’s egalitarianism in opposition to 
multiculturalism is related to the previous two critiques of multiculturalism on exit 
option and social justice. It is about whether principles of liberalism should be derived 
primarily from the good of autonomy or from the good of equality. ‘Barry rejects the 
neo-Kantian idea that liberal principles must be derived from the core value of 
autonomy. His core value is equality not autonomy, and equality is basic and not 
derived from some prior commitment to autonomy’ (Kelly 2002: 119).  
Those who see individuals as the only legitimate agent that have the right to 
exercise liberal rights approve of the collective action of individuals who should have 
the autonomy to live the way of life they choose. For them, however, there is only one 
principle that would justify limiting this autonomy. That is the harm principle (Mill 1991 
[1861) according to which the individual’s autonomy can be limited only when it 
infringes upon the autonomy of another individual.  
It [the Harm principle] frees individuals from having to bear the burdens of 
others but it does so only when they are coercively imposed. It is the coercive 
imposition and not the burdensomeness that matters to Mill…As long as an 
association is not able to restrain members or constrains members from 
leaving, then they are sufficiently self-determining (Kelly 2002: 123).    
 
Barry goes beyond the harm principle.  According to him the state may and 
should find it necessary when the autonomous parents’ cultural interests limit the 
capacity of their children to enjoy their liberty. It becomes apparent in education policy. 
According to Kelly (2002), parents’ decisions on educational issues do not imply any 
restriction on their children’s freedom to leave the community of their cultural 
language when they become mature enough to do so if they wish. Nevertheless, 
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Barry argues, parents’ freedom for and interest in sending their children to schools 
where the medium of instruction is in the mother language would violate the equal 
opportunity of those pupils to learn the language of dominant socio-economic network, 
which is in any case open to them on the basis of merit. This would be contrary to the 
main responsibility of the liberal state to provide students from different backgrounds 
with equality of opportunity to take advantage of the available options in higher 
education, which is the most important gateway to well-paid employment. 
Having considered this trade-off between equality and autonomy, Barry 
argues that liberalism should be derived from the core principle of equality not liberty 
since the liberty principle is not sufficient to provide every individual with equal 
opportunities, but the prior commitment to the good of equality provides equal 
protection of autonomy to all (Barry 2001). 
  
3.1.8 Shortcomings of Barry’s Egalitarianism  
 
However in his argument Barry misses an important point which is that unless all 
citizens across all cultural groups become equally able to benefit from public services, 
equal citizenship cannot be achieved (Conover and Crew 2004: 1037).  Until this is 
achieved, taking the needs of different groups into account to promote equal 
citizenship does not necessarily have to be incompatible with the civic construction of 
community and liberal egalitarianism. 
The remaining autonomy requirements of marginalized group members to use 
their own language in public education and their destructive initiatives have been 
given as a reference point by multiculturalists. This has been done to explain why 
Barry’s egalitarianism that prioritized the value of equality over individual autonomy is 
not feasible for a liberal egalitarian and peaceful solution of minority problems.  
For cultural relativists, public education in a minority language may increase 
the cost of exit option, but the most just way of dealing with this issue is not and 
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should not be to exclude those cultural identities from the public discourse. Outlawing 
the use of minority language at school would keep creating inequalities for those 
minority children who do not have a fair start. Those children who come from a 
linguistic minority community where their parents use the minority language at home 
need a bilingual education at the school to be able to learn the medium of instruction 
properly and in a timely way. Therefore, indifference to the cultural identity of children 
in education would result in inequalities that arise from the unfair start that those 
minority pupils face at the school (Corson 2001: 49). 
 Given that account, denial of the cultural difference in public discourse and 
entitling the state to make decisions on solely the basis of equality is proven to be one 
of the elements that radicalize the cultural group whose members’ right to autonomy 
is ignored. Moreover, radical groups exploit these inequalities to justify their existence 
and violent tactics (Shanhan 2009: 82-83).  In this way they do not only justify their 
position but also find support from their community members who continue to suffer 
these inequalities.  
3.1.9 Ideal Contexts Argument  
 
 Barry asserts that his arguments favouring the principle of equality can be viable 
only if the law commanding the principle of equality ‘can be justified as advancing 
some legitimate public objective’ (Barry 2009). The legitimate public objective that 
was used by Barry in justification for the same treatment as equal treatment is, 
however, not easily found in diverse societies where only the minority groups suffered 
from the nation-building projects that legitimized only the majority’s cultural identity 
and language in the public sphere. Having experienced the inegalitarian 
consequences of the state formation or nation-building project that uses the majority’s 
language as its medium, the minority groups’ perception of the public objective 
usually turns out to be quite different from how the majority perceives of it. While the 
majority sees the state as the guarantor of their rights, some minority members can 
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see it as the violator of their most fundamental freedom. This is to speak their own 
language in every phase of life including both in the public and the private sphere.  
For this reason, the egalitarianism favoring the civic conception of nationality that is 
primarily based on the principle of equality fails to settle down the persisting conflict, 
which is driven by minorities according to whom autonomy is superior to equality.   
Under these circumstances, the remaining questions of why individual 
freedom and equality cannot be protected and why national fusion seems to be 
unlikely even in these cases, where the politics is endeavouring to be more civic 
rather than further ethnicized, require us to accept the inadequacy of this particular 
view of strict egalitarianism. This fact implies that Barry’s egalitarianism on its own 
lost by default.  However this does not mean that the multiculturalism won by default 
as Kymlicka assumed. In the rest of the study I will suggest that the circumstances 
under which Kymlicka can be supported are available in cases that even his own 
explanation is not nuanced enough to point out. Like Barry, Kymlicka also explains 
the ideal context under which his theory can become fruitful. He makes it clear that 
self-government rights can only be proposed for national minorities who are sizeable, 
concentrated and not assimilated.  
The clarification of this ideal context and circumstances, however, does not go 
beyond making starry-eyed assumptions about the nature and availability of these 
circumstances in real cases. For example, according to Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, 
ethnic conflict cannot be resolved by any means other than through regional 
autonomy; (Kymlicka 2004[b]: 5, 13) but if the given group lacks a societal culture it 
should not be given self-government rights (Kymlicka 1995: 76). Then the problem 
arises: what to do when a radical sub group within the minority is in ethnic conflict but 
the minority as a whole is lacking a societal culture? In this paradoxical framework, it 
is not made clear by Kymlicka’s multicultural theory which paradigm should be 
preferred over the other. Should these kinds of minorities be given autonomy to 
subdue the ethnic conflict or should they not be allowed to have autonomy because 
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they are not self-sufficient? Kymlicka’s multiculturalism theory does not have anything 
to say on whether ethnic conflict can be solved justly by self-government rights when 
the given group is semi-assimilated and not capable of exercising self-government 
rights in a way that would promote the equality and freedom of its members.  
Moreover as Young pointed out ‘Whether a cultural group can be thought of as a 
societal culture, which Kymlicka calls a nation, whose practices and institutions cover 
a full range of human activities, is certainly a matter of degree, rather than the 
either/or distinction Kymlicka makes it’ (Young 1997: 51).  
 
 
 
3.2 A Context-Sensitive Approach: When Multiculturalism Does Not Fit 
  
On the face of it, I take the argument one step forward by asking that if the ones 
Kymlicka described are not always readily available in the world; then which national 
cultures can use self-government rights in a way that would promote individual 
freedom and social justice? Moreover, which national cultures can become 
recognized polities by following the path as defined by Kymlicka’s multiculturalism?  
For which national minorities is multiculturalism feasible? 
In this study I will suggest that multiculturalism cannot achieve the ideals of 
equality, peace and liberty in cases where the national ethnic group was exposed to 
the violent assimilating policies of the civic state. The applicability of multiculturalist 
approach in real politics will be measured by looking first at its capacity to produce the 
ideals mentioned above, and second its feasibility. The critiques summarized 
throughout the previous pages will be reference points while measuring the capacity 
of multiculturalist approach to accomplish its own ends in the context I stated above.  
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As regards the feasibility, Kymlicka himself tried to explore the role of factors 
that prevent multiculturalism from being adopted. He identified five preconditions for 
multiculturalist arguments to start shaping the political agenda. These were 
demographic change that indicate the increasing population of culturally distinct 
groups; increasing rights consciousness mainly driven by the domination of human 
rights regime; consensus on these human rights; free political mobilization; and de-
securitization of ethnic relations that is to mean no fear of a fifth column27. (Kymlicka 
2007: 122). Moreover, for him  
 
It would be unreasonable to expect liberal multiculturalist models to be 
adopted in contexts where states have a reasonable fear that it could lead to 
instability. It is important therefore to distinguish what is feasible in the short 
term from what is desirable in the long term…. [in such cases] we can imagine 
a theory of the progressive implementation of liberal multiculturalism with 
different minority rights provisions kicking in as the underlying conditions are 
established. While statues undergoing democratic transition or in unstable 
regions would not be expected to meet the highest standards of liberal 
multiculturalism, they would be expected to explain what they are doing to 
enable those standards to be progressively met over the long term (Kymlicka 
2001: 304-305).   
   
My perspective is going to be different from that of Kymlicka who takes the 
good of multiculturalism for granted and who mostly disregards how the 
multiculturalism itself, as an idea employed by political institutions and actors causes 
instability and perpetuates inequality under the context I specify.  I am not rejecting 
the significance of important external factors like security concerns that hinder the 
likelihood of multicultural politics to be realized. Differently, however, I will show that 
the gradual implementation of multicultural discourse itself proved to be destructive of 
a democratic political life in cases where national minorities were previously exposed 
to the forced assimilation policies of the putatively civic nationalism on a consistent 
basis.    
                                                
27  The Fifth column is an internal group that is ‘likely to work for a neighbouring enemy. This 
is particularly a concern where the minority is related to a neighbouring state by ethnicity or 
religion, so that the neighbouring state claims the right to intervene to protect ‘its’ minority’ 
(Kymlicka 2002:19). 
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3.2.1 Civic Nationalism, Forced Assimilation and Multiculturalism  
 
Why the critiques of multiculturalism that have been mentioned so far are 
more relevant, within this particular context, is the question that I will answer in the 
rest of this paper.  The main point I will elaborate on to attempt to answer this 
question follows the cultural relativists’ arguments that I summarized at the end of the 
part called ‘Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism and its flaws’.  Specifically I will focus on 
Young’s critique of the way Kymlicka defined the societal culture. Kymlicka sees it as 
a matter of dichotomy meaning that it either exists or not. It is actually a matter of 
degree, as Young assumed. I suggest that the degree of societal culture which, 
according to Kymlicka, implies a concentrated settlement, standard language, shared 
practices and expectations is lesser in the cases where the given group has been 
continuously exposed to the forced assimilation under putatively civic nationalism. 28 
In my suggestion I basically follow two similar ideas:  
 
 
•   [group] interests exist, or take their particular shape, only because of 
certain historical circumstances or because particular political institutions 
prevail and not because they are a part of some natural order (Kukathas 
1992: 111). 
   
 
• Rival visions [of a nation] have staying power since they reflect the 
diverse heritages of populations whose territorial location continues to 
expose them unpredictable impacts from several directions. The nation is 
not simply a space but a geographical milieu and subjected to recurring 
and multiple influences from peoples, north, south, east and west. It is 
also situated in time with a layered past, and its different pasts are 
brought into play to cope with shifting challenges. There can be no final 
definition of a national identity (Hutchinson 2005: 111). 
 
 
Drawing on these ideas, I suggest that in-group visions of national identity, 
group members’ interests and expectations of group members from the polity are 
more diverse within groups whose members have been simultaneously exposed to 
                                                28 The particular context defined by cases where the minority was exposed to the forced 
assimilation under civic state nationalism can be better understood by looking at the second 
chapter. 
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the forced assimilation and open door policy of putatively civic nationalism. I suggest 
that the coherency or harmony within such a minority is less likely to be found due to 
differing individual experiences, disparate economic gains and changing social status 
of its members.  
 
3.2.1.1 Role of forced assimilation in dismantling the minority’s societal culture 
 
Some of the forced assimilation policies employed in putatively civic 
nationalism are the prohibition of language in the public sphere including the 
exclusion of minority language from education, the punishment of distinct identity 
expression in the public, imprisoning the minority’s educated and intellectual class on 
the grounds of involving in the ethnic propaganda, and banning the ethnic symbols of 
the group. Another indicator of forced assimilation is the displacement of people to 
different regions to dismantle the shared sense of belonging to a particular community 
other than the state. Given this account we can see that most of the minorities who 
have been continuously exposed to forced assimilation under putatively civic 
nationalism are usually lacking a complex vernacular and economic network. They 
are usually found dispersed. American Indians (UCLA Report 2002), Kurds in Turkey 
(Konda 2006), Corsicans in France (Carillet and Roddis 2007) are three examples 
demonstrating this.29  
 The reinforcing and causal relationship between mobilization and assimilation 
was studied by Deutsch who found out that ‘rate of assimilation among a population 
that has been uprooted and mobilized is usually considerably higher than the rate of 
assimilation among the secluded populations of villages close to the soil.’(Deutsch 
1966: 152) This view, while being consistent with my argument, nevertheless omits 
one important criterion that makes sense of different levels of ethnocentric orientation 
                                                
29 Minority groups’ dispersed population does not mean that they do not dominate some 
regions; nevertheless their population being dispersed has strong implications for their societal 
culture staying very weak.  
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amongst those who have been assimilated.30 This criterion is about whether people 
were assimilated forcibly or voluntarily. I suggest that those who (or whose relatives) 
have been forced to assimilate and who have been victimized by these aggressive 
assimilationist policies are more likely to adopt an ethnocentric view and to mobilize 
around it (Gurr and Moore 1997). This also suggests that the reason why those who 
are successfully incorporated into the mainstream community yet started some of the 
most radical and secessionist movements has something to do with how they 
experienced the assimilation process. I will explain later how the existence of these 
radical groups will be important in making multiculturalism and egalitarianism 
inapplicable under putatively civic nationalism. 
Why minorities sometimes do not have unified characteristics is related to the 
assimilationist policies that prevent the group from developing a coherent vernacular. 
The utilitarian value of language also remains low in this context leading minority 
people to opt in to the language of the community that offers greater opportunities.  
 
                                                
30 By the state of being ‘assimilated’ I simply refer to those who do not know their mother 
language or who successfully incorporated into the mainstream community but this does not 
mean that they would not adopt an ethno-centric orientation. An example of this is that even 
the most radical Kurdish MPs do not know Kurdish.  Moreover assimilation according to 
Breton (1999: 91) consists of two steps ‘the first step consists in learning a second language; 
the second in dropping the original language. Dropping a language means that the language is 
unused, unlearnt, and eventually forgotten. In general, this is not likely to be experienced by 
individuals in the course of their lifetime as only a few are likely to forget a language in which 
they were once fluent. It is therefore best to think of the process of linguistic assimilation as 
taking place over two generations or more.’ Actually as discussed in the second chapter 
seeing assimilation, as a way of complete absorption is misleading because in most cases 
assimilation has an additive nature, people can objectively assimilate to another culture and 
still preserve their subjective ethnic particularities, on a cognitive level.  Most Scots who speak 
English for example are objectively assimilated and have lost their linguistic distinctiveness yet 
they are still preserving their Scottish identity from a subjective perspective. Scotland is one of 
the examples that Kymlicka often uses to support his argument that national minorities who 
are not on the road of assimilation should have self-government rights. Hence in Kymlicka’s 
study the criterion must be rather the willingness or unwillingness of the people to identify with 
their ethnic particularities when it comes to making a decision as to whether or not that group 
actually is ‘on the road of assimilation’. If Kymlicka attributes any meaning to an objective 
criterion of assimilation in the sense that it is one losing his language, then he should be 
careful not to use examples where most minority members have lost touch with their ethnic 
language as in the case of Scots. 
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3.2.1.2 Why civic state nationalism matters  
 
I suggest the integrationist ideal of civic nationalism, for which the assimilation 
policies were used in the first place, is a more important factor that leads to the 
persistence of remaining differences within the group. Civic nationalism offers people 
from different backgrounds an opportunity to identify themselves as an equal member 
of the community in which they can make choices like everyone else.  
Essentially, civic nationalism,31 accepts people with different backgrounds into 
its own vernacular in contrary to ethnic nationalism that rejects the incorporation of 
people with different ethno cultural backgrounds into the dominant core. No matter 
how much the minority members are willing to integrate into the mainstream 
community, this is not an option in an assimilationist state that adopted ethnicity as a 
criterion for membership. Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka32 are a group who obviously 
suffered from ethnic nationalism of the Sinhalese Majority, which did not recognize 
citizenship to up country Tamils in 1949 and discriminated against them in university 
admissions (Edrisinha 2005: 247). Similarly, Uyghur Turks in China cannot enjoy a 
healthy cultural context in Chinese mainstream community, which even discriminated 
against Uyghur Turks who became fluent in Mandarin (Becquelin 2004). Such groups 
have no option other than choosing to live in their own vernacular.  
                                                
31 Although given in the second chapter, I remind the reader why this particular type of 
nationalism is still civic although it uses forced assimilation and promotes an ethnic character 
in the public sphere. Having accepted that it is an illiberal form of civic nationalism I 
nevertheless suggest that it is not ethnic, because the distinction here I made between civic 
and ethnic nationalism mainly refers to the distinction between methods they used with the 
aim of creating a homogenized nation. My conception of civic state nationalism in this paper 
only refers to its assimilationist method that aims to make the minority indistinct from the 
ethnic core. Therefore its aim is to increase the homogeneity through the method of fusion. On 
the other hand ethnic nationalism will be conceived of by its method of exclusion and 
differentiation.  Both civic and ethnic nationalism serve the same goal and imply certain 
injustices; however, their impacts on the minorities’ societal culture and consequently the 
perceptions, experiences and expectations of minority members differ from each other to a 
great extent.   
32 There are two groups of Tamils in Sri Lanka.’ the first are the Sri Lankan Tamils, who either 
descended from the Tamils of the old Jaffna kingdom or who migrated to the East coast. The 
second are the Indian Tamils or Hill Country Tamils, who are descendants of bonded 
labourers sent from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka in the 19th Century to work in tea plantations’ de 
Silva,K. M.(1997: 171). This second group of Hill Country Indian Tamils has been consistently 
excluded from Sinhalese majority whereas the first group has mostly been forced to assimilate.  
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  On the contrary, people of the minority can choose to adopt the culture of a 
civic state and can equally make use of opportunities it would offer as Appiah (2005) 
and Levy (2000) assumed. As Patten, drawing on Waldron (1992), stated  ‘it does not 
matter if one’s own cultural structure is destroyed so long as one has access to some 
sufficiently rich and healthy alternative cultural materials’ (Patten 1999: 10). At this 
point ethnocentric multiculturalism as liberal ethnicity starts to be irrelevant for 
minorities under civic paradigm. As indicated before, Kymlicka’s point is still relevant 
for cases where the group refuses to adopt another culture.  
I suggest that so long as the doors are opened in civic projects there will 
always be some subgroups that want to enter into the mainstream community and 
adopt its culture. The fact that forced assimilation policy is used in a civic state 
building project does not mean that nobody might voluntarily participate in it. 33 
Voluntary participation into civic projects happens for various reasons. It 
happens because the subgroup may share some basic characteristics of the 
dominant culture, as it manifested in Northern Ireland where Protestant Irish people 
have spoken for union with Britain. It happens because the group may want to make 
use of advantages offered in the mainstream community, as was the case for some 
Puerto Ricans who chose to live in United States where the job opportunities were 
greater (Larsen 1973). 
Espiritu (1992) suggested that pan-ethnicity occurs only when a clear-cut 
competition between ethnic groups (like ethnicization of bureaucracy or uneven 
distribution of materials to the certain minority groups) does exist. When people of a 
certain ethnic group are discriminated against, they would be more likely to identify 
themselves with their ethnic descent (Zhou 1997).  In putatively civic communities, 
people are allowed to run offices equally, and given same educational opportunities. 
Those who voluntarily integrated into the mainstream community and could gain 
                                                33 I assume the concept of assimilation can be affixed with the label ‘forced’ only after having 
observed the resistance of those who are subjected to the assimilation. In other words the 
assimilation is forced only for those who resist. 
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important positions proved to be less likely to prioritize their descent in defining the 
polity under which they want to live.  
Moreover, the combination of equal opportunities and voluntary assimilation 
under civic nationalism might diminish the extent of ethnic mobilization34 in time 
(Gordon 1964, Alba and Nee 1997) and subgroups may develop a different vision of 
their broader community depending on their experiences, class position, religious 
belief, and similarity to dominant culture.  
 
3.2.2 In Relation to the Contextual Applicability 
 
3.2.2.1 Applicability on the Normative Basis  
In such cases where the societal culture is more fluid than Kymlicka assumed, I have 
to agree with Barry’s statement ‘[Kymlicka’s] multiculturalist policies are not simply a 
passive adaptation to an ineluctable fact of cultural diversity. Rather multiculturalism 
actually creates the reality which is then, in a circular process of self-reinforcement, 
appealed to as a justification for further extension of multiculturalist policies’ (Barry 
2001: 315). 
 In this process of self-reinforcement, developing the societal culture of minority 
groups and prizing their nationhood requires multiculturalism to stick to the 
essentialization of ethnic culture that itself, as mentioned before, would have some 
inegalitarian outcomes for some group members who do have different interests, 
values or perceptions (Kukathas 1992, Gorenburg 2000).  
In this context, civic nationalism provides an exit option to cultural groups. As 
suggested before, there is always someone who might want to use this option. It is 
                                                
34  Interviewed by Peonidis, Kymlicka (2008) argues that ‘Too many countries still cling to the 
hope that once societies democratize, modernize, and develop economically, then ethnic 
politics will disappear. So far as I can tell, there is no evidence for believing this and much 
evidence to the contrary’. However the concept of democratization in this sentence refers to 
consociational democracy where groups are granted autonomy on the basis of their ethnic 
identity. Civic nationalism with its integrationist ideals and assimilation policies definitely refers 
to a different conception of democracy under which ethnic mobilization can diminish. 
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usually the case that minority groups choose to teach their children the language of 
mainstream community if the utilitarian value of their own language has remained 
very low due to the assimilationist policies of the past. In such a realm, establishing 
an autonomous administrative region, where the leadership would stick up for the 
cultural essentialism, impedes the opportunities of members who might want to use 
this exit option. Allowing the regional administration to require the minority group to 
receive standard public education in its mother language might decrease their 
children’s chances of success in exams and in finding employment in the language of 
majority. This increases the cost of exit and this increasing cost restricts minority 
language pupils’ capacity to use this option. Indeed this is one of the most important 
reasons why multiculturalist policies tailored to these sizeable, concentrated 
minorities do not fit and of why the political movements defending multicultural 
argument cannot be successful under this context. 
Those minority members who would be put at a disadvantage by the 
essentialization of ethnic culture choose to opt into the majority language. In doing so, 
they complicate the multiculturalist aim of creating an autonomous region where 
boundaries are drawn along the lines of ethnicity.  The Corsican case in France 
supports this suggestion. In the 2003 referendum, the majority of Corsicans–with a 
narrow margin–voted against French legislation that attempted to accord autonomy to 
Corsica in 2002 (Sanchez 2008). The Corsican minority that is sizeable, concentrated 
and not assimilated has been one of the groups that clearly fit into the minority 
definition that Kymlicka purports. However, the results of the 200335 referendum 
where the majority of the Corsicans said no to autonomy must have disappointed 
Kymlicka who thought France would soon join the bandwagon of states that 
experienced ‘a shift from suppressing the sub-state nationalisms to accommodating 
them through regional autonomy and official language rights’ (Kymlicka 2007: 70). 
Kymlicka thought that it was the Constitutional Court of France that prevented the 
                                                
35 See the footnote 11. p.21 
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implementation of regional autonomy and self-government rights. However he never 
considered it likely that the Corsicans would choose to opt in to the present political 
system of the centralized French administration which legitimizes only the use of 
French as the language of instruction in public education. It was also the case in 
Turkey where the private institutions that were allowed to teach Kurdish closed due to 
lack of interest from Kurdish society.  
 As concerns the radicalizing impact of the forced assimilation on some 
minority members, those radicalized members might be leaders who are able to 
mobilize enough to get elected in certain regions and they might acquire the 
opportunity to represent their whole group. Yet they still might not have the same 
interests as the majority of group members, and accordingly this may impede benign 
minority members’ democratic right to shape the future of their cultural community. 
This was the case for Kurds in Turkey, where the pro-Kurdish DTP (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi) was disappointed by Southeastern Kurds 41% of whom instead 
supported the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in the 2007 general election 
(Schleifer 2009). It was also the case for Corsicans in France where in the 2010 
regional elections, the Corsica Libera that wanted independence and did not 
condemn terrorist FLNC (Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu: National Liberation 
Front of Corsica) could gain only 9.85% in turn out. Even PNC (U Partitu di a Nazione 
Corsa: Party of the Corsican Nation), which rejects terrorist activities and wants only 
limited autonomy, could gain only 25.88% in turn out (World Elections 2010). 
As concerns the implications of assimilation on development of the minority’s 
vernacular, different linguistic and religious factions in the same group usually cannot 
develop common understanding of belonging and standard terminology. The 
protection of one cultural minority may automatically perpetuate the inequality 
between subgroups of that minority. It especially disadvantages the sub-group that is 
of lesser capacity to mobilize (Barry 2001). 
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 As was shown, most of these inequalities stem from the immaturity of the 
minority’s societal culture.  Therefore, one may assume, as Kymlicka would probably 
think, the societal culture can be developed in time through the progressive 
implementation of multiculturalism. This idea, however, seems impractical under the 
context I specify. This impracticality is the result of the reaction of radical groups to 
weak multicultural policies.  
 
3.2.2.2 When Multiculturalism Rekindles the Radicalism 
As concerns the forced assimilation policies within some of these minorities, there are 
radical factions which keep expressing their nationalistic claims with violent means. 
These violent tactics of minority organizations themselves are forming a barrier to the 
realization of programs that would increase peace, equality and freedom. I suggest 
that multiculturalism seems to be feeding this process under the context specified by 
this study.    
 In the cases where putatively civic nationalism is observed, forcible assimilation 
policies are often put into practice to create a common identity to make minority group 
members downgrade, or even forget, their particular distinctiveness and adopt the 
cultural identity of the mainstream community. Ethnic identification in this framework 
reactively becomes more relevant and important for radical factions to revitalize and 
constantly maintain their ethnic awareness in an opposite direction of the state’s 
forced assimilationist policies (Prilleltensky and Gonick 1996, Bulhan 1985).  
 Moreover, within these cases, as mentioned before, the forced assimilation can 
be understood to have created a more radical group that is now ready to undertake 
the role of revitalizing the ethnic distinctiveness. I already suggested that their (radical 
factions’) conception of the good life as autonomous life differs remarkably from that 
of other minority members who experienced a relatively more voluntary integration or 
who more easily accepted assimilation in order to attain material equality or some 
other legitimate goal (Wolf 1986).  In such cases the radicalized terrorist 
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organization’s own survival seems to become possible only with a sustained level of 
recruitment and in this respect the radical movement requires popular support that 
would provide the organization with necessary human resources. This popular 
support can be guaranteed by strengthening the salience of causes that justify the 
radical organization’s existence (Walker 1983). Mindful of this fact, radical 
organizations use terrorism as a tool for making their cultural identity a constant target 
for state’s repression. Accordingly they create awareness of separation (Fisher and 
Sonn 2003: 119, Trickett, Watts and Birman 1994) and anti-state feeling among new 
generations and group members of the minority who otherwise would have been 
likely to compromise with the central administration for various reasons. An example 
of this cyclical relationship between government repression and ethnic terrorism is 
ETA which ‘sought to force the government to lash out blindly and create a backlash 
that would increase popular support for guerrillas’ (Byman 1998: 155, also in Sullivan 
1988: 44, Conversi 1997: 99). Akcam and Asal (2005) also explain this issue with 
reference to the Kurdish question in Turkey where the radical factions deliberately 
create instability to provoke government repression. ‘Government repression on 
ethnic groups increases disadvantages for ethnic group. The existence of collective 
disadvantages creates opportunities for ethnic leaders to mobilize ethnic group for 
their movement’ (Akcam and Asal 2005).   
  As mentioned, the PKK in Turkey is one of these organizations whose 
operations did not come to an end even when their cultural identities were recognized, 
and the progressive implementation of multiculturalism gradually took place. They did 
not stop, because in these cases, progressive implementation of multiculturalism 
worked in opposition to the interests of radical factions whose main goal is to promote 
the separation (Fearon and Laitin 2000) and to prevent compromise. The need for 
sustaining the feeling of being disadvantaged, which is an important source of ethnic 
radicalization, requires terrorists to constantly sabotage any democratic state 
enterprise that would be to the advantage of the minority community‘s members 
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(Byman 1998).  
  In return, the continuation of ethnic terror and increasing numbers of casualties 
simply feed nationalistic sentiments of the majority community. In this regard, not only 
does respect for minority members and their economic prosperity diminish within the 
major community but also the likelihood of furthering the multicultural project. It 
becomes unlikely because the increasing hostility of the majority against the radical 
and violent factions of the minority generates a pressure on representative 
governments to take action against continuing violent. This in turn results in the 
closure of the ethnic minorities’ political parties that do not condemn the terrorist 
operations. This process blocks the democratic ways and means of negotiating 
further possibilities for a pluralist democracy.   
 I am not arguing that ethnic mobilization or radicalization of minorities occurs 
only when they are exposed to the assimilationist policies of putatively civic state 
nationalism and not when exposed to the exclusionary policies of ethnic state 
nationalism. On the contrary, the ethnic rebellion is primarily a product of state 
suppression (Horowitz 1985, Gurr 2000) and ethnic terrorism is more likely to occur 
when there is not enough political opportunity for negotiation (Tarrow 1998). 
Moreover, the ethnic mobilization is also facilitated by the availability of resources 
(Barany 2002) and intense efforts of the educated classes to mobilize masses (Smith 
1982, Marshall and Gurr 2003).    
  Nevertheless I suggest that when the state starts to welcome multiculturalist 
policies, the nature and aims of minority ethnic mobilization vary depending on 
whether the host state previously used ethnic or civic lenses of nationhood to deal 
with the minority under question. As Arline and McCord (1979: 427) stated, ‘for a 
separatist movement to emerge people must first be convinced that they share 
something against an enemy’. I suggest if the group is already negatively defined by 
ethnic nationalism of the majority community that excluded or discriminated it, there 
would be no need for ethnic terrorism to mobilize the members of the minority against 
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the majority.  The sole aim of the ethnic mobilization in such cases is not to constantly 
revitalize a common identity but to acquire public recognition and self-government 
rights for its community, already being mobilized with the help of other 
aforementioned factors. When the political context is eased through the progressive 
implementation of multiculturalism, the ethnic mobilization of such groups proved to 
be peacefully maintained in the political sphere to reach the final aim of self-
government rights or autonomy.   
  
3.2.3 Multiculturalism in Contrast Cases 
 
 Canada is an example of this phenomenon. Both French and English identity 
has been defined in opposition to each other throughout history therefore ‘French 
Canadian cultural community itself was never in question, never threatened with 
unwanted extinction or assimilation …’ (Kymlicka 1989: 167). Although English 
Canada required French Quebecers to learn English to be equal members of the 
community it never forced them to be English. This remaining difference between the 
two cultures mostly resulted in negative discrimination against minority. Discrimination 
against the French by employers in the mainstream community, if not by state 
mechanism, was the main point that helped increase the common sense of being 
disadvantaged among the French group. Although the ethnic mobilization of 
Quebecers, against the English rule, which was blind to difference in public sphere, 
was obvious, neither the state’s forced assimilation36 nor the reactionary radicalization 
of French that would have otherwise catalyzed the oppression-conflict cycle was 
evident in Canada.   Such an example supports the view that the absence of forced 
assimilative policies creates a context under which multiculturalism seems to be more 
                                                
36 I am not arguing that this was the standard policy of English Canadian rule. The nature of 
the English nationalism in respect to the Aborigines highly differs. Forced assimilation of 
Aborigines into the dominant English community under the civic ideal of nationalism gets this 
case closer to the context I was primarily discussing with reference to the civic state 
nationalism.   
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viable. 
 Those who emphasize the significance of the economic development of the 
region in explaining the success of self-government rights in terms of creating peace, 
freedom and equal opportunities, however, can reasonably question the explanatory 
power of my hypothesis.  One of them indeed is Brian Barry who argues that the 
‘existence of different linguistic communities within a single country is compatible with 
equality of opportunity on the condition that these communities are able to maintain 
educational and economic institutions capable of providing a range of opportunities of 
roughly equal value’ (Barry 2001: 105).  Therefore my hypothesis needs further 
evidence, which can be found only in places where the economic development of the 
region is very backward yet nevertheless the multiculturalism seems to be applicable 
according to my hypothesis.  
 The case of Muslim Turks in Greece provides me with a very fitting example of 
such a context where the economic development of the region is very low.  Although 
it is very well known with its assimilationist policies, Greece differs from the context 
that this study shows as the reason of the inapplicability of multiculturalism. The 
foremost reason for this is that it was never the aim of the assimilationist policies to 
integrate Muslim Turks into the majority rather they were designed to intimidate or 
exterminate them. The Muslim Turks in Greece were deprived of citizenship rights 
between 1955 and 1998 (Human Rights Watch 1999), discriminated against before 
law, ignored, and left to their own destiny (Borou 2009).  
As a result of the exclusionist past of the ethnic state nationalism the Muslim 
Turks can be found demographically concentrated in Western Thrace. The past 
exclusionist policies of the Greek state isolated Muslim members of minority and left 
them with no other option than developing an inferior socio-economic network within 
which they could work and earn separately from the Greek majority. Mostly they were 
confined to stay in a rural area of the country and earn their living in agriculture. Their 
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participation in body politics and economic life of the vast majority has always 
remained limited (Rumeli 2005). 
It can be seen that the Muslim Turkish minority in Greece is economically 
backward. I suggest that multiculturalism is, nevertheless, more applicable in such 
cases.  The progressive implementation of multiculturalism in the period of developing 
the societal culture of the minority, as Kymlicka suggested, is both more feasible and 
less likely to create further inequalities for several reasons.  
Firstly it is more feasible to provide public services and education in the 
language of minority members who are demographically concentrated in certain 
regions. Secondly as mentioned before, due to discrimination, ethnic mobilization of 
the minority is therefore evident but not in radical ways that otherwise could have 
increased the hostility against minority. In these cases, therefore, progressive 
implementation of multiculturalism is not hindered by the cycle of repression- 
radicalism-weak multiculturalism-increasing radicalism.  Lastly, and most importantly, 
those Muslim minorities, including non-Turks, who have been identified and 
historically excluded by persistent Orthodox Christian characteristics of Greek identity, 
are inclined to mobilize around Turkish ethnicity on a voluntary basis (Triandafyllidou 
and Anagnostou 2007).  Therefore multiculturalism’s essentialist self-reinforcing 
policies do not create an injustice for even the most distinct people so long as they 
voluntarily attach themselves to this essentialist orientation.   
This very short analysis about the Muslim Turks in Greece provides me with 
preliminary evidence to rule out the hypothesis that the applicability of multiculturalism 
is only possible when the economic development of the region is high.  It can be 
shown that multiculturalism is justified on a normative basis and can be progressively 
implemented in such contexts if the authorized state appeals to it. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
 
To sum up, in this chapter I located the problem and my approach within a theoretical 
framework. Within this framework I began with the idea that meanings of theoretical 
perspectives used in dealing with the problems of national minorities are more 
consistent in some contexts and less so in others. It has been suggested that ideal 
contexts clarified by proponents of these theoretical perspectives are not available all 
the time.  
Having observed that these ideal contexts are not always readily found, I 
asked if there could be other criteria to assess the applicability of these theories, in 
other words, if there can be a more reliable way to point out an ideal context under 
which these theories can become more viable. The aim of this attempt is of course to 
prevent any unwanted consequences that might arise from the intention of promoting 
liberalism by sticking up for either of these two distinct sets of arguments.  
To do this, the chapter argued that both theories are likely to fail when the 
national minority under question had previously been exposed to the forced 
assimilationist policies of putatively civic state nationalism. 
It was seen that minority members experiencing forced assimilation have been 
inclined to prioritize their cultural freedom over equality. Therefore in such cases it 
turned out to be impossible to find a common public reasoning and shared conception 
of what is good.  While most of the constitutions in civic states stress the principle of 
equality, the terrorist organizations call themselves freedom fighters.   
 For this reason, this chapter suggested that a strictly difference-blind 
egalitarianism has an infatuation with equality even at the expense of freedom and as 
such it may not be able to generate peace between those who do not share the same 
concerns.  
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As concerns the attempt to find a criterion for assessing the applicability of 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, this chapter concentrated on the liberal culturalist and 
egalitarian critiques of him. It is suggested that the egalitarian critique of Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism does make sense mostly when societal culture is not developed in 
the way and as much as Kymlicka has assumed in his proposition.  I conceptualized 
the immaturity of the minority’s societal culture with reference to not only the low 
utilitarian value of this minority vernacular but also the fragmentation within the 
minority itself. I showed the minority members’ different visions of national identity, 
different experiences of citizenship and different expectations from the polity as 
indicators of this intra-group fragmentation. How the forced assimilation policies and 
the integrationist ideal of putatively civic state nationalism jointly created these 
indicators were explained and the chapter consequently discussed how even the 
sizeable and concentrated groups captured by the national minority definition of 
Kymlicka showed some of these characteristics. Under these circumstances 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism proved to have a potential to generate further inequalities.   
Since most of the inequalities which I mentioned in relation to the 
implementation of multiculturalism, stem from this in-group fragmentation, and 
immaturity of the minority’s societal culture; in the following part of the paper, the idea 
that the societal culture can be developed as the progressive implementation of 
multiculturalism takes place was also elaborated. This idea was shown to be 
impractical with respect to important points. First, it was shown to be infeasible, 
especially when those who prioritize the material wellbeing of their children rather 
than political autonomy of their cultural community do not consent to this ethno-
centric project. Without considering how much the economy in their own vernacular 
can develop in time, some of the members in the ethnic community believe that their 
children’s chances to prosper would be higher if they were educated in the language 
of mainstream community.  This was the case in France when the majority of 
Corsicans voted against the referendum for autonomy and obligatory education in 
                                                                                                                
 101 
their mother language. This was also the case for majority of the Kurds in Turkey 
when allowed Kurdish courses were not attended.  Second, multiculturalism’s 
infeasibility under this context was shown in relation to the repression-radicalism-
weak multiculturalism–increasing radicalism–repression cycle where the weak 
multiculturalist initiatives seemed to be contributing to the acceleration of violent 
activities and hatred between cultural communities. I suggested the multiculturalism 
that might be used in rectifying the inequalities, for which the egalitarianism could not 
provide us with a proper insight, indeed exacerbates the activities of terrorist 
organizations, as in such times these organizations increasingly become in need of 
convincing their own ethnic community that the state is still their enemy.  This 
increasing conflict hinders the possibility of furthering multiculturalists’ policies in a 
non-violent political arena as this ethnic conflict provokes majority nationalism, which 
in turn prevents the governments from entering into dialogue with minority’s political 
parties that insist not to condemn terrorism.   
This chapter not only showed why egalitarianism and multiculturalism are not 
viable options for the context I specified but also touched upon the contrast spaces to 
make the argument much clearer to the reader.  It was shown that the progressive 
implementation of multiculturalism in the period of developing the societal culture of 
the minority, as Kymlicka suggested, is both more feasible and more likely to promote 
equality in cases where the group was never exposed to the assimilationist policies of 
putatively civic nationalism. I suggested this premise not only because those groups, 
who were not assimilated, could have a chance to develop their own network to 
accommodate their own members, but mainly because any healthier option was not 
available to these minorities in the mainstream community. Moreover, it was 
suggested that the egalitarian argument, that accuses the multiculturalism of 
hindering people from using the exit option, loses its validity when the group members 
voluntarily participate into this ethnocentric construction of their own community. I 
suggested that minorities who were previously excluded on ethnic basis are more 
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likely to adopt an ethnocentric project for the construction and development of their 
own community. 
In such cases, multiculturalism seems viable without regard to the 
socioeconomic development of the region in which the given minority has lived. In 
such cases, the national minority members’ experiences of citizenship, interests and 
expectations from the polity seem to be more homogenous. For this reason the 
essentialization of ethnic culture that is associated with Kymlicka’s multicultural 
project seems to be less likely to create inequalities between sub groups so long as 
those different groups within the minority are voluntary participants in this project.  
Throughout the chapter I discussed that the differentiation between national 
minorities and immigrant minorities, as Kymlicka made it, is not sufficient to indicate 
what types of rights should be given to which groups. I suggested that we should also 
make a differentiation between two different types of national minorities: those who 
had previously been exposed to ethnic exclusionist policies on one hand and those 
who had previously been exposed to the putatively civic assimilationist policies on the 
other hand. I argued that Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is an ethnocentric project and it 
can be used for groups who had already been ethnically remarked by the authority 
that did not try to forcibly assimilate them into the dominant ethnic core. On the other 
hand I suggested that ethnocentric multiculturalism is not applicable to the latter type 
of national minorities who had been forcibly assimilated under putatively civic state 
nationalism.  
All in all, although the particular context that characterizes both assertive 
assimilation and open subtype of civic nationalism lets us point out only a very limited 
number of cases where neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism would become a 
viable option, this chapter provides us with an insight into how the civic-ethnic 
nationalism dichotomy has analytical power in explaining the applicability of 
multiculturalism and how the injustices of exclusion and forced assimilation should be 
differently rectified. This insight is of great importance when dealing with much larger 
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numbers of national minorities as most of the national minority problems are the result 
of either exclusionist or assimilationist policies and most of the national groups 
became minorities under a state that has used either civic or ethnic lenses of 
nationhood. It was already indicated that even under the same state, application of 
these lenses and policies varied depending on the nature of the relationship between 
the dominant ethnic core and the minority under question, for this reason examples of 
national minorities that we can approach by using this analytical dichotomy of ethnic 
expulsion-civic fusion can be multiplied to a great extent.  And even those few groups 
who have not been consistently exposed to one of these two methods can be of help 
in deciding the degree of applicability.  However this premise requires studying vast 
numbers of cases. In the rest of this study I will start focusing on one case, which is to 
be identical to the context under which I argued that neither the multiculturalism as 
has been described by Kymlicka nor the egalitarianism as described by Barry can be 
a viable option for the solution of national minority problems. 
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Chapter 4: Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma ‘Segmented forms of 
Assimilation’ 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate in practice that civic state-building and the 
policies of assimilation create complexities under which, the previous chapter has 
argued, neither ethno-centric multiculturalism nor difference–blind egalitarianism can 
work. This chapter will focus on the historical relationship between the Kurds and the 
state in Turkey. In providing this analysis, this chapter will also explain where the 
relationship between the state and Kurds fits in the conceptual categorization that the 
second chapter has explained.   
                                                                                                                
 105 
Since the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, the Kurds who today make 
up almost 15% of the population in Turkey have been expected to live under the 
authority of the state that has used only the Turkish language in its relation to all 
citizens. A number of Kurdish rebellions that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s were 
repressed by the armed forces.  Use of the Kurdish language in public offices and 
education was banned and any movement that is based on ethnicity has not been 
tolerated.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Separatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was in 
an armed conflict with Turkish government forces that caused the death of more than 
35,000 people from both sides of the conflict (Heper 2007:1). All ethnic differences in 
the country have been ignored by the ‘state that constitutionally consists only of 
‘citizens of Turkey’ (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 1). According to Article 66, paragraph 1 
of the Constitution: ‘Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of 
citizenship is a Turk’. The term ‘Turk’ was comprehensively explained in the 1924 
Constitution stating; ‘The nation of Turkey with respect of citizenship is called Turk, 
irrespective of religion or ethnicity’. In Turkey, nationality has been reduced to 
citizenship. According to the Turkish Nationality Act No. 403, citizenship can be 
determined by either ‘jus soli (right of land: children born in territories of Turkey do not 
acquire the nationality of either parent at birth, but acquire Turkish nationality from 
birth) or jus sanguinis (right of the blood: either of the parents must be a Turkish 
citizen at the time of birth)’ (Turkish Nationality Act No: 403: Legislative provisions 
concerning nationality). The 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which gave minority status to 
non-Muslims, is still accepted as the unique source of the minority regime in Turkey. It 
is well known that this treaty simply excluded Muslim groups like the Kurds, 
Caucasians, Laz and Romani people, who spoke languages other than Turkish 
(Smith T. 2005). ‘The Turkish constitutional scheme solves the question of minorities 
without ever addressing it. There is no reference in the constitution to the word 
minority, not even the Lausanne Minorities’ (Minority Rights Group 2007). Although 
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Turkey used religion as the most important factor in defining minority and majority, the 
Constitution made the definition of ‘Turk’ solely on the basis of citizenship (Cornell 
2001, Heper 2007). ‘The ethnicisation of bureaucracy that has caused ethnic conflict 
in many newly independent countries has not been pervasive in Turkey (Wimmer 
1997). Many Ethnic Kurds have achieved positions of influence and power within the 
bureaucracy and are integrated into Turkish society (Cornell 2001)’ (Tezcur 2009: 3). 
Yet for the last two decades, state policies have slowly begun to change. With 
amendments to the laws that for so long prohibited its use in education, media and 
public events, the Kurdish language in Turkey has now become more apparent and 
publicly used than ever.  
 
In June 1989 President Ozal announced that he himself had Kurdish blood. In 
December 1991, the deputy Prime Minister Erdal Inonu called for the recognition of 
cultural identity of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. In March 1992 Prime Minister Suleyman 
Demirel openly announced that he recognized the reality of Kurdish ethnic presence 
(Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 113). 
  
Since then the problem extended beyond one of the recognition, yet then the 
debate turned out to be about the forms that it could take, about whether recognition 
should be construed as the toleration of differences in the private sphere or should it 
be extended into the appreciation of diversity in public life by governmental 
regulations.   
The Constitutional Amendment Law no. 4471 of 2002 and Law no. 4903 of 
2003, guaranteed the legal basis for the use of ethnic groups’ languages or dialects in 
non-state funded education or media. And even going further than mere toleration of 
differences in the private sphere, the state started funding a television channel to 
broadcast in Kurdish only. 
 As the politics of recognition gained momentum, the discussion has developed 
to the point where the Kurdish political leaders then claimed their right to autonomy.  
In doing so they also challenged the above given definition of Turkishness in the 
Constitution. This has not only prompted polarization and deepened the tension 
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between the two communities but also created an identity crisis across all ethnic 
groups in the whole of the country.  There is still a tension between the two different 
approaches to the national minorities in Turkey. One clings to the monolithic definition 
of citizenship and the other strives for the decentralization of the state along ethnic 
lines.  Answering questions on what direction Turkey will change and whether this 
transformation will be a liberal one requires a careful analysis of the complexities that 
Turkish modern history has created. This chapter will explore the complexities that 
the above mentioned minority regime and the order of the republican constitution 
have created in Turkey.  
4.1 Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma: Civic State Nationalism and Assimilation 
It is not possible to single out one dominant feature that is capable of characterizing 
what kind of nationalism in Turkey has been salient throughout its history. The 
literature on Turkish nationalism has embraced a conception of the Turkish nation 
that combines both civic and ethnic elements. As Canefe argued ‘Turkish nationalism 
exhibits a highly hybrid character’ (Canefe 2002: 135, Kadioglu 1996: 17, Tezcur 
2009: 2). For this reason I need to clarify that when I talk about civic nationalism in 
Turkey, it is only to define the nationalism to which Kurds have been exposed to, not 
to define the entirety of Turkish nationalism that might be quite exclusionary in its 
relation to other groups.  When I talk about civic state nationalism in Turkey I am 
referring to an illiberal form of civic nationalism: to an integrationist ideal on the part of 
the state, which does not necessarily translate into the voluntary incorporation of all of 
the Kurds. I will show that those Kurds who were unwilling to assimilate have been 
forced to do so. In articulation of this particular nationalism I will follow two main 
points.  
 First of all I will illustrate the inclusionary dimension of Turkish nationalism vis-à-
vis Kurds by comparing it to the exclusionary dimension of Turkish nationalism vis-à-
vis Non-Muslims. Whether a particular nationalism is conceived of as ethnic or civic 
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has much to do with whether its conception of nation is informed by primordial or 
constructivist lenses of nationhood. 37  Although the constructivist approach was 
accepted by the 1924 constitution in making the Turkish nation it can be safely stated 
that cultural components such as language, religion and ethno-symbolic resources 
limited the boundaries of its construction.  For this reason, to define Turkish 
nationalism by looking at its relation to particular groups38 at certain periods of time 
would be to fall prey to the fallacy of dismissing any degree of complexity to its history. 
Within this framework I will argue that due to the historical contingencies it is quite 
possible to see Turkish nationalism as exclusionary in its relation to the Non-Muslim 
population whereas this is not the case for Non-Turkish speaking Muslim groups, 
including Kurds. They have always been addressed by the civic French conception of 
nationhood, in which the assimilation into the mainstream community was the only 
option.   
 Secondly I will focus on the assimilation of Kurds in Turkey and discuss whether 
this can be entirely portrayed as either voluntary or forceful. As concerns these 
problems I will argue that neither ethnic groups nor ‘the state in Turkey should be 
seen as a monolithic and static entity’ (Tezcur 2009: 5, Somer 2004). Hence to focus 
on a limited numbers of actors and sources to illustrate the entirety of Turkish 
nationalism as ethnic wouldn’t be doing justice to the complexity of the reality. 
                                                
37  All other dimensions of the dichotomy have been refuted on the grounds that both are 
cultural in some respects, exclusionary in different degrees, and illiberal in their practices. For 
a detailed argument see Chapter 2.   
38 Here I am going to focus on Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis the position of Kurds not because 
I assume that it provides us with a more accurate picture of the nationalism in Turkey but 
because the paper is specifically concerned with the peculiarities of the nationalism to which 
Kurds in Turkey have been exposed. The reader should be reminded that this study is helpful 
to understand the evolution of nationalist ideology in Turkey yet it is not for the sake of 
categorizing the nature of Turkish nationalism per se but rather for exploring its results. This 
chapter’s main task is to explain the segmented societal culture of Kurds in Turkey.  This 
segmented forms of assimilation will be used later to analyse to what extent it is viable, in both 
practical and normative sense, for Turkey to transform from a centralizing tradition to a 
multiculturalist system where the cultural groups would be differentiated and power would be  
devolved along the lines of ethnicity.  
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Nationalism is an ideological phenomenon which changes depending on the context 
and those people who interact with it. For this reason, a careful analysis requires one 
to trace this dynamic process by accounting for the ‘multiple reference populations 
and correspondingly segmented forms of assimilation’ (Brubaker 2001: 540, 
Neckerman 1999). Assimilation is a social phenomenon that can only be perceived 
and experienced subjectively (Teske and Nelson 1974) and for this reason anyone, 
who tends to describe the relationship between the Kurds and the state as a forceful 
assimilation of the former by the latter, has to engage with the heterogeneity of 
Kurdish communities that have evidently not emerged as a monolithic entity and 
some members of which voluntarily assimilated into the mainstream community 
(Heper 2007). ‘The relationship between Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms cannot be 
adequately captured as the resistance of the latter to the domineering attempts of the 
former’ (Tezcur 2009: 8).  Those scholars like Mann (2005: 12)39 who insist on a 
narrow account of forceful assimilation to depict the position of Kurds in Turkey do not 
allow the past the dignity of complexity that they would surely grant to the present. In 
so doing, their theory tends towards the elevation of mere fragments into totalising 
and ‘authentic’ entities.  I will explain that Kurds, who have experienced state policies 
from different angles in the past, vary in their opinions today and this variation also 
corresponds to their diverse political orientations and expectations in modern Turkey.  
 Now I will elaborate on the first point of my argument, which is about who has 
been the subject of exclusion in Turkish nationalism and what it meant for the Kurds. 
 During the assembly debates on the 1924 constitution, the French conception of 
nation ‘universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state centered’ (Brubaker 1990: 
386) has been accepted to constitute the foundation of the citizenship regime in 
Turkey (Killi 1971).  It was stated in the Article 88 of the 1924 constitution (the 
founding constitution of Turkey) that ‘The people of Turkey regardless of their religion 
                                                
39 Mann (2005: 12) in a totalizing manner asserts that Kurdish speaking people in Turkey has 
suffered ‘institutional coercion, policed repression, violent repression, and unpremeditated 
mass killings’ (Tezcur 2009: 3).   
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and race is called Turk by citizenship’.  It is also stated in Article 54 of the 1961 
Constitution that ‘Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is 
Turkish’. Article 66 of the 1982 constitution repeated the same (Killi and Gozubuyuk: 
2000: 186,283; Yegen 2009: 606).  Moving from this point, Sherman (1960) argued 
that the Turkish case is an example of constructive nationalism in which the nation 
has been embodied by the agency of the state, not vice-versa. Heper (2007: 95) 
argued that ‘Turkey emerged as a state-nation rather than as a nation state’ and 
Shankland (1999) claimed that there is not a clear direction of influence between 
ethnic Turk and Turkishness.  Ataturk in his speeches made it clear that ‘The 
inhabitants of modern Turkey, whom we call the Turks, and who of course are the 
Turks in the sense that they compose the modern Turkish nation, are really a people 
formed over many centuries out of a mixture of races such as pre-Hittites, Hittites, 
Phrygians, Celts, Jews, Macedonians, Romans, Armenians, Kurds and Mongols…[At 
some point] Turks from Asia added themselves to the stock…’ (Heper 2007: 84, 
Hotham 1972: 72).  
 This idea however has been challenged in two respects: one in theory and the 
other in practice. As concerns the theoretical level, Yegen (2004) argues that what is 
implied by the constitution refers to a Turkishness in terms of citizenship which, 
according to him, automatically yields itself to a meaning that there was ‘another–
more authentic–Turkishness’ which cannot be acquired by only citizenship. For 
instance, ‘the law enacted in 1926 specified Turkishness, instead of Turkish 
citizenship, as a requirement for becoming a state employee. The fourth item of 
article 88 stated that being Turkish is a precondition for becoming a state employee’ 40 
Moreover in Cumhuriyet Newspaper of 2 July 1938 a precondition for admission to 
the Military Veterinary School as well as to the Air Forces was announced as ‘being a 
                                                
40  This does not have any discriminatory implications because the term Turkish in this 
sentence might also be understood as described by the Constitution that accepts all citizens of 
the country as Turkish (by citizenship). Moreover ‘this law was in use until 1965… Article 657, 
which is currently in use specifies ‘Turkish citizenship’ instead of ‘Turkishness’ as a 
precondition for becoming a state employee….’ (Yegen 2004: 56). 
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citizen of Turkish Republic and being of Turkish race’ (Yildiz 2001).  
4.1.1. Non-Muslims and Exclusion 
 
Application of these undeniably exclusionary regulations, however, was mainly limited 
to Non-Muslim citizens who were believed41 by the state to be unable to assimilate 
into the Turkish community or rather thought to be constituting a fifth column (Baer 
2004) within the country.42  Non-Muslim constituencies had still not been accepted to 
the military schools and many other security related institutions in Turkey by 2007.  
 Heper suggested that the ‘recognition of the Non-Muslim as citizens was only in 
legal, not in sociological, terms’ (Heper 2007: 91).  The Non-Muslim minorities have 
been either excluded from the body politic or deported from the country. Cagaptay 
(2006), drawing on statistical year books of 1929 and 1934 as cited in the work of 
McCarthy (1982: 60-8), revealed that ‘Christians made up 20 per cent of Turkey’s 
population; fifteen years later, in 1927, they had dropped to as few as 2.64 per cent’ 
(Cagaptay 2006: 62). Historical examples are also rich to illustrate this religious 
essence of the nationalism in Turkey. The Lausanne Peace Treaty, according to 
which only non-Muslims have been accepted as a minority, is a clear indicator to the 
fact that despite the civic rhetoric employed in the Constitution the boundary of 
Turkishness at that time was primarily drawn by Islam and not the language (Taspinar 
2005).  
                                                
 
42 There were two reasons for it. Firstly, it is true that some national minorities are relatively 
more compact, culturally distinct and have developed an internal awakening even before their 
host state started its own nation-building project. In such cases, the ethnic conflict 
regulation/integration policy of a  state is shaped not only by its past ethnic conflict 
regulation/integration policy but by the pre-political qualities of a minority. For example,  the 
Young Turks did not have any choice other than to embody Turkishness with a strong link to 
Muslimness and thereby in opposition to Christianity or Judaism as being the primary ‘other’. 
This was mainly because the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was facilitated by the 
nationalisms of Christian subjects the majority of whom had already demarcated themselves 
as the ‘other’ in the first place.  As Canefe stated ‘it is only in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1913) and the massive loss of life and land these caused that Turkism began to appear 
as a viable alternative to the Ottomanist agenda’ (Canefe 2002: 143).  Secondly, the definition 
of Turkishness was not only an internal matter of self-identification to be dealt at the hands of 
an elite within the Turkish Republic it was also given a meaning by how the Europeans 
described it. The word Turk in the European context was a generic term used to signify the 
Muslim people of Ottoman Anatolia regardless of their ethnicities. (Kushner 1977) 
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 The population exchange between Turkey and Greece is also an important case 
in which this religious conceptualization of the nation could be observed.  In this 
exchange, Non-Turkish speaking Muslim groups have been accepted to Turkey while 
Turkish-speaking Non-Muslims who resided in Anatolia for centuries were deported to 
Greece (Hirschon 2003). Moreover works on early immigration to Turkey reveals that 
non-Turkish speaking ‘Bosnians, Greek, Serbian, Macedonian, Albanian and 
Bulgarian Muslims, who faced extermination or repression in the newly independent 
Balkan states, fled to Anatolia’ (Cagaptay 2006: 62).  While Muslim subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire were easily accepted in Turkey and naturalized on the condition that 
they would learn Turkish, the case for Non-Muslim residents of Anatolia was quite the 
opposite (Ahmad 1993). In the wake of the Republican regime, the ‘Armenian 
population of the Ottoman Anatolia was already decimated’ (Canefe 2002: 145) and a 
majority of the Greek Orthodox Community was also displaced and those who 
remained in the country were intimidated and terrorized through the policies of 
discrimination. The Property Tax Law (Varlik Vergisi Kanunu) was only one of those 
policies deployed to this effect.   
On 12 November 1942, an additional tax, levied exclusively on non-Muslims, was 
introduced on the basis of law 4305. This law concerned 4 to 5 thousand of an 
estimated 28,000 Armenians, Greeks, Jews and even Dönme (Jews or Christians 
converted to Islam)…Those who could not pay up were exiled or condemned to forced 
labour in ‘Turkey’s Siberia’, namely in the quarries of Aşkale near Erzurum, where 21 
forced laborers died (Hoffman  2002: 16). 
 
 Although an inclusive civic rhetoric has been used in its constitutions, an 
exclusionary nationalism in Turkey was obviously prevalent for Non-Muslim minorities.   
Yegen thinks ‘it may be safely stated that the pre-eminent other of extreme 
nationalism, especially in the sixties and seventies, was not the Kurds but rather non-
muslimhood…’ (Yegen 2007: 135).   Mustafa Kemal, before and during the first years 
of Republic, was in a tactical alliance with the clerics to gain the support of all Muslim 
subjects and mobilize them around a nationalist goal (Toprak 1981). During his 
speech to the Turkish Parliament in 1920, Ataturk said ‘you the members of this 
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dignified assembly, are not only Turks, or Circassians, or Kurds or Lazes, you are the 
Islamic element made up all of these’ (Ataturk’s speeches and declarations, I-III, pp: 
74-5, also in Cagaptay 2002: 69).  In his letter to the Caliph, Mustafa Kemal used 
praising words such as ‘Our Great Khan’. It was not the military quarters but the 
mosques where people were mobilized through Cuma Khutba (sermon delivered at 
the noon prayer on Fridays and on certain other occasions). The Assembly of the 
Turkish Republic was opened for the first time in 1920 on a Friday with the 
accompaniment of prayers. Finally in the founding 1924 constitution of Turkey it was 
stated that ‘Islam is the religion of the state’ and this was not revoked until 1928 
(Stirling 1958: 395-408). 
4.1.2 Kurds and Inclusion 
 
 Yet the boundary drawn by Islam in Turkey was only able to create a circle of 
Muslim people whose linguistic differences remained as a barrier before the nation-
building.43 Andrews (1989) articulates the number of ethnic groups in Turkey of the 
early Republican era as 49 whereas Soysu (1992) claims that this number was 
                                                
43 In fact, in the first place the political order, in Ataturk’s mind, was not of a highly centralized 
government that would be dominated by one language. It is known from a telegram Mustafa 
Kemal sent to the deputy Commander of the 13th Army Corps, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, in the 
Southeast that his first intention was to grant autonomy to Kurds. In this telegram Ataturk was 
saying that ‘I am in favour of granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure the 
attachment to the state and the prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on the 
condition that the Ottoman state is not split up’ (Mango 1997: 7).  Another telegram to the 
commander of the Southern front Ataturk was saying that ‘in the areas inhabited by Kurds, we 
consider it a necessity to set up gradually a local government…it is expected that the Kurds by 
that time would have completed the setting up of their local government’ (Mango 1997: 33). 
However, these ideas have not been put into practice for two reasons as explained by Heper’s 
(2007) account.  Firstly because after 1922 Some Kurds especially in southern and eastern 
part of the country started to develop a hostile approach to the officers sent from the center. 
Heper (2007) drawing on the writings of Arslan (1991), who collected observations about 
Kurds between 1919 and 1923 in a book, explains the atmosphere in the region as follows; ‘In 
Diyarbakir, in such public places as coffeehouses and reading rooms the local people are 
saying to officers. What business do you still have here?’, ‘When will you go away?’(Heper 
2007: 121). The second reason for failing to put this idea into practice was rather about 
practical and demographic constraints. Ataturk’s words on the issue is translated by Shaw 
(2000: 745) as follows ‘Within the national boundaries of Turkey, many Kurds live. However, 
they are settled in such a way that they are in the majority only in a few places. As Kurds have 
spread out from the places where they had lived before and started to live among Turks, a 
situation had arisen such that if one wanted to draw a boundary around some places where 
Kurds also lived, that would have led to the disintegration of Turkey’  
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indeed 100.  It was clearly impossible for a newly founded state to operate with such 
a high number of languages. Moreover creating a national consciousness and 
solidarity without establishing a uniform language was also deemed impractical by the 
founders of the republic (Saatci 2002, Barkey 2000).  The significance of the one 
official language in Turkey was continuously accentuated.  ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ 
campaign was launched in 1928 (Aslan 2007: 252).  In the same year Arabic alphabet 
was replaced with Latin script not only to ensure a clear break from the Ottoman and 
Islamic past but also to make it easier and quicker for the people to become literate 
and to bring up the Turkish nation with a ‘modern’ European outlook.  
  The barriers before the nation building were not just of linguistic diversity but 
also the supremacy of religiosity inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Just after the 
republican regime was established, the foundation of the Republic was depicted by 
the republican cadre as an attempt to move away from the Ottoman Empire. An 
empire that evoked failure and backwardness associated with Caliph and the 
asymmetric powers of Sheikhs who maintained a feudal order under his divine 
authority (Barkey 2000). ‘In Atatürk’s opinion it was the scholastic interpretation of 
Islam and the irrational approach to religion that were to be blamed for the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire’ (Demir 2005:11). The Republicans’ mission in this context was to 
secularize and centralize the administration and most of all to liberalize the country 
similar to its European models that also replaced divine authority and regnal loyalties 
with national sovereignty and citizenship.  As early as 1921, Ataturk implicitly 
revealed his intention to transform the ideological base of the political order from 
dynastic loyalty to national sovereignty when he said that ‘Authority, without any 
condition and reservation, belongs to the nation’. Only after the republican regime 
was established, however, could he gradually realize this idea by introducing a series 
of laws, which would ultimately eradicate the institutional power of Islam and its 
political function.  ‘The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 was the first step in the de-
institutionalization of religious involvement in the politics. This was followed by the 
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abolition, on the same date, of the Office of the Seyhu-l Islam and the Ministry of 
Religious affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve evkaf vekaleti). These three 
offices had provided an institutional base for the din-u devlet (Sharia or theocratic 
state) concept’ 44(Toprak 1981: 46). John Palmer and Charles Smith argued that 
‘Mohammedan fanaticism was outraged by Mustafa Kemal’s policy of secularization’ 
(Palmer and Smith 1942: 12, Heper 2007: 148). The (Sunni) Kurds who had been 
very loyal to Caliph were also outraged by this idea. Indeed it was especially 
traumatic for Sunni Kurds because Mustafa Kemal had won their hearts and minds 
partly through appealing to their religious sentiments during the War of Liberation, 
which occurred just a few years previously. Now with the abolition of this institutional 
bond between the various ethnic Muslim groups in Turkey, the primary tool employed 
in the nation-building process, became nothing but the idea of sharing a territorial 
boundary within which the language of the state would be Turkish only. Sheikh Said 
in his effort to mobilize an uprising was trying to incite other Kurdish and particularly 
Zaza Sheikhs with the following words ‘Earlier we had a common Caliphate, and this 
gave to our religious people a deep feeling of being a part of the community that the 
Turks also belonged to. Since the abolition of the Caliphate, the only thing we are left 
with is Turkish repression’ Bozarslan (2003: 180). Seal (1996: 238) and Houston 
(2001: 99) emphasize that ‘on the very day the Republic abolished the Caliphate [3rd 
March 1924] it also published a decree banning all Kurdish schools, associations and 
publications’.45  It has been the very start of an assimilation policy that would facilitate 
the construction of the modern Turkish nation with a strong emphasis on the territorial 
integrity.46 
                                                
44 ‘Religious sects and orders, dervish monasteries and mausoleums of local saints were 
closed and in order to break with the past he went even further’ (Heper 2007: 166) and in 1926 
a secular Civil Law code was adopted. 
45 Tevhid-i Tedrisat was mainly about the centralization of education and it was not particularly 
aimed at banning the Kurdish language but all languages other than Turkish.  
46  Although Islam was to be a cultural bond among the majority of the population and Turkish 
was to be only official language in the country for practical reasons, the real emphasis of the 
Kemalist nationalism was on the territorial definition of the nation.  This ideal was obvious in 
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  Before going any further there are two important points requiring 
clarification. They are about the conceptualization of assimilation and the civic 
nationalism that I will often employ to illustrate the historical relationship between the 
state and Kurds in Turkey.   
 Firstly, erroneous interpretations of civic-ethnic dichotomy extend so far as to 
amount to an assumption that civic nationalism should be acultural and in any case of 
nationalism, where there is representation of ethno-cultural aspects, this should be 
categorized as ethnic.   Here the reader should be reminded that, as the ontology of 
nationalism would suggest, the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalisms has 
less to do with the presence or absence of cultural or ethnic aspects in their ultimate 
productions (Brubaker 2006). This is inevitable that any social entity has to have a 
cultural ingredient and therefore the invisible boundaries of a nation are limited by 
socio-historical contingencies.47 From an ontological perspective, each so called civic 
nationalism, no matter how much it claims to be based on territorial and political 
values, also rests on a cultural component (Kymlicka 1989, Raz and Margalit 1990, 
Kozma 2006). Ethnic boundaries affect policy and politics as much as the reverse. 
When the issue comes to the use of language in recreating a common national 
identity, even the nations that claim to be the most civic and inclusive cannot avoid 
choosing an official language to be used by its subjects in relation to the state. Turkey 
used Turkish to create a common national identity and consciousness among Kurds, 
Lazes, Arabs, Romanis, Albanians and Circassians whose mother tongue were 
                                                                                                                                       
Ataturk ‘s declaration that ‘Neither Islamic union nor Turanism can be .. a logical policy for us 
to adopt. Henceforth our policy will be that of living independently and enjoying sovereignty 
within our national frontiers’ (Allen 1935: 541, Heper 2007: 87). 
47 This is not only articulated by ethno-symbolist scholars like Smith and Hutchinson but also 
suggested by theoretical works of even those who think that ‘nation’ in the modern sense is 
primarily an entity of construction, invention or imagination.  Their emphasis on the 
construction of nations does not automatically translate into the view that the stuff of imagining 
or constructing (the nation) can be invented ex nihilo. Those who insist so are few and far 
between. Hobsbawm (1990) who argued that inventions’ of modern nationalists must resonate, 
otherwise their project is doomed to fail; Breuilly (1993) who concedes that nationalist 
intellectuals and politicians use myths and symbols from the past to promote a particular 
national identity; Anderson (1991) who defined nation as a ‘sovereign and limited imagined 
community’–my emphasis added–can be given as examples of those modernists who would 
inevitably accept that the stuff of imagining can be found in pre-existing cultural identities. 
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thereby excluded from the public sphere.   As can be seen, each nation has a cultural 
boundary and therefore what makes the dichotomy relevant is not the suggestion that 
the ethnic one is based on exclusion while the civic one is not. They both are 
exclusionary to some extent (Brubaker 2006) but what differs in these nationalisms is 
indeed the fact that in the civic nationalism people of other cultures are permitted and 
accepted to become a member of the respective nation provided they are ready to 
adopt the political values, culture and language of the dominant ethnic core (Jackson 
Preece 2005). Whereas in ethnic nationalism the people of other cultures, language 
or religion are not anticipated to become a member of the respective nation because 
ethnic nationalism–in the primordial sense–assumes that the boundaries of nation are 
given by nature and thus nationality cannot be attained later (Connor 1972, Shils 
1957).48  It means that in ethnic nationalism there is no project for incorporation (Barry 
2001: 83). Unlikely in Turkey the state policies have always been informed by the 
goal of eventual incorporation and assimilation of Kurds and other Muslim ethnies into 
the mainstream community. To this effect Kurds, like any other citizens of non-Turkic 
ethnie, have been expected to relegate their ethnic identities and cultural differences 
to their private lives. 
 Secondly it is also another erroneous interpretation of the dichotomy to assume 
that civic nationalism is necessarily associated with liberalism whereas eastern ethnic 
nationalism is accepted as illiberal (Kohn 1944). This wrong use of the dichotomy has 
obviously led some scholars to associate assimilationist policies in Turkey with ethnic 
nationalism. For example Kutschera (1979: 89-90) who speaks of Kurdish genocide, 
and Van Bruinessen (1994), who termed it as ethnocide, think that it was the Kurdish 
identity per se that the state in Turkey endeavoured to ‘eliminate’. Within this 
                                                48 Brubaker suggests that there are few ethnic nationalists that would have got so far if the 
members of the minority adopt the language or religion of its majority. The primordialist 
conception of ethnic nationalism leaves us with a very few examples that can qualify within 
this category. I argue that although a civic conception of nation is adopted in most examples, 
politics of exclusion and differentialism in all cases is informed by the primordialist idea that 
the boundaries between people of different ethno-cultures are fixed and will always be so. For 
a more detailed argument see Chapter 2.  
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perspective assimilation is pre-supposed to have a pejorative meaning and is wrongly 
associated with ethnic nationalism, foundations of which, as explained above, are 
indeed very against the formation of identity by any means of construction such as 
forceful or voluntary assimilation, amalgamation or acculturation.  Behind the 
argument that links the assimilation to ethnic nationalism, there is a more serious 
problem in the sense that assimilation is confused with the concept of cultural 
annihilation reducing the former to a process of absorption after which the identity of 
origin on the part of the one who is being assimilated ceases to maintain its distinct 
character. Whether assimilation may imply cultural annihilation for the one who is 
being assimilated depends upon whether or not the culture that the one assimilates 
into and the culture of origin that the one assimilates from are mutually exclusive. One 
may not become half Christian and half Muslim at the same time, yet one can be half 
Turkish and half Kurdish, or one may identify her national identity as Turkish while 
preserving her ethnic Kurdish identity. As suggested by Zolberg (1997) in his work 
‘modes of incorporation’, learning and using Turkish does not necessitate one to 
forget her knowledge of Kurdish. While the sort of assimilation that implies cultural 
annihilation can be called absorptive assimilation, the second type of assimilation 
where a ‘previous cultural membership is retained while acquiring a new one’ 
(Baubock 1998: 43) should be understood as an additive assimilation (Barry 2001: 
81). Those who think that assimilation is annihilation usually assume that one has to 
cease to be Kurdish in order to become Turkish. Thus assimilation has been 
conceptualized by some scholars like Kutschera (1979), Nezan (1980) and Entessar 
(1992) to epitomize the Kemalist Turkish nationalism as if it were, in essence, 
something of ethnic nationalism that systematically targeted the cultural annihilation 
of non-Turkish speaking Muslim minorities in the course of homogenization. 
 This is what Heper (2007) does not accept. In his response to the ethnicist 
interpretation of Turkish nationalism, Heper dedicated a book to argue that what 
happened in Turkey is not assimilation of Kurds (in an absorptive sense). In his 
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account of ‘the state and Kurds in Turkey’ Heper makes a differentiation between the 
terms of assimilation and acculturation arguing that ‘the state–in Turkey–has not 
resorted to forceful assimilation of the Kurds, because the founders of the state had 
been of the opinion that for long centuries, both Turks and Kurds in Turkey 
particularly the latter had gone through the process of acculturation, or steady 
disappearance of cultural distinctiveness as a consequence of a process of voluntary, 
or rather unconscious, assimilation’ (Heper 2007: 6). Although Heper is right in his 
defence of the view that acculturation (in the sense of additive assimilation) has not 
been systematically translated into absorptive assimilation of Kurds, there is an 
irrefutable fact that undermines the legitimacy of Turkish Nationalism in its relation to 
the Kurds.  It is the absorptive and forceful characteristic of state policies against 
those Kurds who rejected the relegation of their identities to their private sphere and 
who resisted the idea of additive assimilation for various reasons. In what follows I will 
argue that in these resistance cases civic ideals of additive assimilation have been 
derogated by policies of repression that even reached to the extent of absorptive 
assimilation. 
  In what follows I will endeavour to bring the complex relations to the forefront by 
focusing on these two dimensions of Turkish nationalism: first, an ever remaining 
idealization of civic nationalism-incorporation, and later the historical forceful 
assimilation in practice.  
4.1.3 Some Kurds and Voluntary Incorporation  
 
 The emphasis on the voluntary incorporation of Kurdish community to the 
mainstream community in Turkey has often been challenged or ignored, by those who 
take the roots of Kurdish nationalism for granted, assuming that the Kurdish 
nationalism was derivative of a Kurdish nation. In his arguments Entessar (1992: 81) 
states that ‘No country has been as preoccupied with the eradication of Kurdish 
national Identity as Turkey in the twentieth century’. That which persists, it is implicitly 
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asserted, is all that there was.  Along the line of this argument likeminded scholars 
tend to assume that the state’s oppressive policies radicalized the Kurdish ‘national’ 
movement.  It should be emphasized that here the word is not ‘nationalist’ but 
‘national’ which presumes that there had already been a nation in the name of which 
the nationalist movement was justified.   Just like those who insist on matching the 
Turkish nation with one particular ethnic root in the past, those scholars such as 
Entessar (1992), Nezan (1980) who approach the Kurdish nation in the same manner, 
also suffer from their one sided view of history that neglects whose culture and 
expectations would be scotched, suppressed and silenced in the formation of both 
ethnic and national identities. Having said that I will explain how diverse, like any 
other groups, the Kurdish community has been, and how some of the Kurdish groups, 
on the contrary of nationalist segments, supported the centralized administration in 
Turkey and chose to incorporate to the mainstream community for a variety of 
reasons such as religious affiliations and maximizing material benefits. Those who 
reached important positions in the administration and society of Turkey will also be 
given to illustrate that only in the presence of ideal of civic-inclusive nationalism this 
incorporation could be possible.  
 Kurdish nationalists and some scholars interpret the Lausanne Peace 
Conference where the non-Turkish speaking Muslims were left out of the minority 
definition as a disappointing moment which led Kurds to start an armed struggle 
against the Republic. Olson (1989: 39-41) and White (1995) states that after the 
Lausanne treaty all possibilities and talks of granting autonomy to Kurds disappeared 
and after then, ‘Bitterly disappointed, the Kurds turned again to armed struggle in 
1925 led by Sheikh Said and was organized by Azadi’ (White 1995: 73). On the other 
hand the record of March 1923 confidential sessions in the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey reveals that almost all Kurdish deputies spoke strongly in favor of the 
inseparability of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples.  Heper’s account of the Kurdish 
MPs’ approach to the Lausanne Peace conference is also quite different from what 
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has been depicted by White (1995), Olson (1989), Entessar (1992) and Nezan (1980). 
In Heper’s account, examples of Kurdish MPs’ expressions to support the unity of 
Kurds and Turks are summarized as follows,   
‘We (Kurds and Turks) are no different from each other … We have no conflict among 
ourselves. We have neither a Turkish nor a Kurdish problem. We are all brothers 
(Diyop Agha), ‘If you can lay bare the true sentiments of the Kurds and the Turks, you 
would see that  They have the same vision for the future of this country. The Turks 
and the Kurds became so mingled together that our nation that, (the allies) are trying 
to tear apart, constitutes one single entity.’(Necati Bey from Erzurum whose mother 
was Kurd); ‘In the invitation to the (Lausanne Peace) Conference, there is the term 
‘Non-Turks’. I am a Kurd… I beg our delegates to tell everybody that the Turk and 
Kurd together constitute one single nation. I ask our delegates to reject such a 
reference to the Kurds in the strongest terms possible (Kurd Necib Bey from Mardin)’ 
(Heper 2007: 117). 
 
Entessar (1992) in his account of the Sheikh Said rebellion accepts that ‘the rebellion 
failed because the Azadi49 leaders were unable to coordinate the Kurdish officers 
rebellion with the anticipated uprisings of tribal leaders’ (Entessar 1992: 83) but this 
author and his likeminded colleagues like Nezan (1980) avoid asking why it was the 
case. Those scholars who wrote on Kurdish national movements are rather reluctant 
to accept that tribal and religious matters were the overriding determinants of these 
movements, which did not resonate with those Kurds who lacked national 
consciousness or integrity of any sort.  On April 19 1920, the British Prime Minister 
Lloyd George made the following observation: 
When it comes to Kurdistan, it is difficult to decide which policy to adopt…Once it was 
thought that separating Kurdistan from Turkey and granting autonomy to it would have 
been the best policy .Yet it has never been clear what exactly the Kurds themselves 
preferred. On the basis of a study of this issue that I had asked to be made in Istanbul, 
Baghdad and elsewhere, I now have the impression that a Kurd does not represent any 
entity other than his own tribe. …’ (Arslan 1991: 47 cited in Heper 2007: 113) 
 
Given the absence of a unity on the part of Kurds, Mustafa Kemal and his associates 
did not think that they would be challenged by a remarkable threat in the long run 
                                                
49 Azadi (freedom) is an organization that was established sometime between 1921 and 1924 
and whose objectives according to Olson (1989: 45) were as follows: ‘to deliver the Kurds from 
Turkish oppression; to give Kurds freedom and opportunity to develop their country; and 
obtain British assistance, realizing Kurdistan could not stand alone’ the republican cadre saw 
this as a merely a product of foreign complicity.  From a perspective of chronological order it 
was meaningless for Kurds to oppose Turkish oppression because there was neither any 
remarkable trace of such oppression nor an ethnic interpretation of Turkishness by the 
authorities that preceded 1924 (Somer 2004: 241).  
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(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 11). After all as can be understood from the 1923 Lausanne 
Treaty, the state’s policies happened to be only in favour of those Kurds who 
defended unity and incorporation as opposed to Kurds who did not. Targeted 
incorporation of the Kurds into the mainstream has been facilitated by resorting to a 
territorial definition of the nation including equal opportunities and cultural 
commonalities such as religion and common history. Particular segments of Kurdish 
society have complied with state policies and not developed resistance to this ideal.  
First of all, in the very beginning of the Kurdish resistance movements, the ordinary 
Kurdish peasantry did not attach themselves to the rebellions led by Sheikhs and 
tribal leaders because the Sheikh’s revolts ‘promised them no relief from exploitative 
landlords, while Ankara had already announced its desire to curtail feudalism’ 
(Romano 2006: 106). There are European parallels in Hungary and Poland. Along the 
same line of this argument Bulloch and Morris (1992) identified the main motivation 
behind these Kurdish rebellions as being of the desire of Sheikhs to ‘be left alone to 
exercise their feudal tyranny over as many of their countrymen as they can contrive to 
control’ (Bulloch and Morris 1992: 97). 
  The religious division between the Alevi and Sunni Kurds has also been a 
relevant factor to explain the incorporation and resistance patterns among members 
of Kurdish society.  This division is accepted to be one of the elements that explain 
the failure of Sheikh Said to invoke an ethnic mobilization among Kurds in 1925. 
Olson explains this as follows: 
The core of the Sheikh Said rebellion’s military leadership was drawn from sunni 
former Hamidiye commanders, such as Xalid Beg Gibran, to whom Sheikh Said was 
related by marriage … Mindful of the depredations of the Hamidiye the Alevi tribes 
refused to join the rebellion, considering themselves better off in a secular Turkey, 
nominally Sunni, than in a self-declared Sunni Kurdistan in which the Naksabandi 
(Sunni) tarikat would assume a major role. The Alevi rejection of his overture greatly 
limited the potential area of the rebellion (Olson 1989: 94).  
 
 Similarly the Dersim uprising, which I will explore later in this chapter, failed chiefly 
because ‘it appeared to most Sunni Kurd at the time to be merely an Alevi uprising –
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and thus not in their own interest’ (White 1995: 71; van Bruinessen 1978: 374-75). 
This historical distinction between more secular oriented Alevis and religious Sunni 
segments of the Kurdish population remained a relevant factor to explain their 
changing political orientations. 
 
There were, in 1920 and 1937-38, rebellions of Kurdish Alevis against the Kemalist 
movement and the Republic, but at no time until today did Kurdish Alevis in significant 
numbers join forces with Sunni Kurds against the Kemalist regime. By and large, 
Kurdish as well as Turkish Alevis were supportive of the secular and populist ideals of 
Kemalism; many Kurdish Alevis voluntarily assimilated to Turkish culture and came to 
identify themselves as Turks rather than as Kurds’ (van Bruinessen 1996: 8).  
 
Indeed not only a remarkable proportion of Alevis have been incorporated into the 
mainstream Turkish community by the secular ideals of the republic, but some Sunni 
Kurds have also been integrated to the mainstream by the political parties of the right 
wing with an Islamic flavor to some degree (Narli 1999). A great number of Sunni 
Kurds most of the time made their decisions in general elections to vote for parties of 
this kind. 50   As can be deduced from party programs; Islam has always been 
pragmatically employed in Turkey to win the support of the Sunni Kurds. The right 
wing political parties with this aim have usually been successful to different degrees in 
incorporating the Sunni Kurds to the body politic.  When the first multi-party politics 
began in Turkey in 1946, The Democrat Party–as the only alternative to Ataturk’s 
Republican People Party–came to represent and voice the traditional Sunni Islamic 
values in the social and institutional strata that beforehand the republican revolution 
had sought to secularize.  During the era of DP–the first political party that won an 
election against Ataturk’s Republican Party–the relevance of Islam increased in the 
                                                
50 ‘Known to have an Islamist branch, the ANAP–Anavatan Partisi: the Motherland Party–
campaigned on a secular platform and adopted an accomodationist stance toward religion. 
For example, when asked about Islamist political activity, Yilmaz replied that the secular 
nature of the Turkish state was secure and that therefore Islamists should be permitted to 
express their views freely. On the positive end of the scale are those parties that explicitly 
include Islam in their platform and champion anti-secularist issues such as women’s rights to 
wear the headscarf in universities and other public offices. The MHP–Milliyetci Hareket Partisi: 
the Nationalist Movement Party–includes a religious plank and supports Islamist struggles, but 
does not advocate the Islamicization of the state. The RP–Refah Partis: the Welfare Party–, at 
the Islamist pole of the continuum, argues that Islam represents the true identity of the Turkish 
state’ (A.J. Secor 2001: 549). 
                                                                                                                
 124 
eastern regions. For example, ‘after 1950, within a year, 250,000 Quran and 
thousands of religious books, many of which aimed to lessen Kurdish nationalism, 
were sold in the region’ (Alis 2009: 55, Karpat 1967: 244).  While being concerned 
with undermining the Kurdish nationalism, The DP’s policies were simultaneously 
accompanied by a means of incorporation and inclusion. This is shown by the fact 
that, like many other Kurdish figures from the eastern regions, Abdulmelik Firat, who 
is Sheikh Said’s grandson, could also become a member of the parliament between 
1950 and 1960 (Akar 1996). Like the DP, succeeding AP (Adalet Paritsi–Justice 
Party) was also similarly supported by the Kurds. Again the DP’s emphasis on the 
urgent need to rectify regional disparities between the eastern and western parts of 
the country was rejuvenated by the AP (Kokce 2010: 89). This approach was evident 
in AP’s 1965 government program one part of which is as follows: 
To realize a balanced development in a social justice framework, we have to narrow 
the development gap among the regions. There are great gaps in terms of life and 
living standards in most parts of the country, especially in East and Southeast regions 
(Kokce 2010: 89, Yeğen 1999: 163). 
 
In the 1961 elections The Justice Party and New Turkey party shared the votes of the 
electors in east. Doctor Yusuf Azizoglu from the New Turkey Party who became the 
minister of health in 1962 was a Kurd. Prime Minister and later the president Özal 
who thought it is very likely that the ethnic differences could be overcome by a 
recourse to Islam and equal citizenship was also of Kurdish origin, and he frequently 
said so in public (Leezenberg 2001: 26, Genckaya 2001, Akyol 2006:221, Heper 
2007: 125). According to Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 112), after the 1980 coup even 
the military that used to be known as the guardian of the secular regime ‘viewed 
religion as a political tool to boost national unity and weaken the influence of Marxist 
and separatist ideas’. Duran (1998) argued that Islam was again a salient factor to 
explain the collaborative attitude and political behaviours of those Kurds who voted 
for the Islamist-Welfare Party with 34 members of Kurdish origin in the 1995 general 
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elections (Barkey and Fuller 1998:106).51  Lastly in 2007’s parliamentary elections, for 
example, ‘the Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) managed to collect 56 
percent of the southeast’s votes. Even in Diyarbakir, considered a pro-Kurdish DTP 
stronghold, the AKP took 41 percent of votes’ (Schleifer 2009). Moreover as of 2007 
elections the AKP has 75 MPs who are of Kurdish origin.  ‘It has been estimated that 
by the end of the twentieth century … at least one-fourth of the deputies elected to 
Parliament since 1923 have been of Kurdish origin’ (Heper 2007: 118, Ergil 2000: 
126). Hotham (1972: 180) states that  
‘Many Kurds in Turkey (though their ethnic origin is never publicly referred to) have 
reached high positions in the Turkish state and enriched many walks of life, in the 
same sort of way it seems to me as Scotsmen, Welshmen, or Irishmen, have done in 
Britain’ (Heper 2007: 118, Cornell 2001). 
 
Those Kurds who have been elected to the Parliament though could only operate 
within the boundaries of the official ideology dictating that the only official language is 
Turkish, and the politics of ethnicity has no place in the office. These people have 
been evidence of the fact that the citizens of any ethnicity could enjoy influential 
positions in Turkey so long as they have not made their ethnicity an issue.  Indeed 
these Kurds who cooperated with the state were to be condemned and attacked by 
radical Kurdish nationalists. 
‘Texts such as The Way of the Kurdish Revolution, distributed in 1975 contained 
extremely brutal attacks on the Kurdish bourgeoisie, accused of collaboration with the 
Turkish state’ (Chaliand 1994: 47)  
 
‘Some of the former DEP (a pro-Kurdish party) deputies were also very intolerant of 
Kurds in other political parties. According to Yasar Kaya, many prominent deputies of 
Kurdish origin serving other parties such as Hikmet Cetin, Kamran Inan, and Fehmi 
Isiklar were traitors who had betrayed the Kurdish cause…The PKK, too, in 
accordance with its Decree on Village Raids has attacked and burned ‘non 
revolutionary villages that do not support national struggle for liberation’ (Kirisci and 
Winrow 1997: 131-147). 
 
                                                51 Barkey and Fuller (1998: 106) argue that ‘Had there been no national 10 percent threshold 
blocking (pro-Kurdish) HADEP’S entry into parliament, Welfare’s representation in the south 
east would have been seriously reduced’. Nevertheless this does not undermine the fact that 
remarkable number of Kurds in east instead of abstaining from voting, chose to vote for 
Welfare that ‘obtained majority of the votes casts in Bingol city with 51.6 percent’  (Celebi 1996: 
Appendix 3). 
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 4.1.4 Some other Kurds and Forced Assimilation  
 
 Although the majority of Kurds who chose to integrate into the mainstream 
community were given ‘equal opportunities’ as everyone else, no solution other than 
forceful assimilation was anticipated for those Kurds who were not willing to relegate 
their ethnic identity to their private sphere and who had rejected becoming Turkish in 
any form. ‘This, in a nutshell, was the problem of a significant portion of the Kurdish 
population’ (Cornell 2001).  
 The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the declaration of the decree banning 
the use of any language other than Turkish in public offices and schools was followed 
by a series of laws on secularization as explained before. In Mardin’s opinion this 
secularization process, the centralization of all administration and education for all in 
the Turkish language have been the primary factors that politicized the Kurds (Mardin 
1993: 100-101). Resistance to these above mentioned developments steered a wave 
of mutinies in the 1920s and 30s. ‘Of the 18 rebellions that broke out between 1924 
and 1938 17 were in Eastern Anatolia and 16 of them involved the Kurds’ (Kirisci and 
Winrow 1997: 100, Simsir 1972). The first of these insurgencies was Sheikh Said 
rebellion (Olson 1989). As already mentioned before, Ataturk read this rebellion, as 
being more an outcome of religious fundamentalism or feudal resistance rather than 
Kurdish nationalism. This view is also supported by so many scholars since the 
rebellion had been led only by one Zaza speaking Sunni tribe. Moreover it was not 
supported by other Kurdish tribes let alone Alevi Zazas who felt more secure under 
the authority of the semi-secular Republic 52 than the rule of Hanafi Sunni Kurds. 
                                                
52 It is semi-secular because the day when the Caliphate was abolished witnessed the 
establishment of the directorate of Religious affairs (today the presidency of religious affairs) 
that would work under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Directorate of Religious Affairs has 
been given the responsibility to construct mosques, advise on issues of religious education, 
and administer the worships.  The aim with the foundation of this institution was rather to keep 
the religious activities under state control and avoid the development of religious movements 
that would otherwise have challenged the authority and principles of republican regime.  
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Moreover even today Kurmanci has nothing to do with the language of Zaza 
(Kirmanci) people who demarcate themselves from Kurmanci Kurds in the strongest 
terms possible53 and for this reason it would be meaningless to assume that the 
Zazas at that time might have revolted in the name of Kurmanci people to whom they 
could not even communicate properly. Whatever the main reason behind the rebellion 
was, the government’s reaction to this movement had certain assimilative implications 
for both Zaza and Kurmanci people who lived in the region.  
 While this rebellion was going on, Ataturk declared martial law and introduced 
‘the 4 March 1925 Law on Maintenance of Order and Peace’–Takrir-i Sukun–which 
would create Independence Tribunals (Istiklal Mahkemeleri). These had complete 
authority of arrest and execution of those who committed treason and endangered the 
public order (Mumcu 1992). Independence tribunals authorized by the Martial Law 
sentenced Sheikh Said and 52 of his partisans to capital punishment. Police forces 
were established there and authorized with extraordinary powers to maintain 
tranquillity. The application of repression policies was not only confined to those who 
engaged with mutiny but also extended to ordinary people in the region who had been 
intimidated. One of the most important initiatives to prevent a further rebellion was 
formulated through the plan for the reformation of the East–Sark Islahat Plani. On 8th 
September 1925 this plan was issued by the prime ministry with the resolution 
number 2356 (Bayrakli 1993). According to article 14 of the Plan for Reformation of 
the East  
People who speak a language other than Turkish in state and municipality, 
institutions, and other organs and administration, in schools, at the 
marketplace in the district and regional centers of Malatya, Elâziz, Diyarıbekir, 
Bitlis, Van, Muş, Urfa, Ergani, Hozat, Erciş, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Çarsancak, 
Çemişgezek, Ovacık, Hısnımansur, Behisni, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik, Çermik, 
(would) be brought before the courts (Fernandes 2008: 45). 
 
                                                
53 ‘As recently as the 1990s, when a former Kurdish separatist leader, Seyfi Cengiz, tried to 
convince villagers in his region that they were Kurds, the latter responded to him with the 
following words: “We are Kirmanci (Zaza). You are saying we are Kurdish. We are not 
Kurdish” ’ (Heper 2007: 113). 
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 In the meantime the government also initiated a plan to mix the populations of 
different ethnicities and introduced the resettlement law to this effect. More correctly 
the government employed its resettlement policies to strengthen the Turkish 
character of the population at the national level. Based on the resettlement law, no: 
8885, 31 May 1926 Cagaptay (2006: 67) stated that  
On 15 October 1925 Directorate General for resettlement decided that the Maras 
province whose inhabitants were of various elements, needed Turkish 
immigrants… 2nd resettlement law also focused on domestic population issues. 
Accordingly, it authorized the ministry of interior to relocate the nomadic tribes54 
and others around suitable centres. 
 
 
Fuat Dundar (2001: 137-54) also indicated that this policy was principally aimed at 
assimilating Kurds into the Turkish population. Kokdemir (1952: 28-30) argued that 
Turkey deployed this forced resettlement policy as a means to bully the mutinous 
elements in the country. Heper on the other hand argued that the law was ‘aimed at 
creating a new nation through integration rather than assimilation–forcing one ethnic 
community to adopt the ethnic primary identity of another ethnic community’ (Heper 
2007: 169). To this end again, the government passed, in 1927, the Law Nr.1097 
(Law on the transfer of certain people from the Eastern regions to the Western 
provinces).  By this law almost fourteen hundred individuals from Agri province and 
the Eastern regions were resettled to the Western provinces (Cagaptay 2006: 68). 
  Another policy deployed against separatism was to ban any associations and 
political organizations established on the basis of ethnicity. Associations as such were 
banned by the Law no 765 published in the official Journal of the Turkish republic on 
3rd March 1926, Articles 141 and 142 contain the key provisions:   
Article 141-4 Any attempt, on the basis of race, to suppress or eliminate the rights 
recognized by the Constitution, the creation or attempted creation of organizations 
aiming to weaken or diminish national sentiment and the leadership or administration 
of such organizations are criminal offences punishable from eight to fifteen years’ 
incarceration. Article 141-5: Membership to such organizations is punishable from five 
to twelve years’ incarceration. 141-8: For the purposes of this legislation, an 
organization shall consist of any gathering of two or more persons to pursue a 
common goal. …142-6: If any of the above mentioned criminal offences is committed 
                                                54 Cagaptay (2006) emphasized that, in the jargon of the time, nomad people were simply 
referring to the Kurds and Roma people.  
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by way of publication, the sentence will be increased by one half’ (Chaliand 1994: 31). 
 
 When the oppressive policies were in practice there were some other 
insurgencies taking place around The Agri Mountain.  These uprisings that Captain 
Ihsan Nuri did lead and the Kurdish Nationalist organization the Hoybun55 supported 
were to be repressed by the government in 1930. Article 1 of the law no 1850 
published on 29th July 1931 specified that:  
 Killings, and other acts committed, either individually the state or of its provinces, 
by civil or military personnel, as well as by local authorities, guards or the militia, or 
any civilian having aided them or having acted in accord with them, from the 20th June 
1930 to the 10 December 1930, in the pursuit and extermination of uprisings which 
took place at Ercis, Zilan, Agri Dag and surrounding area, also including the region of 
the first inspectorate and the district of Pulumur, in the province of Erzincan, will not 
be considered as crimes (Chaliand 1994: 38).  
 
The Dersim region had been problematic for almost a century. Inhabitants of the 
region consisted of Alevi Zazas by and large. Sheikhs and tribal leaders in the region 
did not accept any authority other than their own control and Dersim had remained as 
the last part of Turkey that could not be controlled by the mid-1930s.  Tribal chiefs 
and Sheikhs insisted on maintaining their exercise of unlimited authority over the 
masses, whom they often abused economically (van Bruinessen 1994: 144-45).  The 
US ambassador to Turkey stated in his Dersim report that ‘Although the Turkish 
government tried to solve the problem by means of economic reforms, tribal chieftains 
resisted these reforms, refused to pay taxes, and disrupted the constructions of  
bridges, roads and schools in the region’ (Cay 1993: 422-424).  To subdue the 
insurgencies and revoke the feudal order, the government issued the 1934 Law on 
Resettlement–'İskân Kanunu' Law No.2510, 13th June 1934.  In 1934, 25,381 people 
                                                
55. The ruling government under Ismet Inonu saw this rebellion as an insurgency of feudal 
tribal chieftains because the Hoybun was led by leaders who belonged to the ‘great feudal 
(that is to say tribal) Kurdish families’ (Chaliand 1994: 37).  Moreover ‘the rebellion obtained 
the tacit support of Reza Shah’s government in Iran and as a result Ihsan Nuri’s forces were 
able to freely cross into Iran and receive equipment and supplies from sources in Iran 
Kurdistan. Reza Shah apparently was intent on using his Kurdish card to force Turkey to settle 
some of its territorial disputes with Iran’ (Entessar 1992: 85). 
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from 5,074 households in Eastern and South Eastern cities were resettled to the 
western parts of Turkey (Tekeli 1990: 49). 
  Besikci (1990: 20) and van Bruinessen (1994: 146) in their studies on Dersim 
rebellion revealed that, as a second step, the Government had commanded the Army 
to ‘round up and deport the people in the rebellious districts… to render those who 
have used arms or are still using them once and for all harmless on the spot, to 
completely, destroy their villages and to remove their families’ (The secret Decision of 
the Council of Ministers on the Punitive Expedition to Dersim of 4 May 1937 quoted 
from van Bruinessen 1994: 6).  After the Dersim rebellion was subdued in 1938, 
7,954 persons were reported killed or caught alive yet Kurds claim that the number of 
death in Dersim was much higher (Kirmizitoprak, 1970). After the rebellion was 
subdued and mutineers were executed, reforms have been intensively realized in 
Dersim, the name of which was also changed to Tunceli in 1935. Schools were built 
and children were educated so intensively along the lines of Republican ideology that 
most of the later generations in the region not only assimilated into the mainstream 
very successfully but also ended up being proud of holding Turkish nationality (Selek 
2006: 528-529). As of April 2011 the current leader of the mainstream Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kilicdaroglu is only one of those Alevi Zazas from 
Tunceli (Dersim) who has strongly opposed the politicization of ethnicity in Turkey in 
the modern era.    
After all the number of Kurds deported to western Turkey in 1930s was in total 
25,381 (Tekeli 1990: 49-55). Repressions of these rebellions between 1924 and 1938 
resulted in the displacement of Kurds who would later mix with people of other 
ethnicities in the places they were resettled to.  
 In the 1930s and 1940s these assimilationist-integrationist policies went so far 
as to deny the very existence of a distinct Kurdish ethnicity. It was declared that 
Kurds were indeed (Mountain) Turks and they forgot their Turkishness in time. Those 
were the only times when Turkishness was defined as being something of ethnic 
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origin rather than citizenship.  This deviation from the constitutional spirit that defines 
Turkishness primarily as a category of citizenship was however only prevalent 
between 1930s and 1940s until the racist storm in Germany and Italy had vanished 
from Europe.  According to Heper (2007: 107) ‘German influence was particularly 
effective vis-à-vis at least some officers’. It was also effective on a very limited 
number of civil servants like the Minister of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, who stated 
that ‘The Turks are the only lords of this country, its only owners. Those who are not 
of pure Turkish stock have in this country only one right that of being servants, of 
being slaves’ (Van Bruinessen 1994:54). A careful analysis of the newspaper reveals 
that before and after this sentence Bozkurt was referring to Non-Muslims who 
previously dominated commercial activities and owned most financial assets in the 
country.56 It should be stressed that even in those times between the 1930s and 
1940s Kurds had not been excluded from ethnically defined Turkish community but 
they were represented as being of Turkish descent.  ‘On the historiographical level 
this has been expressed by the Turkish Historical Thesis and the Sun Language 
Theory, according to which the Turkish language is the source for all existing 
languages in the world’ (Hirschler 2001: 147).  According to this, the word ‘Kurd’ was 
a name given to the one of the 24 grandsons of Oguz Khan, the mythological founder 
of the Turks, so the Kurds, it is asserted, were indeed Turks.  
A decade after the Dersim rebellion the first easing in the relations came just 
before the election in 1950 (Kilic 2007: 65, Simsir 2009: 447).  The CHP–Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi: Republican People’s Party–had allowed those previously displaced 
Sheikhs and Aghas to return to their hometowns in 1947 hoping that these chieftains 
in return would use their tribal potency to generate local support in the coming 
election (Besikci 1969: 220).  Moreover, 22,516 people of 4,128 households returned 
                                                
56 For the original text see Aksam Gazetesi (19 September 1930:2). Taking the sentence out 
of context and presenting it as if it was to be used to portray the relationship between the 
Kurds and the Turks, as Van Bruinessen (1994: 154) and Mateescu (2006: 234) did, is an 
example of historical disinformation. Far from taking history seriously, actually, these scholars 
seem to be treating it far too lightly. 
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to their homes in 1947 (Tekeli 1990: 55). However it was too late for CHP to win the 
support of the Kurdish chieftains who were ready to blindly support any opposition to 
the previous regime that had been very harsh on them. In the 1950 election the 
Democrat party came to power with the support of the conservative majority and 
Kurdish chieftains who thereby became MPs of the new parliament. Resettlement of 
Kurds by state coercion laws were followed by a wave of voluntary migration on the 
part of Kurds who wanted to benefit from the development of a national market 
economy in the urban industrialized regions of the 1950s (Yegen 2009). From that 
time onwards until the outbreak of the violent conflict between PKK and the armed 
forces of the State in 1984 there was not going to be a serious uprising on the part of 
the Kurds.  All political activities of rather a smaller scale by that time were to be 
repressed without any difficulty.57 It was illegal to establish a political party that was 
based on ethnicity. For this reason political activities of nationalist Kurds who adopted 
a Marxist-Leninist ideology were to be maintained under the Workers’ Party of 
Turkey–TIP: Turkiye Isci Partisi–the main consideration of which was to bring 
socialism to Turkey. This party in 1971 was closed down on the grounds that its 
Eastern Region Demonstrations–Dogu Mitingleri–turned out to be a base for the 
politicization of the Kurdish ethnicity.  Later on in 1974 Kurdish members of the former 
workers party of Turkey established an underground organization called the Socialist 
party of Turkish Kurdistan. Members of this organization tried to disseminate the 
                                                
57 The first one of those activities emerged as a student movement that embodied a Kurdish 
independence party in 1958. These university students had adopted a Marxist Leninist 
ideology which was in strong contradiction not only with the official ideology of Republican 
regime but also with those Kurdish MPs most of whom were tribal chieftains and maintained 
the feudal order to their own interest (Simsir 2009: 515, Cay 1993: 431). 52 of the participants 
to this party, who also came to be known as 49s or Easterners, were arrested in 1959 and 
freed in 1961. Most of them were going to take active roles in politics later. On 30th April of 
1963 two university students were arrested on an accusation of publishing a magazine in 
Kurdish. In the same year police forces arrested 13 Turkish Kurds who were either communist 
or nationalist and whose aim was to establish an independent Kurdish state in Turkey. Those 
students were also to be freed due to insufficient evidence against them. In 1965, Faik Bucak 
established Turkey branch of Kurdistan Democratic Party (TKDP) illegally under the 
leadership of Mustafa Barzani who controlled the party from Iraq. The number of the party 
members in Turkey could only reach to 30 by 1971 when the party members were arrested 
and 10 of them were sentenced to 7 years in prison (Simsir 2009: 548). 
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leftist ideas of Kurdish identity ’yet they continued to believe in Kurdish – Turkish 
coexistence within a socialist system (McDowall 2000: 412). This Kurdish 
organization was not well accepted by those Kurdish groups who were rather 
committed to the traditional tribal and Islamic values.  During those times the PKK–
Partiya Karkari Kurdistan: Kurdistan Worker Party–emerged out of a group led by 
Abdullah Ocalan who was previously a former member of the Ankara Higher 
Education Association and arrested for distributing ideological bulletins.  ‘In 1977 the 
Apocular (partisans of Abdullah Ocalan) identified the enemies of the Kurdish people 
as the fascists; agents of the state and those (no matter whether Turks or Kurds) who 
supported them, the Turkish left which subordinated the Kurdish question to the leftist 
revolution and finally the exploitative Kurdish Landlord class.’ (McDowall 2000: 419). 
What separated PKK from all other Kurdish organizations was its ultimate goal to 
create an independent Kurdistan (Entessar 1992: 95). To this effect Apocular fought 
not only with the tribal Kurdish chieftains and villagers, who did not support them, but 
also the Kurds who preferred to stay loyal to the state and any Kurdish leftist group 
that strayed from PKK’s violent techniques and ultimate goal to create a separate 
Kurdistan. The foundations of which were justified by Marxist ideology had indeed 
been adopting a fascist and intolerant approach leaving no room for the opposition of 
any sort within its own community.  Not surprisingly the first attack of the PKK was on 
a Kurdish tribal leader, Bucak, who was also an MP from the conservative Justice 
Party.58   
While the Kurdish movement was operating clandestinely the political 
atmosphere all over the country was chaotic as the vicious conflict between rightist 
and leftist factions went so far as to be described as anarchy with ‘231 political 
murders in 1977, 832 in 1978, 898 during the nine months between December 1978 
                                                
58 It should be noted that all the logistic support, equipment and the human force that Ocalan 
needed at the time was provided by another tribal leader who was the enemy of Bucak tribe. 
The first armed forces he enjoyed before 1984, therefore, had not come out of the participant’s 
commitment (if any) to Kurdish nationalist cause. 
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and September 1979, and 2,812 during the following twelve months’ (Mango 2005: 
16). 
  McDowall (2000: 415) states that the Ataturk legacy ‘was under assault not 
only from the war between leftist and rightist groups, but also from Kurdish 
nationalists, Marxists and Islamic revivalists’. With the 1980 military coup the army 
declared a state of emergency and suspended the civil government for two years. 
According to official statistics police forces arrested 175,000 political activists and 
civilians in these two years (Karasapan 1989: 8). Most of the detainees consisted of 
Marxists and leftists.  Given that Turkey had been a strong ally of the US in the cold 
war59, it can be safely asserted that the target of police forces during and after the 
1980 coup, by and large, has been the communists not the Kurds per se. It was not 
only Kurdish leftists but also so many Marxists of Turkish origin that had to flee the 
country. The ‘other’ vis-à-vis the Turkish nation in this context was not Kurds per se 
but rather the communists and separatists.  Most of the Marxist but not necessarily 
separatist Kurdish detainees were tortured until 1984.  Hundreds of testimonies of 
torture in the prison can now be read in the works of Hasan Cemal (2003) and Faruk 
Bildirici (2008). It is a well-known argument that the PKK would have never been able 
to generate the first wave of support to its cause if those leftist Kurds in Diyarbakir 
Prison had not been repressed, tortured and marginalized by the police forces (Cemal 
2003).  As can be inferred from this argument, those religious Kurds who had nothing 
to do with Marxist leftist ideology were not considerably marginalized by the state in 
the first place. It is also known that a massive support for the PKK, even 11 years 
after its establishment, could not be generated among Kurds. For which Abdullah 
Ocalan was to admonish his deputies, stating that ‘When we look at the experience in 
other countries, we see that they started with 300 guerrillas. Within two years their 
                                                
59Turkey joined NATO; supported the US in the Cuban missile crisis; installed an American 
base in Incirlik; and endorsed the principles of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine.  Finally Turkey 
accepted nearly 2.5 billion dollars in military aid from the US between 1950 and 1970 
(Karasapan 1989). 
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numbers rose to 10,000. We also started with 300, but we are still only 1,500. Why?’ 
(Mango 2005: 38). The PKK was still not a massive movement at the time, yet its 
existence was posing a great threat to Ataturk’s legacy of national unity and the 
patriotic conception of nation in the country. 
  The new policy measures to prevent the acceleration of separatist movements 
were not going to be different from the previous ones that had already impeded the 
emergence of a distinct Kurdish societal culture in Turkey. In October 1983 the 
government introduced the Law 2932 that forbade ‘express, diffusing or publishing in 
any language other than the official language of the states recognized by the Turkish 
state. Until 1992, Kurds were not allowed to be engaged in cultural activities and 
perform songs and plays in Kurdish, or identify certain customs as Kurdish’ (Heper 
2007: 164). Those who wanted to give their children Kurdish names were not allowed 
to do so by the law (1587) that articulated that names contradicting the national 
culture, traditions and morality and offending the public opinion cannot be legally 
registered on birth certificates (HRFT 2002).  By 1986, 2842 out of 3254 villages in 
mostly Kurdish populated cities had been given Turkish names for further integration  
and ‘to obliterate Kurdish identity’ (McDowall 2000: 425).  The government applied 
the deportation policy again and evacuated 2,253 villages by 1995 for security 
reasons (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 131).  In addition to these, some other villages 
have been vacated by those villagers who escaped both the terror of the PKK60 and 
banditry of the village guards61 who abused their power in the region. Some of the 
villages had been left by the inhabitants who found themselves under crossfire 
between the PKK and the security forces.  The war on PKK was to be carried under 
                                                
60 Kurdish villages that did not want to support the struggle for national liberation were 
attacked by the PKK. A long list of the villages attacked and burned by the PKK is available in 
Simsir’s documentary work (2009: 642-648).  
61  ‘The controversial village guard system was introduced in April 1985 because of the 
enormous logistical difficulties of ensuring security in the mountains and rural areas of Eastern 
and South Eastern Turkey. The aim was to enable villages to defend themselves against 
attacks from the PKK’ (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 129). Yet these village guards were later 
detected to have abused their power in brigandage and smuggling.  
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the state of emergency (OHAL: Olaganustu Hal Durumu) which was declared and 
issued in July 1987, it was to be renewed every four months by the Parliament (Yavuz 
2001). Civilian governors were authorized by this law to exercise certain powers, 
which would not be subject to the supervision of the constitutional court.  Practices of 
the Civil Governors who held this power included limitations on the press and 
elimination from the area of persons whose actions were thought to be inimical to the 
public order.  Under the state of emergency both the police forces and Civil 
Governors violated a great number of human rights like the right to speak one’s 
mother tongue (HRFT 2002). In the meantime however the governments inevitably 
recognized the existence of a Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey. Governments that used to 
see the problem as merely a security issue have gradually evolved to become more 
concerned with the consolidation of the democracy in Turkey.  One of the reasons 
why this shift gradually took place is Turkey’s candidacy for membership to the 
European Union that put the protection of minorities as a condition for accession. 
Moreover the Kurdish nationalists increasingly came to voice their demands with the 
rhetoric of democratization, rather than independence claims, so the government as 
well as so many liberals started to hope that the conflict would wane if liberal 
democracy was consolidated.   However as I mentioned in the introduction, different 
approaches to the liberalism have arisen mainly due to the problem of agency, 
meaning that who should be considered as the ultimate holders of rights, if not only 
individuals. This discussion has not been derived from an informed philosophical view 
on the part of the government but as a result of the practical problem of diversity 
within the country and among the Kurds in particular.    
 
4.2 Conclusion  
The state versus the Kurds paradigm is not able to capture the complex relations of 
the diverse groups within Kurdish society, and their reflections on the agency of the 
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state. Considerable groups of Kurds have cooperated with the state whereas radical 
nationalists have been fighting against its armed forces (Tezcur 2010, Heper 2007).  
As this chapter has shown, the significant other vis-à-vis the Turkish nation has never 
been the Kurds per se but rather, communists and separatists as well as non-
Muslims.  Under the subtitle of ‘Some Kurds and Incorporation’ I endeavoured to 
show that the conflict was not only between the state and separatist Kurds but also 
between the nationalist Kurds who rejected Turkish identity in any form and moderate 
Kurds who have wanted to maintain their multiple identities within the current 
framework (Kirisci 2000). This fragmentation among Kurds has remained and could 
not be overcome by resort to the ethnic root they share, not only because the state 
tried to oppress any nationalist mobilization around particularistic ethnicities, but also 
because those Kurds who can occupy any position in the mainstream have chosen 
not to adopt an ethno-centric approach.  
 This chapter has shown that the assimilation of different segments of the 
Kurdish community to the system has been facilitated through the equal opportunities, 
religious sentiments, semi-secularism, and anti-feudal regulations at different points in 
the past. Yet those who could not be incorporated into the system by any of these 
means experienced the oppression and forced assimilation becoming more radical 
than their contemporaries (Watts 2006, Somer 2007). Legitimate public objectives for 
the majority turned out to be something irreconcilable with Kurdish nationalists’ 
prioritization of cultural autonomy. In Turkey, Turks and Kurds have not only fought 
together in the independence war but they have also shared a religion and a territory 
for so long a time that Kurdish nationalists’ intent to put one likeness (ethnicity) above 
all others is now being rebuffed by a group of intermingled Turks and some Kurds. 
Mixed marriages62 and the resettlement of the Kurds into the western parts of the 
                                                
62 Approximately 2.708.000 Turks and Kurds are related to each other by marriage. This figure 
does not even account for people who are of Kurdish origin yet identify with Turkish language 
as their mother tongue. This is by no means uncommon; as it will be explained in the coming 
chapter, a remarkable number of Kurdish couples communicate their children in Turkish to 
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country created an enormous number of people who came to hold multiple identities. 
Given that nationalism affirms the importance of certain likenesses above all others 
(Calhoun 1993: 229), the nationalist mobilization also happened to be problematic for 
some Kurds who are more concerned with their future prospects, linguistic and 
religious particularities than their overall Kurdishness. Zaza and Alevi Kurds’ 
demarcation of themselves from the majority of Sunni and Kurmanci Kurds, as has 
always been the case throughout history, is still evident (Neyzi 2003, White 1995).  
An important part of the Sunni Kurds is also valuing their religiosity, which is 
represented more by some political parties whose members are of diverse ethnicities 
(Somer 2007). All these fragmentations are still present because the Kurds per se 
have not been constantly marked by their ethnicities and never excluded from the 
mainstream on the basis of their ethnicity in a way that would lead them, in turn, to 
merge around it. Obviously what the system is ‘transitioning’ from affects the limits of 
transition or change itself.  In what follows I will explain the difficulties with this 
transformation in Turkey on both normative and practical levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
support their education in school. (Gultekin 2012) Given that the average fertility rate in Turkey 
is 2-3 children per family there are about 7 million people who are half Turkish and Kurdish in 
Turkey.  
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Chapter 5: When Multiculturalism Does not Fit. Kurds and 
Turkey in the 2000s 
 
 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated the heterogeneous nature of the Kurdish 
minority under the historical relationship between the state and Kurds in Turkey. I 
argue that the assimilation policies and integrationist ideals of civic nationalism 
together discarded ethnicity from public life. This has facilitated a great deal of 
fragmentation in political orientation, social status, and economic power of the citizens 
across their ethnic identities. As the Chapter IV has shown there is a tension between 
Zaza and Kurmanci Kurds; Alevi and Sunni Kurds, the conciliatory and the radical 
Turks; the Western Kurds and the Eastern Kurds; the Religious Kurds and the Marxist 
Kurds. This fragmentation has been presented as an outcome of the historical 
narrative in Turkey. It is now these circumstances under which ethnocentric 
multiculturalism fails to capture the complex and dynamic conception of the nation 
beyond its ethnic components. In such cases like Turkey where the societal culture 
and the meaning of ethnic distinctions are more fluid than Kymlicka assumed, Barry’s 
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statement holds true: ‘[Kymlicka’s] multiculturalist policies are not simply a passive 
adaptation to an ineluctable fact of cultural diversity. Rather multiculturalism actually 
creates the reality, which is then, in a circular process of self-reinforcement appealed 
to a justification for a further extension of multiculturalist policies’ (Barry 2001: 315). 
The aim of this chapter is to contextualize this argument in Turkey and show 
how the strong ethno-centric multiculturalism is bound to lead to further inequalities 
and limit the freedom of people within the minority it seeks to empower. The chapter 
will show that the difference-blind egalitarianism is equally problematic. Its extremely 
stringent interpretation of individual equality damages the very equality it seeks to 
promote. In what follows, I will first explain how multiculturalism has become an issue, 
and what its fundamental premises are to justify the need for a change in Turkey. I 
will then explain egalitarian critique of multiculturalism which is followed by an 
account of why the stringent version of egalitarianism in Turkey itself is not a viable 
option either. The thesis will focus on an alternative view of liberal egalitarian 
multiculturalism that departs from both ethnocentric multiculturalism of Kymlicka and 
difference-blind egalitarianism of Barry. This part will offer a post-multiculturalist 
politics of recognition that is equally sensitive to the problems with both equality and 
freedom. Post-multiculturalists will propose a third way in which the two must be 
combined and the last part of the chapter will take on the practicality of this third way 
in Turkey.  
 
5.1 Kurds and Turkey: Journey of Multiculturalism and Egalitarianism  
 
In spite of the heterogeneity that marks out Turkey from other multinational countries, 
there is a similar political discourse present in Turkey. There is a strong pressure to 
transform the country in a way that the central administration is expected to devolve 
its power between Turkish and Kurdish blocks. In Turkey, the culture of politics is 
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being changed to the politics of culture. The territorial conception of ‘nation-state’ is 
slowly being replaced by an ethno-cultural conception of multinational state.  In this 
changing environment, the pressure for the transformation in Turkey has so much in 
common with arguments of the ethno-centric ‘liberal multiculturalism’ theory of 
Kymlicka.  
 
Chart 1 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2 
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The demographic information also suggests that the Kurds are large enough 
and its majority did not assimilate to the mainstream as other ethnicities did in Turkey.  
Sizeable enough and ‘not assimilated’, the Kurds are captured by the definition of 
national minority that Kymlicka thinks should be given self-government rights.  
As already explained in the previous chapter, Turkey is a country where ethnic 
differences have been subordinated to the Turkish citizenship in public life ‘where the 
republic clings to its imagined monolithic identity’ (Taspinar 2007). ‘Between 1924 and 
1990 the Turkish state denied this aspect of the Kurdish question, perceiving it 
primarily as a social issue generated by the endurance of backward social structures 
and even occasionally as a security concern posed by foreign rivals’ (Yegen 2011: 
72).  
5.1.1 The Story of Multiculturalism in Turkey  
 
 
However as of the 1990s Turkey has seen a gradual increase in the 
recognition of Kurdish identity and a remarkable difference from what previously used 
to be known as a denial policy. As suggested by Kahraman’s work ‘From culture of 
politics to politics of culture’,   ‘under the pressure of the European Union, Turkey has 
undergone a remarkable change toward a better liberalism’ (Kahraman 2007: 66). 
The application of differentiated cultural rights for minority groups was prescribed by 
the EU as a mechanism to reduce the extent of cultural inequality in Turkey and 
develop democracy.63 In its 2009 Progress Report on Turkey the Commission of 
                                                63 Here it is important to clarify that the EU does not have either a consistent and agreed 
definition of what constitutes a national minority, or a standard minority regime that could be 
applied to all member countries, the minority policies of which vary considerably. Nevertheless, 
the EU has introduced minority rights as a condition of the enlargement process, and implicitly 
accepted the terms and policy advice of other international organizations such as the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe; the 
conventions and reports of these organizations are referred to as decisive in the European 
Commission’s progress reports on candidate countries. For this reason the EU’s stance on the 
Kurdish problem of Turkey will be presented within the conceptual framework of the 
conventions, charters of the above mentioned organizations whose recommendations have 
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European Communities, an executive body of the European Union, made its 
concerns explicit: 
Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities or the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages. There is a need for a dialogue 
between Turkey and the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities.i 
 
Protection of linguistic minorities in candidate and member countries became 
more important with the 1990 Copenhagen CSCE Document and the Council of 
Europe’s 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Members and 
candidate members of the Union were advised to allow the use of minority languages 
in public education and services. According to Article 14 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ‘states should endeavour to 
ensure adequate opportunities for being taught in the minority language or for 
receiving instruction in this language’.ii Even these linguistic rights were deemed 
insufficient by Joost Lagendijk, the co-chair of the Turkish–EU Joint Parliamentary 
Commission,iii who suggested that ‘Turkey should consider regional autonomy to help 
solve its Kurdish problem’.iv  
 
The same tone in compliance with the multiculturalist policies has been 
repeated among the intellectual stratum.  Hirant Dink who was an important 
intellectual in Turkey stated that  
 
the history almost every geography has such a multicultural environment in 
which the cultures have lived together, but it has recently been accepted that 
multiculturalism requires more than this; since it is vital to recognize these 
different beings and specific rights derived from such an existence. Indeed it 
is what the politics of multiculturalism tries to achieve so in this respect it is 
different from the concepts of pluralism and difference, which have no 
historical dimension and can emerge at any time. (Gulec 2003: 163 Interview 
with Hirant Dink) 
 
Another intellectual Beyaz claimed that   
                                                                                                                                       
obviously implied a set of standards that the EU expects Turkey to meet on its road to 
membership. 
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the State should recognise the identity, linguistic and cultural rights of the 
Kurds, take measures for Kurdish children to be taught and educated in their 
own language and for the promotion of Kurdish culture and by taking into 
consideration the historical and regional conditions, the state should constitute 
autonomous self-government regions for the Kurds in places densely 
populated by Kurds (Ibid: 163). 
 
 
In order to meet the minority criteria for accession to the European Union, in 
2002 Turkey reformed its policies to allow teaching of minority languages in private 
institutions. Moreover, one of the state funded national channels (TRT 6) today 
broadcasts 24 hours a day only in Kurdish (Siddique 2009).  
Somer (2007)’s ‘comprehensive content analysis of the mainstream nationalist 
Turkish daily Hurriyet’ also upholds the claim that  
Since 1999 the mainstream discourse has been undergoing a transformation 
that prepares a basis for liberal nationalism. The analysis covers all issues of 
Hurriyet from 1984 through 2003. All articles that were fully or partially related 
to the Kurdish question were identified and their contents were analyzed with 
respect to their subject matter…Comparison made between the periods of 
1984-1998 and 2000-2004 shows that there’s a considerable shift in the 
mainstream discourse in the sense that ‘non-secutity (social and identity–and 
human rights–related) aspects of Kurdish issue have become considerably 
more visible (Somer 2007: 123). 
 
 The following analysis of the articles that appeared in Hurriyet daily news 
from 1997 to 2011 also shows that the cultural dimension of the issue has been 
steadily increasing.  
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Chart 364 
 
 
 
What accompanied this increasing visibility of the Kurdish question with its cultural 
dimension and possible liberal solutions in the media and public debates and 
discourse has been a series of policy reforms. International Crisis Group (2011) listed 
these reforms as follows; 
• First of all, the Extraordinary Situation Region (Olağanüstü Hal Bölgesi, OHAL) 
designation was lifted from the last two provinces of southeastern Turkey where 
it applied, the death sentence was abolished, and some early, partial steps 
towards freer broadcasting and education were implemented. 
 
• AKP passed five laws in 2004-2005 to strengthen provincial assemblies and 
municipalities, replacing laws from the 1930s. ‘The new laws adopted in 2004-
2005 have introduced a drastic shift in the relationships between central and 
local administration, to set them in line with the standards and criteria laid down 
in the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Article 8)’. (UNDP 2010.) 
 
 
• In 2005, Erdoğan signalled a change in policy on the Kurds that led to the launch 
of the Democratic Opening in July 2009.  
 
• In 2005-2006, he replaced the military team holding exploratory talks with jailed 
PKK leader Öcalan with one led by civilian intelligence agents closer to him.  
 
                                                64 In this analysis articles with the word ‘Kurdish’ has been counted. It should be emphasized 
that the word ‘Kurdish’ refers to the language of Kurds, and all the articles analyzed here were 
on the linguistic dimension of the problem. 
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• In his 12 August 2005 speech in Diyarbakir, Erdogan expressed that ‘The Kurdish 
problem is my problem too … we will relax this area. Turkey has always looked 
through the security window; we will look through a different window’.   
 
• In July 2009, He summoned several ministers to his residence to put the final 
touches on the Democratic Opening.  
 
• On 29 July, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay gathered the media to announce a 
‘broadening and strengthening of our citizens’ democratic rights and ensuring 
that each of our citizens, wherever they live, feel themselves to be equal and 
free individuals of the state’. 
 
• On 1 August, a broad group of civil society activists and intellectuals met Atalay at 
Ankara’s Police Academy to discuss the project. The optimism that day was 
reflected by veteran commentator Hasan Cemal, a leading Turkish proponent of 
a Kurdish compromise: ‘this is the first time the Turkish government approaches 
the Kurdish problem so seriously.’ 
 
 
• In April 2010, the ruling party removed the bar on all languages other than 
Turkish in elections, changing the outright ban in the election law to the more 
flexible ‘in principle, political parties and candidates should use Turkish for 
electoral propaganda.’(Law on the Basic Regulations of Elections and Electoral 
Rolls, No. 298 (1961).  
 
 
 Even Perihan Sari, a member of the Republican People Party that has consistently 
opposed the use of any local language other than Turkish, communicated to the 
people of the Southeast region in Kurdish. Several ministers in the government also 
made declarations in the Kurdish language and legal barriers to the foundation of TV 
channels to broadcast in Kurdish for 24 hours a day were abolished. The State has 
allowed renaming the places in Southeast region with their old Kurdish versions.  
During my visits to the region in 2011 I also observed many commercial activities and 
advertisements conducted in Kurdish.  On 12th April 2012, Erdogan declared that the 
Kurdish language and the Ottoman would be elective courses in the curriculum. The 
Sabanci University and the Bilgi University offer the Kurdish language as an elective 
course. And the Higher Education Institute even approved the opening of a Kurdish 
Language and literature department in the State University of Mardin Artuklu.  
However, this transformation that to some extent complies with the expectations 
of normative theorists like Kymlicka (who sees group rights as a remedy to the 
injustices in diverse societies), did not bring either peace or equality. The PKK 
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(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) maintained the conflict in a 
time when the state had abandoned its policy of forced assimilation. Radical 
members of the cultural group remobilized and increased the extent of ethnic conflict 
when the state started to recognize their cultural identity in the public discourse. 
Obviously there are some further levels of recognition such as the establishment of 
autonomous regions with legislative powers, and the state funded education in 
mother tongue. It is these levels of recognition that the Kurdish nationalists keep 
demanding and it is these demands on behalf of which the Kurdish nationalists justify 
their recourse to violence.  
These remaining problems compel the political actors to think further about 
whether the historical idealization of ethnicity-blind civic nationalism in Turkey on the 
constitutional level should be from a liberal perspective, and can be, deconstructed. 
Should and can Turkey change its minority regime ‘in the shift from an individualist, 
opportunity oriented, difference-blind to a collectivist interpretation of civil rights 
legislation; in generalized opposition to the centralizing claims of the modern nation 
state’ (Brubaker 2001: 532)? 
In Turkey there are fundamentally two different approaches on the possibility 
and desirability of this transition. One is the egalitarian perspective that favours the 
persistent application of a difference-blind approach on the constitutional level65 and 
the other is the ethno-centric multiculturalism that stands for the elevation of 
particularistic identities to form a decentralized body politic. Whereas the former view 
yields itself to civic nationalism that inevitably favours the culture of the dominant 
                                                65 Articles 10 and 24: all citizens are entitled to equal rights before the law without any 
discrimination on the basis of language, race, colour, conscience and religion. Moreover, CHP 
(the Republican People’s Party) and MHP (the Nationalist Movement Party) also have a long 
tradition of supporting this conception of this constitutional nationality. In parallel to its 
idealization of equality of opportunity, CHP historically adopted individualistic difference-blind 
approaches and strongly criticized any argumentation that favors the differentiated group 
rights. Although this has changed in the rhetoric as the party manifestation before 2011 has 
illustrated, their message has not reached out to the public in election rallies.  For a detailed 
analysis on the mainstream Turkish political parties’ stance on the Kurdish Issue, see also Nil. 
S. Satana. (2012) ‘Kurdish issue in June 2011 Elections: Continuity or Change in Turkey’s 
Democratization’. Turkish Studies 13(2): 169-189. 
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language, the latter is translated into the minority’s ethno-cultural nationalism that 
often becomes essentialist in a way that would violate the freedoms and equalities of 
its own population (Somer 2007).  Proponents of these competing nationalisms in 
Turkey try to justify their positions by criticizing each other for having violated the 
fundamental principles of liberalism.  
 As has been argued before, in order to generate the liberal values of equality, 
freedom and peace, these approaches need some pre-conditions in theory. I assert 
that these are not available in Turkey due to the historical narrative of state 
nationalism vis-à-vis the Kurds. Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis the Kurds created a 
population of complexities, which, I assert, neither the ethno-centric multiculturalism 
nor the difference-blind egalitarianism can accommodate along with the liberal values 
they defend.  What follows is an account of these theories’ normative and practical 
infeasibility in Turkey. 
 
5.1.2 Multiculturalist critique of Civic Nationalism and Political Liberalism in 
Turkey   
 
Increasing support for multiculturalism in Turkey has been informed by the 
presumption that the homogeneity in the public sphere has a pejorative meaning in 
the sense that it is destructive of particularities. So far as the homogenization is 
concerned, the private and public sphere distinction has been given as the ultimate 
logic in classical liberalism as well as in the constitution of Turkey. It is suggested in 
the constitution that differences should be lived in the private sphere, and that they 
should not be a matter in the regulation of public life. It has been suggested that the 
public sphere is the place for everyone to have equality of opportunity and not to 
compete on cultural grounds.  But this conventional perspective adopted in state 
offices has been highly criticized by ‘libertarian’ scholars of Turkey like Baskin Oran 
(2000), Mustafa Erdogan (1998: 355) and Atilla Yayla (1997). 
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As suggested by Balaban (2007: 76), critiques of the state nationalism in 
Turkey focus on this private-public distinction and the authoritarian implications of 
universal citizenship in the sense that the state of universal citizenship disregards the 
cultural particularities of its own population. This culminates in public ‘homogeneity’ 
which indeed represents the ‘logic of nationalism’. Actually this might sound like an 
unusual inference because universal citizenship in classical liberalism is informed by 
an individualistic perspective whereas the nationalism as an ideology is known to 
champion the value of community as its pivotal concern.  However, the analogy made 
here between universal citizenship and nationalism might be given credibility only if 
the conception of nationalism at stake is being primarily informed by a consensus on 
civic values of individual equality and freedom as the regulative basis of community in 
the public domain.  Starting from this point, Balaban (2007), Smith, T (2005) and 
likeminded scholars stress that in general neither universal citizenship nor an 
ethnicity-blind civic state nationalism that is supposed to facilitate this citizenship 
regime can really offer a liberal paradigm for the reasons I have already explained in 
the theoretical background to this study.66 So their stance in defending liberalism 
revolves around the critique of this ethnicity-blind civic nationalism as an elusive ideal.  
In the rest of his argument Balaban (2007) argues that in the case of Turkey, 
the creation of public-private distinction, and prioritization of the former in making the 
nation has been motivated more by the nationalist discourse of homogenization as 
the ultimate concern than by anything else. According to him, liberal principles of 
individual equality and freedom that informed the private-public distinction and thereof 
the nationalist ideology in the early years of the republican regime were only of 
secondary importance.  The Ideational characteristics of nationalism in Turkey were 
inspired by the French ideals of la patrie and sovereignty (Akman 2004) but this 
inspiration in Turkey was confined to the very limited number of elites whose 
                                                
66 Their analysis on this incompatibility is very likely to yield itself to an assumption that 
nationalism as an ideology and nation as a socio-political entity cannot be solely based on 
civic values.  
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motivation to modernize the country was in conflict with traditions and interests of 
local Sheikhs and tribal chiefs. As explained by Sahin and Yilmaz (2006) in their work 
Modernity and Economic Nationalism in the Formation of Turkish Nationalism, this 
modernization project was in conflict with local and regional interests. First this is 
because the material modernization in a country like Turkey with a very backward 
industry necessitated the use of a standardized language for educational and working 
purposes. This happened to be at the expense of other local languages in public 
domain. Second it brought about a central administration of the regional lands that 
used to be governed by local powers. The modernization in Turkey after the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire therefore has posed a great challenge to the very existence of 
a feudal ownership regime and the status of local powers that used to rule it.  
Therefore the modernization process in Turkey is usually depicted to have 
started an illiberal and destructive trajectory in the sense that the state has 
continuously worked against what was already there, which is usually associated with 
pre-existing ways of life and the will of people whose loyalties lie in these tribal, 
religious or ethnic traditions (Smith T 2005). There is, of course, nothing wrong about 
having loyalties in tribal, ethnic or religious traditions; uniting around a particular 
cultural or political identity is, after all, an individual’s freedom of association. Critics of 
modernization are, however, blindly over-enthusiastic to take for granted the pre-
existing loyalties and usually they do not question the way in which pre-existing 
loyalties themselves have been forcibly homogenized by the feudal politics of 
ethnicity.  In the critique of modernization and its ethnocentric variations, all 
distinctions between Alevi and Sunni, land owners and villagers, rich and poor, 
western and eastern, religious and secular, Kurmanci and Zaza as shown in the 
previous chapter are subordinated to an overall Kurdishness as one overarching 
marker of identity.  
The problem with this perspective revolves around the question: why is the 
state as an agent of power guilty for creating its own culture of the public with a 
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discourse of homogenization whereas the same illiberal logic relevant in creation of 
pre-existing ethnic loyalties is accepted to be immune to these critiques? This 
question is not raised to justify the position of the state and its homogenization 
discourse. It is rather to show the inconsistency within the argument of ethnocentric 
multiculturalism itself, which, in the guise of defending liberalism, tends to favour one 
injustice (pre-existing cultural hegemonies) over another (order of state domination). 
As Miller suggested, ‘what we must avoid is thinking of the ethnic identities that we 
wish to support as “genuine” or “authentic” in contrast to other identities which are 
“manufactured” or “imposed” ’(Miller 1995: 135).  
If both the culture of state and the culture of pre-existing loyalties are artefacts 
of one or another political project and historical conditions, if they both are equally 
constructed (Horowitz 1985) in time, then why should we favor one over the other?  
And more importantly should we favour any at all (Kukathas 1992)?  
Answers to these questions in liberalism mainly come from two ideological 
sources; one is informed by an overarching libertarian and a cultural relativist 
perspective and the other derives from egalitarianism. In almost all their premises 
both libertarians and egalitarians share the idea that ‘the principle of justice that 
specify our rights do not depend for their justification on any particular conception of 
the good life’ (Sandel 1998: 185). As suggested by Sandel (1998), however, 
libertarians and egalitarians differ from each other on what rights we have, and the 
discussion turns out to be about the agency and the subject of rights. What are the 
rights that matter first and foremost: the right to be equally free (from a libertarian 
perspective), or the right to have equal opportunities (from an egalitarian approach)?   
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5.1.3 Egalitarian critique of multiculturalism in Turkey  
 
  For egalitarians, the idea of seeing groups as an agency of rights, and the 
representation of cultures67 as a matter of equality cannot be compatible with the 
classical liberalism because it generates new inequalities between individuals and 
among groups.  
 The following section will assess the extent to which the politics of recognition in 
the form of ethno-centric multiculturalism can create equality for members of the 
Kurdish community as well as for other citizens in Turkey.  Looking at the issue from 
the perspective where equality is taken as an important concern is useful because 
people’s understanding of injustice is informed by their sense of discrimination68 that 
derives from inequalities. This in return leads those people who feel discriminated 
against to free from this systematic injustice.  This is also suggested by the equity 
theory (Lemer 1977, Waltster 1978) attempting to introduce notions of justice into the 
calculus of individuals. According to this theory, ‘people strive for justice in their 
relationships and feel distressed when they perceive an injustice’ (Taylor and 
Moghaddam 1994: 97). ‘The main motivation for action and conflict, thus, appears to 
be issues of fairness and not self-interest’ (Kotsovilis 200: 16). 69  
Moreover it is important because even those who prioritize freedom over 
equality use the rhetoric of the latter in the sense that they want to be ‘equally’ free, in 
most cases, to live their culture as everyone else in the society. In this logic, if 
                                                
67 The representation of the cultural group is given in this context as an alternative to the 
representation of individuals with varying cultural affiliations.  
68 The survey research done by Konda in 2010 suggests that there is a negative correlation 
between level of education and perception of discrimination; another research done by Duman 
in 2008 suggests that education level and income are positively correlated and the direction of 
influence is reciprocal in Turkey. From the combination of these two researches we can infer 
that worse off people are more likely to develop a sense of discrimination than better off 
members even in the same ethnic category.  
69 Equity theory is flawed in two senses. First it presumes that there is an agreed and fixed 
definition of fairness, second it overlooks the significance of self-interest that becomes more 
relevant when it comes to explaining the reason why radical organizations accelerate the 
conflict in times when injustices, previously given as their justification for fight, are recognized 
and eased.  Nevertheless the equity theory is relevant to understand fairness, as a motivation 
and justification for people to fight in the society that they know is more about order than 
anarchy.  
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multiculturalism is not able to promote equality, people’s demand to be free from the 
system that generates these inequalities will be even more persistent in a circular 
trend. It will be more persistent in the sense that conflict for freedom repeats itself so 
long as inequality remains to be the problem as a source of motivation and 
justification for conflict. Therefore interpretation of multiculturalism from an egalitarian 
perspective in Turkey is not only a matter of its capability to promote equality as a 
good in itself, but also a matter of its ability to generate equality as a source of 
motivation for people to opt into the system available in the country. 
 
5.1.3.1 Multiculturalism and intra-group inequalities 
 
As indicated before, the EU’s minority conditionality expects Turkey to provide certain 
rights to Kurds. This policy is in line with the multiculturalist argument of scholars like 
Kymlicka (2001), Young (1995), and Modood (2005), who all argue that special rights 
for minority groups can counterbalance circumstances in which people have been 
subject to discrimination as a result of their distinct cultural practices. However, their 
interpretation of these special rights varies to some extent.  
Will Kymlicka’s proposal for promoting equality and freedom is to grant self-
government rights to national minorities in the form of regional autonomy. In practice, 
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly also supported this idea with its 
Recommendation 1201 in 1993. The Recommendation’s Article 11 stated that:  
 
 
 
In the regions where they are a majority, the persons belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate 
local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching this 
specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the 
domestic legislation of the State. v 
 
Article 10 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which 
concerns the administrative authorities and public services, vi  also indicates that 
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minorities should be able to use their mother tongue within the borders of their local 
or regional authorities, as recommended by Article 2(1) of the Draft European Charter 
of Self-Government drawn up by the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE).vii Moreover, ‘on November 4th 2008, Joost 
Lagendijk, the co-chair of the Turkish-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission, suggested 
that ‘Turkey should consider regional autonomy to help solve its Kurdish problem’.viii  
However, it is clear that self-government rights in the form of regional 
autonomy cannot provide all Kurds in Turkey with the same opportunities to maintain 
their cultural identity in public discourse. 
The first reason for refuting the proposal of regional autonomy is the lack of its 
representative capacity. Kukathas states that ‘cultural groups are not undifferentiated 
wholes but associations of individuals with interests that differ to varying extents’ 
(Kukathas 1992: 114). This is the case in Turkey, where ‘Kurds’ approach to the 
solutions is different. 52.1% of Kurds in Turkey think that   ‘the only way (of solving 
the problem) is to end terrorism’ix. However, no Kurdish leaders can represent the 
whole group. The argument that group leaders might not represent the interests of 
group members is supported by the case of the Kurds in Turkey. For example, 
members of the DTP refused to condemn the Kurdistan’s Worker Party (PKK), a 
terrorist organization that used to demand a separate homeland for Kurds in 
southeastern Turkey, and which has caused the deaths of more than 30,000 people 
through guerrilla attacks. Most ethnic Kurds in Turkey did not vote for the DTP 
because it was seen as supporting the violent tactics of the PKK. ‘In 2007’s 
parliamentary elections, for example, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
managed to collect 56 percent of the Southeast’s votes. Even in Diyarbakir, 
considered a DTP stronghold, the AKP took 41 percent of votes, up from only 16 
percent in the previous general elections in 2002’ (Schleifer 2009). This data shows 
that the vast majority of Kurds support a peaceful approach and ‘democratic’ opening 
of the AKP government, rather than the DTP. In light of this information, it is clear that 
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the Kurdish leadership in Turkey does not represent the majority of Kurdish citizens; 
so granting them the right of veto may constitute a violation of the rights of 
conciliatory Kurds to make decisions about their future.  
Another reason for the egalitarians’ disagreement with the self-government 
proposal is chiefly because of the dispersed demography of Kurds in Turkey. Through 
its assimilationist or acculturative government policies, the Turkish state intended not 
to exclude but to integrate the Kurdish population into the rest of the community. 
From the beginning of the 1950s, Kurds were willingly moving to the Western 
provinces in order to have better employment opportunities and better economic 
conditions. After the armed fighting between the PKK and military forces started, a 
large number of villages inhabited by Kurds were vacated for security reasons. The 
exact number of Kurds who were internally displaced is not known for sure, but the 
official estimate of the Turkish government in 1998 was about 350,000.x  
 As a result of this evacuation process, the Kurdish population became 
relatively dispersed. Although some cities are still intensively populated by Kurdish 
people, the overall population in Turkey is quite mixed; and therefore it is not possible 
to assume that there is a clear distinction between cities dominated by different ethnic 
groups. According to the social structure surveys conducted by the KONDA Research 
and Consultancy Institute in 2006 and 2010, 1,571,000 Kurds live in Istanbul, 
compared with 618,000 Kurds living in Diyarbakir. It is clear then, that the greatest 
number of Kurds live in Istanbul, not in Diyarbakir. ‘The level of the Kurdish population 
in Istanbul is striking, demonstrating the high percentage of ethnic mixing among 
society and how inseparable ethnic groups are’.xi The same survey also calculated 
that 66% of Kurds live in North-eastern, Middle-eastern and Southeastern Turkey, 
while 34% are dispersed across the country. 
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 Chart 4: Ratio of Kurds to Others by Region  
 
         
Chart 5:  Distribution of Kurds by Region70 
 
Other: East Marmara: 3%, West Marmara: 0.5%, West Central Anatolia: 4%, East Central 
Anatolia: 0.5%, Mediterranean: 3%, Aegean: 5%, West Black Sea: 0.5% 
 
 
 
 
                                                
70 The demographic information used in this graph was drawn from Konda Survey (2011) 
Perceptions and Expectations in Kurdish Question. Istanbul: Iletisim.  
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 Figure I Turkey Map by Regions  
 
 
 
     
    Source: Nations Online Project (1998)  
 
 
 
Distribution of Kurds by regions and their ratio to the people of other ethnicities in 
their region of residency show that even in regions where they comprise the majority 
approximately 30% of the population is still made up by people of ethnic groups other 
than Kurdish.  
 
This information suggests that regional autonomy in Southeastern Turkey 
would not provide Kurds who live across the country with the same opportunities as 
Kurds who already reside there. If regional autonomy was granted, Kurds who lived 
within the authority of the regional administration could use their mother tongue in 
public life and schools, while Kurds residing in other parts of the country would be 
prevented from enjoying those same rights. Moreover, the KONDA survey indicated 
that, unlike those Kurds who could not integrate into the socio-economic life of the 
cities to which they moved years ago, more than half of the Kurds now feel settled in 
western cities and would not be willing to move away. 
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Table I:  Regional tendency of the Kurds to move away for good  
 
Would you like to move away from this city or village for good? 
 Istanbul Aegean  Eastern 
Marmara  
Western 
Anatolia 
Mediterranean  Neareast 
Anatolia 
CE 
Anatolia 
SE 
Anatolia 
Yes 19.1 18.5 6.9 25.0 8.3 10.3 13.0 10.1 
Depends-
on 
conditions  
  
35.1 25.9 17.2 25.0 33.3 51.7 53.2 26.1 
No 41.5 51.9 72.4 47.2 52.8 37.9 31.2 60.3 
Have-no 
idea 
4.3 3.7 3.4 2.8 5.6 0.0 2.6 3.5 
Source: ‘A social structure survey: who are we?’ Conducted by KONDA Research and 
Consultancy in 2006.xii 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, the percentages of Kurds who answered ‘no’ to the 
question, ‘Would you like to move away from this city or village for good?’ are 41.5% 
in Istanbul, 51.9% in the Aegean, 72.4% in Eastern Marmara, 47.2% in Western 
Anatolia and 52.1% in the Mediterranean. This raises the issue of what would happen 
to these people if regional autonomy were declared in the Southeast. Kurds who 
already live there would benefit from the advantages of the federal solution at no cost, 
while Kurds with good jobs and homes in the West would have to move away and risk 
losing their jobs to be able to enjoy the advantages of regional autonomy.71 It is 
clearly not an equal opportunity for all Kurds, some of whom are already integrated 
into the socio-economic life of the country.  
This argument can be criticized on the grounds that Kurds who have already 
been integrated into the community do not need or prefer regional autonomy anyway 
as much as Kurds who do not have equal access to socio-economic opportunities. 
                                                
71 One may argue that this is in parallels to Canada where 1/7 of the French population live 
outside Quebec. It does not seem to be a major problem there and why would it be in Turkey?  
It is always the case that we make a choice and accept the tradeoff between different options 
we have.  This does not constitute a problem if we are free to make that decision.  I argue that 
this is actually an important problem in Turkey because of the stigmatization that differentiation 
creates in the environment of violent conflict. For that argument in detail please see the 
section‘ Stigmatization and Self-respect’ pp. 191-192 
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However I argue that regional autonomy is an ill-advised proposal because it creates 
further inequalities among the Kurds.   
 Instead, it seems that a higher level of investment by the state in places 
dominated by Kurds who have suffered inequality of educational and vocational 
opportunities would be more likely to promote equality for all citizens. Socio-economic 
disparities have been the most prominent inequality problem for Turkey. Demographic 
studies show that Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia are the most underdeveloped 
regions of Turkey (see Figure 2) and consequently local Kurds living in these lands 
have been most affected by material difficulties and illiteracy.  
There is no doubt that the state should increase the extent of its investment to 
underdeveloped regions, in order to increase equality among citizens who live in 
different areas of the country. By contrast, the multiculturalist solution of self-
government seems far from enabling the state to remedy this regional inequality. 
Granting such public rights to a distinct cultural group in a deeply diverse society 
would erode the sense of solidarity among communities. According to Rousseau and 
Habermas, if the sense of solidarity disappears democracy cannot function properly 
(Stilz 2009). This problem is convincingly explained by Stilz, who draws on 
Rousseau’s view of freedom in an egalitarian state.  
Rousseau offers us one kind of controversial answer to these problems: 
he claims that in order to legislate generally and impartially on one 
another’s behalf, the citizens of a democratic state must share a special 
bond of identity, one that motivates them to show concern for the 
freedom and welfare of their compatriots. In Rousseau’s view, in order 
to legislate impersonal laws—laws that will truly protect each citizen’s 
freedom equally—each citizen must be capable of taking up the 
viewpoint of the general interest or common good, a perspective that 
requires solidarity with her fellow citizens (Stilz, 2009: 23). 
 
 Egalitarian liberals like Brian Barry also support the view that different groups 
in a country can develop mutual understanding only ‘in the presence of fellow feeling’ 
(Barry 1983: 141). According to him, common language is an important mechanism 
for developing this feeling and it cannot be obtained in a multicultural discourse where 
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the sense of solidarity would be diminished by placing subgroups in their autonomous 
regions. Moreover the state needs the majority’s support to increase the budget for 
rectifying regional disparities. The majority members of which lack such a fellow 
feeling and therefore might not be willing to reciprocate the needs of self-governing 
minority groups and regions (Barry 1983: 141). What happened in Turkey after a 
destructive earthquake struck the city of Van, a city densely populated by Kurds, in 
2011 is a striking example of this phenomenon.  The earthquake struck just after 24 
soldiers were killed by PKK. The public outrage which was generated by this 
increasing cost of terrorist attacks spurred a hostile approach towards Kurds, even at 
a time when Kurds are in desperate need of help to recover from what remained after 
the earthquake. The aid transferred to the region was immense and the parts that 
celebrated this disaster were in the margins of the society. Nevertheless this indicated 
that employment of ethnic distinctions to promote the group autonomy has a potential 
to diminish the social solidarity that is a vital condition for democracy to operate and 
for equality to emerge. 
 
Intra-group inequalities that can arise from differentiated multicultural rights 
are not limited to the unjust elements of the regional autonomy proposal. For 
example, Kymlicka also proposes the permanent use of minority languages in public 
services. From the perspective of egalitarians this solution, in the case of Turkey, 
would also cause intra-group inequality within minorities that accommodate linguistic, 
religious or racial subgroups. These subgroups should ideally have an equal 
opportunity to represent and shape their cultural community, but in practice cultural 
communities are usually dominated, recognized and identified by the characteristics 
of the subgroup(s) that has the greatest power in terms of size and capacity. This is 
also evident in the Kurdish community, where the rights of the Zaza-speaking minority 
are overlooked while the Kurmanci-speaking majority represents the Kurdish cultural 
identity as if it were an undivided whole. The exact number of Zaza people in Turkey 
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is not known because the last census, which noted ethnic affiliation, was conducted in 
1965 and in it, people who declared their ethnic language as Zaza were recorded as 
Kurds. Since then, different surveys have provided some idea of the approximate 
number of Zaza people in Turkey. The most detailed social structure surveys, 
performed by the KONDA Research Company in 2006 and 2010, indicated that 8.6% 
of 50,000 respondents who were randomly interviewed across the country in 200672 
identified themselves as Kurdish, while 0.41% defined themselves as Zaza. This data 
shows that Zaza speakers evidently constitute at least 5% of the Kurdish-speaking 
population in Turkey. The 2010 Survey suggests that this ratio may be higher by as 
much as 10%.  
 As an outcome of assimilative policies in Turkey, Kurds who already speak 
different dialects of the Kurdish language could not generate a common 
understanding of belonging. Today, the Zaza and Kurmanci-speaking groups of the 
Kurdish community can hardly communicate with each other. Scholars such as White 
and O’Neil indicate that ‘there are substantial differences between Zaza and other 
Kurdish dialects’ (O’Neil 2007: 74). This fact was also evident when a remarkable 
number of DTP parliamentarians from a Zaza background could not understand the 
speech of their leader (Ahmet Turk) in Kurmanci dialect.  A Zaza member of 
parliament (MP), Ayse Tugluk from Diyarbakir, stated that ‘I could hardly understand 
the speech; some of us do not even know Kurdish at all’.xiii The following Zaza MPs 
also did not understand the Kurmanci dialect of Ahmet Turk: Sellahattin Demirtaş 
from Diyarbakır, Ayla Akat Ata from Batman, Şerafettin Halis from Tunceli, and 
Sabahattin Tuncel from Istanbul. This is a clear indicator of the substantial difference 
between the Zaza and Kurmanci subgroups of the Kurdish community in Turkey, and 
prove that it would be unjust to equate the linguistic identity of Kurds with the 
dominant dialect of Kurmanci speakers, although these are more numerous and more 
                                                
72 2006 survey was conducted in 3000 locations all over Turkey with a staff of over 1500 
people and 47,958 people were interviewed face-to-face. 
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present in public discourse. For instance, when the state-owned channel TRT 6 
broadcasted most of its programs in the Kurmanci dialect, the Zaza group 
understandably complained on the grounds that their right to media access in their 
mother tongue had been ignored and that their dialect was becoming extinct.xiv The 
claim for a separate TV channel in the Zaza language also raised questions about the 
viability of providing all subgroups with differentiated cultural rights in public life. As 
seen from the case of the Zaza people, whose culture and language were 
subordinated to the broader Kurdish cultural community in a multicultural discourse, 
the protection of one cultural minority may automatically perpetuate inequality 
between subgroups within that minority. In this respect, according to Shachar, ‘it (the 
state) also indirectly partakes in the on-going process of redefining the established 
traditions that constitute a group’s Nomo’s’ (Shachar 2000: 74), and thereby loses its 
neutrality. 
 
5.1.3.2 Multiculturalism and inter-group inequalities  
 
‘Irrespective of the discourses of the democracy and human rights that the groups 
use, they fight for their own political interests and concerns not for the general 
interests of the society. This is a general weakness of the identity politics and has its 
own reflections in Turkey, too’ (Gulec 2003: 14). 
Self-government rights such as the permanent use of minority languages in 
public education and services not only give rise to intra-group inequalities, but also 
create and deepen inter-group inequalities. This will be discussed from the 
perspective of two main arguments. In the first place, it will be argued that the rights 
of different cultural groups to be treated equally in public life would be violated if 
multicultural principles were implemented in genuine politics, because in such cases 
the state’s neutrality–a condition of equal treatment–would wane (Shachar 2000: 74). 
Second, it will be argued that allowing some minority groups to receive public 
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education in their mother tongue might decrease their competiveness in a labour 
market dominated by the majority community. In such cases, education in a minority 
language might violate the right of minority pupils to access employment opportunities 
in the majority language (Barry 2001: 107). 
The multicultural paradigm, supported by the EU and the Council of Europe, 
requires states to provide their minorities with certain linguistic rights. xv  Public 
education and public services in minority languages are among those requirements. 
In Turkey there are about 16 distinct linguistic groups, who have been settled in 
Turkey for centuries. The percentages of those groups in the whole population of 
Turkey were assessed by KONDA Research and Consultancy Company in 2006 as 
follows: 
                        
Table 2: Population by native language in 200673 
  
Language % as Mother Tongue Language  % as Mother Tongue 
Turkish 84.54 Balkan 
Languages 
0.23 
Kurdish 11.97 Caucasian 
Languages  
0.07 
Zazaki 1.01 Laz 0.12 
Arabic 1.38 Circassian 0.01 
Armenian 0.07 Turkic 
Languages 
0.28 
Greek 0.06 Romani 
Language 
0.1 
Jewish languages 0.01 Other  0.12 
West European  
Languages 
0.03 Total 100 
 
Source: ‘A social structure survey: Who are We?’ Conducted by KONDA Research and 
Consultancy in 2006.xvi 
 
Despite the abundance of different linguistic groups in Turkey, the EU only 
recommended that Turkey provide the Kurds with the right to public education in their 
                                                73 The more up to date data is available at the beginning of this chapter. This is just to give the 
reader an indication of the linguistic diversity in Turkey.  
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own language. No other linguistic group was mentioned in negotiations.xvii This raised 
the question of the conditions under which a cultural group is entitled to the special 
rights as advocated by the multicultural discourse (Forst 2001: 133).  
If the criterion for deciding whether a minority is entitled to receive public 
services in the mother language is its size. This undermines the starting point of the 
multicultural discourse, which is to secure equal rights for disadvantaged minority 
groups. According to Kymlicka, all national minorities who are adequately large (more 
than 10% of the whole population)74 and could develop a societal culture should be 
given rights of self-government (Kymlicka 1995: 111). However, implementation of 
this proposal violates the equal opportunities of people whose cultural group is too 
small to develop an institutionally complete societal culture. Even if the claims and 
grievances of a particular group warranted the application of special rights, there 
would nevertheless be a potential inequality between groups with a greater or lesser 
capacity to voice their claims. This idea is also supported in Brian Barry’s view that 
‘multiculturalism (understood as normative policy implying the recognition of identity 
groups) is only a formula for manufacturing conflict, because it rewards the group that 
can most effectively mobilize or make claims on the polity’ (Barry 2001: 21). 
This is the case in Turkey where culturally distinct groups, such as the Laz, 
Roma, Arabic, Kurds and Circassians, are assumed by the state to have an equal 
right to promote their cultural identities in the private sphere. However, the Kurds–
who are greater in number than other cultural groups–have been able to mobilize 
most effectively to claim public recognition, and the EU’s support of linguistic 
minorities in Turkey has been confined to the Kurdish group (Yildiz 2005). Turkey 
                                                74 Kymlicka does not give an exact number, though in his account of national minorities that 
cannot exercise self-government rights he refers to ‘countries which are essentially ethnically 
homogenous, e.g., where the dominant group forms 90-95% of the population, and where the 
remaining ethnic groups are small, dispersed, and already on the road to 
assimilation’(Kymlicka 2004[b]: 13). It can be asserted then that if the minority comprises more 
than 10% of the whole population then it is entitled to those rights.  
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initiated state television broadcasting in Kurdish; thereafter, other Laz, Arabic and 
Georgian cultural groups demanded the same treatment.xviii  
Thus, inter-group inequalities that stem from differentiated rights for members 
of cultural minorities in public life can be traced back to the inability of the multicultural 
discourse to explain which groups should be entitled to differentiated rights, and on 
what basis. It is clear that to decide which group would be entitled to certain rights is a 
matter of power politics and is inconsistent with the non-aligned status of the liberal 
state. However, as Kukathas stated: 
The liberal state should take no interest in these interests or attachments –
cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic or otherwise – which people might have; it 
should take no interest in the character or identity of individuals, nor should it be 
concerned directly to promote human flourishing. It should have no collective 
projects; it should express no group preferences. Its only concern ought to be 
with upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can 
function peacefully (Kukathas 2003: 24). 
 
Official language policy limits minorities’ freedom to benefit from public 
services in their own language. At this point, multiculturalist ‘liberals–who see this 
policy as unfair–often align themselves with national demands raised by “underdogs”, 
be they indigenous peoples, discriminated minorities or occupied nations, whose 
plight can easily evoke sympathy’ (Tamir 1993: 11). Multiculturalists argue that the 
institutional framework, which the state is supposed to maintain for equality, should 
be improved and reconfigured. According to Kymlicka, this reconfiguration for cultural 
equality can be achieved if minority languages are also accepted as a legitimate 
means of communicating with the state (Kymlicka 1995: 30). In line with this 
argument, minorities should also have the right to receive public education in their 
own language. According to Patten and Kymlicka, implementation of this proposal 
would not prevent minority pupils from having equal access to jobs working in the 
majority language. According to them, ‘minority language speakers may be able to 
learn the dominant language and generally equip themselves for success in the 
modern economy even while receiving a significant portion of their schooling in their 
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home language’ (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003: 40). However, Kymlicka and Patten do 
not explain how linguistic minorities who undergo public education in their mother 
tongue can become as fluent in the majority language as native speakers, and how 
this would not constitute a disadvantage in a state where the majority language is the 
medium of business.  
 In the Turkish education system, students are required to take a central exam 
to enter university, and the grades achieved in this exam are the only decisive factor 
for admission. The exam is conducted in Turkish and requires extensive knowledge of 
grammar. It would be absurd to expect that 17-year old Kurdish students, with no 
motivation other than their own will and a partial requirement in public education to 
learn Turkish, could be as successful in this exam as native speaker candidates. 
 Indeed statistics show that, even in countries where instruction of the official 
language is compulsory, students from linguistic minorities are less successful than 
native speakers (Grubb 1974: 52-94). The reason for this is that there is usually no 
additional programme to help minority pupils when they face the official language for 
the first time in school. Similarly, for instance, most of the children of naturalized 
Turkish families in Germany hardly speak German at all in elementary school; 
consequently their educational success is relatively low. ‘In 2006, out of the 12,258 
students successfully graduating from gymnasium in Berlin, there were only 165 
Turks, i.e. a total of less than 1.5 percent’ (Jungius 2007). This data indicated that 
additional language courses should be provided in public education, with teachers 
who are experts in both the official and the minority language helping children from 
non-majority language communities to improve their official language skills (ibid). This 
bilingual education facility should also be open to all citizens who require it. This is 
equally applicable to Turkey, where Kurdish children require extra assistance to learn 
Turkish when they begin their schooling (Grubb 1974: 52-94).  
 However, scholars like Parekh, Kymlicka and Patten overlook this need for 
additional programs at elementary school level, and in fact propose something quite 
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different: public education of all grades in the minority language. I think it is obvious 
that allowing those children to receive most of their education in their first language 
would not increase their chances of success but damage their educational and 
economic opportunities, for example by failing to prepare them for college admission 
exams in the majority language. This would be contrary to the main responsibility of 
the liberal state to provide students from different backgrounds with equality of 
opportunities, in relation for example to access to higher education, and subsequent 
employment (Rex 1998: 203–19). Howe suggests that the state should be concerned 
with the promotion of equal opportunity on a much broader scale than multiculturalist 
scholars, who confine their argument to equality of cultural identity in public life (Howe 
1992: 460). In Howe’s own words:  
Education is, no doubt, valuable in its own right, but it also is enabling in the 
sense that it serves (however imperfectly) as the gateway for obtaining other 
societal goods, such as desirable employment, adequate income, and political 
power. For this reason, equal educational opportunity is related to equal 
opportunity more generally because it serves as an important link in what might 
be termed an opportunity chain (Howe 1992: 460). 
 
Barry indicates that egalitarian liberalism is mainly concerned with equality of 
opportunity. In the case of Turkey, equality of opportunity is more about the 
opportunity to learn the official language to achieve educational distinction and be 
fully equipped for the job market (Barry 2001: 107). For the reasons I have explained 
above, multiculturalism is unlikely to generate such long-term opportunities in Turkey.  
Kymlicka also argues that: 
 
Some language minorities are sufficiently large and institutionally complete, they 
constitute their own societal culture so that individual members can find a relatively full 
range of economic, social and cultural options and opportunities in their own language 
(Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 40).  
 
 
Egalitarians would argue that if Kurdish became the main language of education in 
minority public schools, the ability of minority pupils to benefit from that socio-
economic network would automatically decrease, as the Kurdish population could not 
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so far develop a network that would be sufficiently broad to act as a counterweight to 
the opportunities available in the majority language.  
            There are two clear indicators of this insufficiency of Kurdish societal culture. 
Firstly, its dispersed demography and fragmented cultural structure would make it 
difficult to develop an institutional network sufficiently broad to accommodate the 
Kurdish population in their mother tongue. It is striking that half of Kurdish group 
leaders in parliament cannot communicate with each other, and that MPs from the 
DTP, such as Akin Birdal and Emine Ayna, cannot speak any Kurdish dialect at all.xix 
Another indicator of the institutional incompleteness of the Kurdish community 
is the low level of industrialization and recruitment opportunities in the Southeast 
region, where some local Kurds have claimed self-government rights. Geographic 
and climatic hardships (Baycan 2002: 337), and the insecurity of the region following 
PKK’s terrorist activities, xx  are among the reasons why industrial progress and 
employment opportunities have stagnated in the region (Albayrak, Kalayci and 
Karatas 2004: 101–30). These factors clearly indicate that the Kurdish community in 
Turkey could not so far develop a societal culture, which is capable of providing 
socio-economic opportunities for its members in their own language. This perspective 
does not have any sort of patronizing sense whatsoever yet it stresses that ‘whether a 
cultural group can be thought of as a societal culture, which Kymlicka calls a nation, 
whose practices and institutions cover a full range of human activities, is certainly a 
matter of degree, rather than the either/or distinction Kymlicka makes it’ (Young 1997: 
51). Under current circumstances, while public education of all grades in Kurdish may 
give Kurds some cultural freedom, in the long term it could prevent their children from 
integrating into the Turkish-speaking network, which at present seems to be the only 
option that can offer a wide range of socio-economic opportunities.75 
 
                                                
75 The argument that the societal culture can be developed by weak multiculturalist policies to 
the extent that it may ultimately become mature enough to provide all means of opportunities 
for its members will be elaborated in the following pages of this chapter.   
                                                                                                                
 169 
 
 
Figure 2: Socio-economic Development of Regions in Turkey  
   
                              Source: (Albayrak, Kalayci and Karatas, 2004: 104) 
 
 
The preceding section demonstrated that the ethno-centric theory of multiculturalism 
is not a viable solution for Turkey’s Kurdish problem as it violates the principle of 
equality. As was shown, most of these inequalities stem from the immaturity of the 
minority’s societal culture. This study conceptualized the societal culture through 
examining the indicators such as economic development, settlement patterns, 
political orientations, linguistic unity, and basic agreements on the symbolic identity 
borders of the minority members. Therefore, one may assume, as Kymlicka would 
probably think, the societal culture can be developed in time through the progressive 
implementation of multiculturalism. I am going to elaborate its feasibility later in this 
chapter, but before this I will explain why we should still be committed to 
multiculturalism in principle. At this point the liberal culturalists’ arguments and their 
critique of egalitarianism in Turkey have become important. 
5.1.4 Why the Difference-blind Egalitarianism is not a Liberal solution for 
Turkey?  
 
 Egalitarianism is helpful in spotting the further inequalities that multiculturalism 
is bound to create in Turkey, yet far from being able to guarantee the freedoms and 
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the very equality it seeks to promote. Liberal culturalists unlike strict egalitarians 
support the recognition of culture in the public sphere arguing that  ‘the formal 
equality in the enjoyment of the rights, do[es] not guarantee the equality of respect, 
access to labour markets on an equal footing or making use of the welfare measures 
like free health and education services… The combination of all these factors, as 
Castles argues, marginalises the minorities and blocks the formation of extensive and 
inclusive concept of citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000: 127-128)’ (Gulec 2003: 
45-46). 
 Imposition of one official language in public education can be justified on the 
grounds that everyone should have sufficient knowledge of the official language to be 
able to communicate with public authorities, benefit equally from public services, and 
compete on an equal footing for education or for employment opportunities. However, 
even if everyone in the country is given an equal opportunity to learn the official 
language, there is still an older generation who cannot learn Turkish and so need to 
use their mother tongue in relations with the public authorities. ‘A semi-official survey 
on internally displaced persons (IDPs) conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of 
Population Studies shows that ‘not speaking Turkish’ ranks third among reasons for 
IDPs’ lack of access to health services; 27.4 per cent of IDPs, the vast majority of 
whom are Kurds, responded positively to this question’ (Minority Rights Group 2007: 
19). To ensure that such persons are accorded equal citizenship rights they should be 
provided with services in their own language, at least on ad hoc needs basis. This 
arrangement would not violate individual equality so long as all citizens from different 
linguistic groups within the country could benefit from it.  
   The same logic has already been discussed with reference to minority pupils, 
who need help in their own language in order to be able to learn the official language 
when they first face it in the elementary school. Those minority pupils who do not 
learn the official language at home suffer from this disadvantage in the initial years of 
their education when they encounter the official language for the first time. Their 
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educational success and motivation are seriously affected by this unfair experience at 
the beginning of their formal education. They frequently score badly in examinations, 
get into worse colleges than they would otherwise have gotten, stuck with unqualified 
and less well-paid jobs. Those Kurds with lesser paid jobs, and therefore less money 
to invest in their children’s education, pass on this systematic injustice to the next 
generation and this vicious circle of systematic inequality between the Turks and 
Kurds repeats itself. There are of course many Kurds in Turkey who break this chain, 
have the best education and reach to positions of influence that many Turks cannot. 
However this happens at the expense of freedom of many Kurds to speak to their 
own children in Kurdish.  Many Kurds think they must speak to their children in 
Turkish to support their education in school, slowly surrounding to the domination of 
the majority culture in the public realm.  
An extreme interpretation of equality is not only destructive of cultural diversity 
but also creates systematic inequality for those who value their cultural freedom to 
speak to their children in Kurdish.  This takes us to the point of the cultural relativists: 
that culture is a source of difference and we should take this into account so as to be 
able to understand if one can really enjoy the opportunities guaranteed by the 
principle of formal equality (Fraser 2009). Furthermore, the liberty of people belonging 
to minority national ethnic groups is violated when they are forced by the state into a 
civic project that is not their own. Secondly, the violent assimilationist policies 
marginalize and radicalize members of these groups, some of whom thereby become 
terrorists. The KONDA (2010) research survey shows that those who support the 
violent tactics of PKK in Turkey are also the ones with a low level of education, 
income, and a concomitant sense of discrimination.  In this sense, denial of difference 
in the public realm marginalizes people not only because it limits their cultural 
freedom but also because it creates a systematic injustice and a sense of 
discrimination. It is this injustice that most Kurds want to defeat in Turkey. 
 Theorists of liberal culturalism also argue that the standard application of a civic 
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law is unjust and universalistic human rights are not adequate because they are 
usually a product of one culture amongst others.  For this reason, imposing civic laws 
that are more compatible with the cultural identities of majorities than those of the 
minorities is an unequal policy.  In his reply to this view, Brian Barry argued: ‘All laws 
have a different impact on different people depending on their preferences and beliefs, 
for instance speed limits inhibit only those who like to drive fast. This does not 
constitute unequal treatment provided the law can be justified as advancing some 
legitimate public objective’ (Barry 2009). However what these legitimate public 
objectives are, and who decides what they are, are still vague issues. This way of 
thinking continues to legitimize the standard exercise of the majority rule. Those who 
resisted assimilation have never had a sense of belonging to the same public as the 
majority. The egalitarians are incapable of accounting for this reality.  
 
5.2 Post-Multiculturalism Critique in Turkey 
 
5.2.1 Politics of Recognition:  Freedom for Kurds?  
 
 As neither of the two perspectives that this chapter has explained so far are 
able to correspond to the complexities of Kurdish question in Turkey, the post-
multiculturalism critique will be elaborated to demonstrate a third way. In this third 
way, denial of the difference is not an option yet the recognition as defined in 
Kymlicka’s theory is equally problematic. ‘Recognition is undoubtedly a matter of 
justice, but it cannot be reduced to that alone, since it operates within a more 
personal psychological domain, and requires the unique bonding of two subjects, 
which will necessarily be different every time’ (Wynne 2000: 10). 
 Politics of recognition as argued by Kymlicka and Taylor is dominantly informed 
by a responsive conception of recognition by which it is asserted that there is an 
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authentic self, awaiting to be recognized (Heyes 2003). Here, to recognize someone 
in a responsive sense is 
to acknowledge them as they already really are…The demand for recognition in a 
response-model is produced and justified through pre-existing characteristics of a 
person…. in the generation-model it is the act of recognition itself which confers those 
characteristics onto a person through their being recognized as such. The former is a 
case of person ‘knowing’, whilst the latter is a case of person ‘making’  (McQueen 2011). 
 
 I argue that securing the recognition of differences in a responsive way so that they 
are institutionalized as such is misleading. The reason for this is that ‘our individual 
identity is not constructed from within and generated by each of us alone. Rather, it is 
through dialogue with others that we negotiate our identity’ (McQueen 2011).76  Given 
that there are too many ‘others’ and that they change depending on the context, there 
cannot be only one ‘self’ to recognize as such across the time.  
 
 
5.2.2 Inter-subjectivity, ‘Significant Other’ and Multiculturalism in Turkey  
 
 
 Given that we have more than one pre-existing characteristic, what matters in 
responsive recognition is about the question of what characteristics are to be 
recognized. In the context of this study Calhoun (1993: 229) asks: given that 
nationalism consists not only of claims to social and cultural identity, but an 
affirmation of the importance of certain likeness above all others, why has selected 
likeness been chosen as the ‘single’ definition of the political community in question? 
Given that the subjects composing a group have their own differences and conflicting 
interests, as well as commonalities other than the overarching identity marker, we 
should understand the reason why those other commonalities of its members do not 
                                                
76 ‘Taylor refers to these others as ‘significant others’, meaning those people who have an 
important role in our lives. The idea that our sense of who we are is determined through our 
interaction with others initiates a shift from a monologic to a dialogic model of the self’ 
(McQueen 2011). In Miller’s words ‘ethnic and other group identities are by no means fixed, 
and groups adapt their self-conceptions to their surroundings. Very often the identity of one 
group is worked out in relation to other groups and develops along with changes in the groups’ 
relative standing’ (Miller 1995: 134). 
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matter, or why all internal distinctions and conflict cannot prevent the binding marker 
of group identity from occurring as politically relevant.  
 The answer lies in ‘the significant other’ (Gillespie and Cornish 2010). What is 
distinctive about a group can only be explained in relation to its ‘significant other’ 
(Taylor 1995, Brubaker 2000, 2002), and for this, our focus should be moved from the 
‘authenticity’ of the group to the contexts within which individuals collectively develop 
a sense of distinctiveness around one specific difference.  This phenomenological 
understanding of the self encourages us to look at the context and source of 
motivation for people to stick to one particular sense of belonging.  
 In applying this dialogic perspective to the Kurdish case I argue that we have to 
look at the ways in which the ‘Kurdish ethnic group’ is defined in relation to its 
significant other which is, in this case, wrongly77 portrayed to be the ‘Turkish ethnic 
group’ by Zeydanlioglu (2008) in his work called ‘The White Turkish Man’s Burden’: 
Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey’. At this point Chapter IV on the 
historical relationship between Kurds and the state in Turkey becomes relevant, as it 
gives us the necessary information about the context. A careful analysis of this 
context suggested the Kurds per se had never been the significant other vis-à-vis the 
Turkish identity until the 2000s. Turkishness has dominantly been defined as a 
citizenship category on an ideational level and any group formation on the basis of 
ethnicity was strictly prohibited rather than crystallized and stigmatized. Assimilation 
was the main method used in homogenization discourse within which differences 
                                                
77 It is wrong because he bases his argument on a structure where, it is asserted, the process 
of ‘othering’ which was inherent in the relationship between the Western Imperial powers and 
their oriental Colonies is also relevant to explain the unequal relationship between the Kurds 
and the state in Turkey. To prove his point about this unequal relationship, the Author gives an 
account of denial and assimilation policies in Turkey. However, the evidence he used to 
exemplify the assimilationist policies contradicts his main argument, which is about the 
othering process. The ‘othering’ process requires a continuous differentiation, not acculturation 
or assimilation that works against the crystallization of differences. From this emerges the 
question his study cannot explain: how the State in modern Turkey could be ‘othering’ the 
Kurdish identity when it did not even recognize its existence. In Turkey the existence of a 
distinct Kurdish nationality was denied for a very long time until the late 1990s. If you do not 
even accept that such a distinct nation exists how can you then be ‘othering’ that nation. It is 
this logical gap that renders his argument somewhat paradoxical and rather inconclusive. 
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have been moulded into Turkishness. 
 This process of assimilation has been given in the conventional literature as the 
primary cause of Kurdish nationalist radicalization and the politicization of ethnicity 
(Zeydanlioglu 2008, Yegen 2006). This has also been supported by Honneth 
(1995:169) who offered a detailed theoretical account of how ‘the denial of recognition 
provides the motivational and justificatory basis for social struggles’ (McQueen 2011). 
The scholars who suggest this relationship between assimilation and social struggle, 
however, cannot account for why during the time between 1938 and 1984 there was 
not a mass Kurdish struggle. ‘All the present paradigm of the assimilation-resistance-
assimilation model in respect to ethnic conflict remains less than satisfactory to 
explain the Turkish case’ (Heper 2007: 2).  Neither can the same paradigm explain 
remaining and increasing levels of social struggle and conflict on the part of the Kurds 
in times when their identity is recognized and accommodated by the state (Tezcur 
2010).   
 The proponents of the ‘assimilation-resistance–assimilation’ model have the 
presumption that the assimilation process poses a challenge to the very existence of 
the subject’s identity and therefore the subject who senses a danger of extinction 
develops a motivation for social struggle. The reason why they have this 
misconception of what happened in Turkey and why ‘they cannot explain the periods 
of relative peace and quiet’ in the past (Tezcur 2009: 3) is because their interpretation 
of assimilation is not informed by the distinction between absorptive and additive 
types of assimilation. Their argument lends itself to a serious problem in the sense 
that additive assimilation is confused with the concept of cultural annihilation reducing 
the former to a process of absorption after which the culture of origin ceases to exist. 
This can only happen when the culture of origin and the receiving culture which one is 
expected to assimilate into are mutually exclusive.  
 Those who want to reverse the policies of assimilation are informed by this 
erroneous reading of the problem in which it is asserted that Kurdishness and 
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Turkishness are mutually exclusive categories and binary oppositions.  Almost all 
scholars of ‘liberalism’ in Turkey who think of Kurdish and Turkish identities as being 
of binary oppositions advised to reverse the assimilation and recognize the ethno-
cultural distinctions.  Recognition has been translated into the demand for a body 
politic where each social segment has its own sphere of authority, either territorially or 
functionally.  
 Supporters of this view in Turkey accept that people of Kurdish origin, have 
enriched all walks of life in Turkey where this has been facilitated by an 
understanding of formal equal citizenship. They also accept that ethnicity as such has 
not been the criterion for exclusion from the body politic when it comes to explaining 
the state’s problematic relationship with the Kurds. 78  The historical discourse of 
assimilation and heterogeneity that it constructed within and across ethnic groups has 
not been analysed in terms of its implications for the contemporary politics of 
recognition they have championed. 
 Proponents of ‘reverse assimilation’ never examine what to recognize if there is 
not such a unanimous category of Kurds who have been excluded on the basis of 
their ethnicity per se and merged around it in return. Immaturity of the minority’s 
societal culture is rather interpreted by ‘liberals’ in Turkey to be the outcome of the 
unjust historical discourse of assimilation that they think should be reversed. They 
usually do not approach the societal implications of the historical narrative as an 
independent variable. The reason for this is that liberalism in the minds of radical 
minority members and some ‘liberals’ in Turkey is wrongly associated with just the 
opposite of everything done by the state in the past.  Their definition of unfairness is 
informed, dominated and blinded by their hatred of the historical injustices and 
everything associated with them. I am not going to dwell on the normative problem 
and these past injustices; it is already a widely accepted fact that the state 
nationalism in Turkey has been illiberal. In this study I will rather focus on 
                                                78 Ethnicity as such was not a reason for exclusion but the politicization of ethnicity was.  
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heterogeneity that it has created.  
 What follows is an account of the heterogeneity in Kurdish societal culture. In 
this study it is suggested that only by way of showing what these in-group differences 
are, we can go further to explain the injustices that a generative model of recognition 
is bound to create in Turkey. The data about these differences and the societal order 
in which we operate is drawn from my field work in Eastern cities of Turkey including 
Diyarbakir, Mardin, Tunceli, Bitlis, Van and Hakkari that I visited twice between 2009 
and 2011; another important source of information is the broader survey researches 
done by KONDA research institute in 2006 and 2010.  
5.2.3 Additive Assimilation and Heterogeneity  
 
 As explained in the previous chapter, Turkishness has been defined by the 
constitution as a category of citizenship and as such it has been internalized by a 
huge number of minority citizens in the country. Most of the people from different 
ethnic groups even refused to be identified as a minority in the sense that the concept 
of minority refers to a group of citizens who are deprived from fundamental rights on 
the basis of their differences from the majority. 38.2% of Kurds in the Southeast and 
Central-East Anatolia claim that their ethnic Kurdishness is in no conflict with their 
Turkishness so long as the latter is defined to be a category of citizenship, 29.8% of 
them implied that their sense of Kurdishness and Turkishness as being of a binary 
opposition and this has been inaugurated only recently and not in their childhood. 
Only 32% of Eastern Kurds refuse to accept Turkish identity in any form in opposition 
to the 68% of Eastern Kurds who do not see their ethnicity and Turkishness by 
citizenship as mutually exclusive categories. 
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Chart 6 Q: You know it is compulsory in elementary schools to read an 
anthem every day, which starts as follows; ‘I am Turkish, I am Honest 
and I am Hardworking’. How did or does it make you feel?  
       
 
 
The question was only directed to those Kurds who reside in Southeast and Centraleast 
Anatolia.  
 
      
 The Kurds’ varying perceptions of Turkishness are also reflected on the variety 
of demands that they have for the education in their mother tongue. 82.1% of Kurds 
want education in their mother tongue (KONDA 2010: 124) but what they understand 
from education in mother tongue differs to a great extent.  56% of the Kurds who 
demand education in their mother tongue think of it as an optional language course 
beside Turkish as being the medium of instruction in all taught courses.  Only 19% of 
Kurds in the region claim all grades of education to be in Kurdish.  Open ended 
conversations I had with Kurdish people in the region revealed that although they 
believe that their demand for cultural recognition is represented by the BDP (Pro-
Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party), its leaders’ insistence for education in Kurdish 
for all grades does not in fact represent the interest of the majority of Kurds who think 
that the future of their children lies in Turkish. ‘Most Kurdish couples speak Kurdish 
between themselves but the communication process in Kurdish is cut off when they 
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communicate with their children at home; they speak Turkish with their children in 
order to support their school life and future interests’ (Gultekin 2012: 156).  One of the 
many likeminded people I spoke explained that  
Most of the children in the region already know Kurdish as its their mother 
tongue, those Kurds who want education of all grades in Kurdish wants to 
develop a societal culture in Kurdish, their wish is not to be recognized as 
such, they want to live in that language and for this reason they need to 
institutionalize the language in a way that everyone here in the southeast 
can ultimately live without a need to speak and write Turkish at all. I believe 
that majority of the Kurds think that their children need to learn Turkish as 
well so that they can have equal chances in education and job market all 
over the country. 
 
Chart 7 Q: What do you understand and expect from education in mother 
tongue?  
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Chart 8 Q: Can you live your identity freely? 
 
 
The Kurds who think that they cannot live their identity because there are legal 
barriers to them comprise less than one quarter of all Kurdish society in places they 
comprise the majority. The half of the Kurdish respondents in the region thinks that 
they either can fairly live their identity or do not have any problem in living it at all.  
 
Chart 9 Distribution of Ethnic groups by income 
  
 
 
 
It is argued that ‘economic disparities can cause people to develop a heightened 
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awareness of their class or regional identity. But because the Southeast of Turkey is 
both the poorest region and the only predominantly Kurdish part of the country, 
economic disparities lend themselves particularly well to heightened, politicized ethnic 
identity formation’ (Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci 1999: 998).  According to statistics 
29% of Kurds live under the poverty line whereas this figure for Turks is around 20% 
(KONDA 2010: 96). The reason why this sense of economic disadvantage is felt more 
and more deeply among Kurds than Turks is that the majority of those Kurds who live 
under the poverty line are concentrated in the Southeast region. That clearly gives an 
idea that the economic dimension of the problem is regional rather than ethnic, but 
the discourse of differentiation and the politics of grievance itself creates misguided 
analogies between ethnicity per se and economic deprivation. 
 The survey results as shown in the above graph reveal that there is an 
economic disparity between the Turks and the Kurds, but the disparity between 
different income groups within the same ethnicity proves to be far greater than the 
level of disparity that we observe between Turks and Kurds. The economic inequality 
that matters in terms of justice can only be recognized by a comparison between the 
worse off and the better off. With this logic in mind, I argue that there is no point in 
explaining the disparity with ethnicity per se, because none of the better off categories 
in opposition to the least advantaged lowest income groups are exclusive to the 
members of the dominant ethnicity.   
 Duman’s (2008) work ‘Education and Income Inequality in Turkey: Does 
Schooling Matter?’ suggests that the income disparity between Turks and Kurds can 
be explained better by their access to education:  
 
There is a wide gap between the educational levels of the poorest and richest 
socioeconomic groups in Turkey. For example in 1987, 53% of the lowest income 
quintile had a primary school leaving certificate while this ratio was less than 40% 
for the richest quintile. Only 0.75% of households with a university degree 
belonged to the lowest quintile in the same year. These ratios got even higher 
over the years as the share of households with primary school completion, which 
is in the poorest segment, rose over 56% whereas the ratio of university 
graduates in the same category declined to 0.5%. Within the richest portion, 
households with university educations started to have a share of almost 28% in 
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2005. The numbers suggest that higher educational levels are associated with 
higher incomes (Duman 2008: 377) 
 
 
 
 
Chart 10 Education by ethnicity  
 
 
  
This argument is also indicated by the number of Kurds and Turks with different levels 
of education. The percentage of illiterate Kurds is almost identical to the percentage 
of Kurds with the lowest income as shown above. Figures also suggest that 
educational opportunities like income and material sources have not been exclusive 
to one ethnic group or another. It is, however, true that those who couldn’t have equal 
access to education also comprised the lowest income group and this in turn made 
them less likely to invest in the education of their own children. Those Kurds who are 
stuck in this vicious circle of injustice were also found to comprise the group with the 
deepest sense of discrimination in Turkey. As shown before in this Chapter 
recognition of linguistic differences is a matter of justice in terms of its capacity to 
provide equal access to education. It is, however, misleading to depict the problem as 
being of ethnicity only and then formulate solutions on the basis of this criterion to 
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promote the ethnic character of the body politic.  The reason why it is problematic is 
because it overlooks the way in which equal access to education is violated by factors 
other than ethno-linguistic differences. As shown by the research (Duman 2008) 
access to education seems to be associated more with family income and class 
differences than ethnicity in the first place. 
Chart 11. Perception of Discrimination and Education Level 
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Chart 12 Q: What should be the primary action to take as to make the 
Kurds happy?  
 
 
 
As seen on the chart above, 37.8% of Kurds think that improvement of their economic 
conditions is the most important and necessary action to make things better for all 
Kurds in the region. 21.2% think that recognition of their Kurdish identity will be 
enough and only a very small portion of them 16.8% want the local administration to 
become autonomous and make its own decisions. What complicates the feasibility of 
multiculturalism in Turkey therefore is that only a very small proportion of the Kurdish 
population is asking for administrative autonomy with legislative powers. Nevertheless 
this is still quite problematic as only small proportion of Kurds –16.8%– maintains the 
remaining conflict and as long as the conflict is an issue, an amnesty is far from being 
an option in the country where the majority has a tendency to interpret it as a form of 
surrender to violence. This recognition is still an issue because Kurds in the region 
are not exactly sure what it means and their demand for recognition is most likely to 
be conflated by radicals with regional autonomy as well. Multiculturalism still remains 
as an option and a desirable idea, but in what forms and how?  Can ethno-centric 
16.8 
21.2 
37.8 
13.5  10.8 
The local administration should be autonomous and make its own decisions Kurdish identity should be recognized in the constitution  
The problems of economic backwardness and unemployment should be solved Amnesty for leaders, those who are abroad or in prison  
Government should apologize for what has been done in the past. 
                                                                                                                
 185 
multiculturalism equally promote freedom for all these segments of Kurds with their 
different interests?  
 
 
5.2.4 Generative Recognition and Ethno-centric Multiculturalism  
 
 If the Kurds have not been directly envisaged as other by the state discourse; if 
there is not such a unanimous category of Kurds who have been excluded on the 
basis of their ethnicity per se and merged around it in return; if the differences among 
Kurds as I illustrated above have been relevant to the extent, that they do not even 
share the same view about the causes and solutions of the problem; then what 
distinction will the ethno-centric multiculturalism recognize? 
  I argue that the ethno-centric multiculturalism in Turkey is complicated by the 
complexities I explained above. The politics of recognition has to fabricate distinctions 
to overcome the problem of complexities. In doing so it is also bound to violate the 
freedom of the Kurds because it segregates and puts them into one cultural block. 
What follows will also argue that the segregation diminished the dignity that the Kurds 
would have derived from recognition in different forms.  This argument is informed 
and suggested by post-multiculturalist scholars like Phillips (2007), Cowan (2001) and 
Benhabib (2002) who are indeed sympathetic to idea of multiculturalism.  
Nevertheless their account is nuanced enough to be able to track the difference 
between the ‘recognition of identity’ and ‘the politics of identity’. In other words this is 
the difference between the recognition of culture as ‘knowing it’ and the recognition of 
culture as ‘making it’.  Their critique is based on the illiberal implications of the latter.  
Bringing their arguments all together I will suggest that the violation of freedom by 
ethno-centric multiculturalism takes four different forms in Turkey: violation of the 
freedom of exit, essentialization of the culture, reification of the identity, and 
stigmatization of minority.   
  I should remind the reader that what I am criticizing here is the application of 
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ethno-centric liberal multiculturalism in Turkey and the violation of individual freedoms 
it causes, not the theory itself.  As I will be arguing in the following chapter, it can 
work in some other cases and does not create what is bound to imply for the Kurdish 
question in Turkey.  In this sense I suggest the condition that renders the ethno-
centric multiculturalism theory of Kymlicka illiberal is only contextual and not inherent 
in his theory.  
5.2.4.1 Freedom of Exit 
 
Benhabib argues that ‘no authority should impose cultural membership on a person 
with reference to where he or she is born. It also means that a person must be totally 
free to leave his or her cultural group and to join any group of his or her own choice, 
i.e. the ‘freedom of exit and association’ (Benhabib 2002: 19). Similarly Kukathas, 
drawing on Brian Barry’s view, explained that ‘Given that many forms of association 
such as group membership, are unchosen, the critical issue is whether or not 
individuals can exit from an association’ (Kukathas 2002: 186). Education in the 
mother language is the crucial point where the multiculturalism may come to be very 
problematic. Under its egalitarian critique, multiculturalism has been assessed in 
terms of its capacity to provide children from different ethnicities with the equality of 
opportunity. At the very heart of the argument championed by scholars who defend 
the ‘freedom of Eexit’ lies this concern. Drawing on Mill’s concept of ‘harm principle’, it 
has been asserted by Barry that the decisions about the language of the education 
should not be left to the hands of the parents only. This is because freedom of exit is 
possible only if the people are well equipped to use that option. As education is the 
only means to attain the qualifications that open the exit door, the state should make 
sure that education is given in the language that then opens the door to the largest 
range of opportunities available in the body politic.   
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According to Barry, the state may and should find it necessary when the 
autonomous parents’ cultural interests limit the capacity of their children to enjoy their 
liberty. According to Kelly (2002), parents’ decisions on educational issues do not 
bring about any limits to their children’s freedom. Children can leave the community of 
their mother language when they become mature enough to do so. Nevertheless, 
Barry argues that parents’ freedom for and interest in sending their children to 
schools where the medium of instruction is in the mother language would decrease 
their chances to leave. Given that the societal culture of the Kurdish community is not 
yet developed as much as and in the way that Kymlicka defined as necessary, the 
education of all grades in Kurdish would halt children from enjoying the opportunities 
available in broader society.  As I suggested before this is only a contextual condition 
that might be developed in time and therefore might not be a problem in the future if 
the gradual implementation of multiculturalism (in the case of education the minority 
language as an elective course in the curriculum) starts to take place. This is indeed 
what is currently happening in Turkey, yet it creates another problem in the sense that 
radical nationalists in the minority group see this weak multiculturalism as only 
another manipulative way of the state discourse to integrate the Kurds into the 
mainstream community. On these grounds, they exacerbate the conflict to gain what 
they ultimately want. The problem becomes more serious in light of evidence which 
shows that the number of Kurds (56%) who want to have Kurdish only as an elective 
course, far exceeds the number of those Kurds (19%) who insist on the education of 
all grades in Kurdish.  Even if everyone is given what they want in this context the 
development of the societal culture in a way that is necessary for the foundation of a 
stronger multiculturalism regime is not so likely with such a small number of people 
who are willing to use it in every stage of life.   
The only strategy the radical nationalists can follow is to win the support of 
minority members. Any means used to this end has to do with them promoting either 
the environment of insecurity, a sense of injustice or an increasing alienation from the 
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broader society. Taspinar suggests that ‘It does not take much to see that Turkish 
nationalism begets Kurdish nationalism and violence begets violence. Instead of a 
nationalist straitjacket, the real challenge–and solution–that awaits Turkey is 
multiculturalism’ (Taspinar 2007). Indeed as clearly as it can be seen, what begets 
Kurdish nationalism is the multiculturalist initiatives of the state, not the oppressive 
Turkish nationalism as we used to know it. I will come back to this point when we 
need to assess the feasibility of the weak multiculturalism and its likelihood to be 
transformed into a stronger multiculturalist regime in Turkey. Before that what follows 
will explain remaining three forms where ethno-centric multiculturalism limits freedom 
in Turkey.  
5.2.4.2 Essentialism  
 
 According to Benhabib (2002: 4) drawing on Turner (1993: 412)  
 
 
reductive sociology of culture [in multiculturalism] risks essentializing the idea 
of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race, it risks reifying cultures 
as separate entities by overemphasizing the internal homogeneity of cultures 
in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for cultural conformity; 
and by treating cultures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them 
in ways that put them beyond the reach of critical analysis  
 
 As has been argued in the previous chapter, state nationalism in Turkey has 
been informed by its ideational sources like equal citizenship, patriotism and rights on 
one hand and resort to religion as a source of mobilization on the other. A secular, 
ethnicity-blind, civic and French formulation of nationhood in Turkey on the ideational 
level has been supplanted in practice by religious sources of mobilization. The Kurds 
who belong to the same religion as the rest of the population have always been 
incorporated in the system by this commonality. The outcome of this can be observed 
in the survey done in 2010. It shows the most important source of identity that binds 
people and especially the Kurds to Turkey is now religion, and according to the same 
survey, almost half of all Kurds tend to identify with Islam before their ethnicity. 
Evidence has already been given under the egalitarian critique that almost half of the 
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Kurds even in the Southeast region let alone the other Kurds who are scattered 
across the country vote for the AKP which is a pro-Islamic party. Its program strongly 
resonates with religious Kurds and the party has 75 Kurdish MPs in the cabinet.  After 
the electoral victory of the AKP in 2007, Emine Ayna who was a Kurdish nationalist 
MP from DTP said that ‘Whoever becomes an AKP candidate is not a Kurd, even if 
she says I am a Kurd’ (Tezcur 2009: 5).   
  It is not only ‘who is not a Kurd’ that is decided by the activists, ‘who is a Kurd’ 
also becomes a matter to be decided by the dominant narrative and the activists.  
Zaza people, who assert that they are not Kurds, are treated as traitors by radical 
Kurdish nationalists. This is also supported by the factual evidence that I observed 
during my visit to the city of Tunceli where the Zaza people I spoke communicated 
their Zazaki (Alevi Kirmanci) identity as being distinct from Kurdish in the strongest 
terms possible.  This was also evident when the city of Elazig, which has a large Zaza 
population, organized a very well attended protest against ‘PKK terrorism’ on October 
24, 2007. The participants, many of who are Zaza Kurds, shouted, ‘we are all Turks, 
we are all Mehmets’ [a generic name given to soldiers of the Turkish Army]’ (Tezcur 
2009: 7).  
 As clarified before, of course this is not an inherent malfunction in the 
multiculturalism theory that Kymlicka offers. He especially stresses that theory of 
multiculturalism is not 
 a single unified force that walks and talks out there in the world. According to critics, 
multiculturalism is actively ‘encouraging’ people to think in essentialist terms, ‘pressuring’ 
people to act in essentialist ways, even ‘forcing’ and ‘imposing’ essentialist identities 
and practices on people. Multiculturalism isn’t a single actor or force that speaks with a 
single voice. It operates at different levels: theorists of multiculturalism say one set of 
things; laws, bureaucratic regulations and court decisions tell us another set of things; 
the media tell us yet another; and activists have their own message. (Kymlicka 2013: 
22).  
 
  
So Kymlicka’s multiculturalism theory as such cannot be accused of encouraging 
essentialism and it is true that political actors are more responsible than the theory for 
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its practice and implications. Yet the problem is deeper than suggested because it is 
not only about how the political actors arbitrarily interpret and use multiculturalism in 
practice. It is much more about the context in which agents sometimes have no other 
option but to define what constitutes a group, unless it has already been agreed by 
people themselves from an inter-subjective perspective.  As Ivor Jennings (1956: 55-
56) famously suggested ‘the question of who has the right to self-determination 
complicates the principle. On the surface, it [self-determination] seemed reasonable: 
let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until 
somebody decides who are the people’.  This account does not leave any room for us 
to claim the responsive way of recognition may also hold true.  We must, however, 
accept that some groups, more than others, are defined by its members having a 
deeper sense of togetherness, consent and willingness to be recognized as such. As 
I have argued before, people’s sense of ‘us’ is entrenched as much as, and so long 
as, they are defined as ‘the other’ by their significant collocutor.  
  I argue that ethno-centric multiculturalism is more likely to result in the 
essentialization of ethnicity when the ‘group’ at stake has not already been defined as 
‘the other’ by the system.  
5.2.4.3 Reification  
 
 Anne Phillips argues ‘Multiculturalism … solidifies differences that are currently 
more fluid, and makes people from other cultures seem more exotic and distinct than 
they really are.  Multiculturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a 
cultural straitjacket’ (Phillips 2007: 14, Kymlicka 2013: 2). 
 In applying this argument to the Kurdish case, I argue the way the meaning of 
Kurdishness is generated reduces the multiple identities of its members into one. This 
is in the sense that members of the Kurdish group are Kurdish before anything else; 
before their religion, sex, profession, ideology, motherhood, and so on. Of course this 
is not a barrier to the other things that they can be, but if the creation of their group 
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identity is primarily dependent on their prioritization of this ethnic distinction, the 
discourse generates the ways in which people are primarily represented by their 
ethnicity. For example, a meeting of intellectuals may increasingly be described as a 
meeting of ‘Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals’ instead of just intellectuals’ (Somer 
2007: 105).  
 This can also be seen in the KONDA (2010) survey where the opinions of the 
Kurdish and Turkish respondents on discrimination are attributed to their ethnicities. 
One problematic perspective in these kinds of analyses is that the discourse itself 
leads us to think that those who say that they cannot live their identity are saying so 
because they are Kurdish. A more accurate analysis requires us to develop an 
awareness that the members of the Kurdish group are not only Kurds but they also 
hold other identities that might be subject to discrimination in society. Gay people and 
Alevis are some of the other marginalized groups in Turkey. The Kurds’ sense of 
deprivation might be informed by one of these other identities that lead to them being 
excluded and marginalized.  All in all components of identity are many, and definition 
of the ‘self’ changes, depending on the context where one particularity becomes more 
relevant than others in relation to the ‘significant other that ‘the self’ communicates. It 
is also true for the vice versa: only by looking at those Kurds who say that they can 
live without any problem, we cannot infer that these Kurds are not stigmatized or they 
are fairly free to live their ‘Kurdish’ identity. What the information here says can be 
interpreted rather as an indication to the existence of those Kurds who might come to 
define their identity primarily with Sunni Islam that has always been financed, 
maintained and promoted by the state. If this is the case, they think, they can live their 
identity freely. What I stress here is that everything people do or say should not be 
attributed to their Kurdishness or Turkishness.  This especially becomes a more 
important problem in Turkey where ‘Turks’, who have been indoctrinated since the 
foundation of the Republic that Turkishness is a category of citizenship, are now 
forced to define it in ethnic terms in relation to Kurds. Not only those Kurds who resist 
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it but also Turks who refuse to acknowledge ethnic conception of their identity 
complicate the feasibility of multiculturalism.  Emina Ayna who is a hardliner of the 
Ocalan (the PKK’s founder and now its honorary leader) faction insists that the 
Constitution should use a language where the population of the country should be 
referred to as the ‘citizens of Turkey’ but not ‘Turkish’. This claim yields itself to the 
suggestion that Turkishness is a category of ethnicity and not citizenship.  Apparently, 
minority activists are not only dictating who is Kurd and who is not, but they also 
define who is a Turk. By refusing this ethnic conceptualization of their identity, the 
majority of the people in Turkey blame the nationalist Kurds for creating false 
categories and psychological warfare.   
5.2.4.4 Stigmatization and Self-Respect 
 
‘Social Identity theory posits that individuals choose to affiliate with social groups 
primarily because such affiliation serves to enhance self-esteem’ (Tajfel and Turner 
1979). From the inter-subjective perspective as the chapter argued before self-
esteem cannot be generated from within. ‘It is through dialogue we negotiate our 
identity’ (McQueen 2011).  What dignity Kurds can make out of recognition will be 
dependent on what image of Kurdishness is generated by the politics of recognition in 
the eyes of the majority. After all what makes it liberalizing for Kurds is not the 
recognition itself but rather the rights and advantages that it entails (Inwood 1992: 
245-47, Margalit 2001: 128-129). If the recognition and prioritization of their ethnic 
particularity in political sphere is bound to create inequalities and injustices, as shown 
above, then it is suspicious what self-respect Kurds can derive from this image.  
  In this context the politics of recognition is more likely to create new 
stereotypes about the minority, rather than liberating its members. For example, the 
Turks have increasingly started to hold the Kurds responsible for escalating the 
conflict. As an outcome of this stigmitization, the military conflict between the PKK 
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and Turkish armed forces has almost turned into a civili war. In October 2011 
thousands of civilians attacked the pro-Kurdish BDP centers in Bursa, Eskisehir, 
Konya and Erzincan to protest against the PKK’s killing of 24 soldiers in Hakkari. 
Most of the Kurds I spoke to in the Western cities of Turkey complained to me that 
they are increasingly stigmatized in daily life just because people tend to think that 
any Kurd who is proud of being Kurd would necessarily support the PKK.  
 This might not be a problem in an ideal context where members of different 
groups live in their own societal culture under territorially concentrated self-
governments, but given that almost 40% of Kurds are scattered across the country, 
this seems to be quite a problem.    
 All in all, the context as I theoretically defined in Chapter III, and illustrated with 
the case of Kurds in Turkey in Chapter IV and V, renders the ethno-centric 
multiculturalism less conducive to equality and freedom than it can be in other places.  
 As was shown, most of the ways in which multiculturalism either reduces 
autonomy or create/exacerbate inequalities stems from the immaturity of the 
minority’s societal culture.  Therefore, one may assume, as Kymlicka would probably 
think, the societal culture can be developed in time through the progressive 
implementation of multiculturalism. This approach, however, seems to be impractical 
in Turkey.  
5.3 Practicality: Violent Ethnic Conflict and Multiculturalism  
 
This impracticality seems to be the result of the reaction of radical groups to weak 
multiculturalist policies that seem, from a liberal account, to be in due course the 
optimal solution. However the orthodoxy that nurturing democracy would settle the 
ethnic conflict in Turkey is challenged by Tezcur (2009), asking 
 
Why did the insurgent PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), which was militarily defeated, 
which renounced the goal of secession, and whose leader was under the custody of the 
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Turkish state, remobilize its armed forces in a time when opportunities for the peaceful 
solution of the Kurdish question were unprecedented in Turkey? (Tezcur 2010: 775). 
 
 Tezcur’s work focuses on the democratic competition that challenges the 
authority of the dissident PKK over its ethnic constituency. For him, this explains why 
democratic initiatives bring about the increasing need for the PKK to resort to conflict 
and mobilize its constituency. This account is relevant to explain the persistence of 
the conflict. Implications of this persistence for the feasibility of further 
democratization and multiculturalism is, noticeably, missing from his analysis and this 
is what I am endeavouring to capture in this part of my study.  
 Chapter III explained why the weak multiculturalism discourse rekindles 
radicalism in countries where the minority has been deeply divided. Division has 
emerged due to the fact that the boundaries between the majority and the minority 
have always been fluid and the members of ethnic groups crossed the boundaries 
easily. The policies of civic integration and forced assimilation prevented what would 
have otherwise been, in Weber’s words, a social closure. As there is no social closure 
or systematic exclusion that mobilizes the Kurds in Turkey the ethno-nationalists need 
to fabricate a sense of segregation.  This is because the very existence of their 
political presence is founded on the idea of a distinction between the Kurds and the 
Turks in the country. The sustainability of the ethno-nationalist movement depends on 
whether it is capable of mobilizing the ethnic constituency. Arline and McCord (1979: 
427) stated ‘for a separatist movement to emerge people must first be convinced that 
they share something against an enemy’.  Maintaining an environment of insecurity is 
crucial for nationalists (Walker 1983) because it is the only way of reminding all 
members of the Kurdish minority that the state is their enemy.   
 Tezcur’s observation is also supported by Akcam and Asal (2005) who argue 
that the radical factions deliberately create instability to provoke government 
repression. ‘[Government] repression on ethnic group increases disadvantages for 
ethnic group. The existence of collective disadvantages creates opportunities for 
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ethnic leaders to mobilize ethnic group for their movement’ (Ibid).   
 Not only by provoking the government repression but also by directly attacking 
on health and education facilities in the region, The PKK creates an environment of 
insecurity.  The climate they create discourages medics and teachers from taking up 
posts in the region through a fear of intimidation and murder. This consequently 
reduces the quality of the services people can benefit from in the region and also 
increases the Kurds’ sense of discrimination.  ‘5219 citizens, 1330 Village Guards, 
325 public officials and 123 teachers that the PKK killed–in Kurdish regions–between 
1984 and 2006’ are the proof of this fact (Usak Research Report 2009).   
 
Chart 13 PKK Conflict Graphic 2000-201279 
 
 
 As seen in the above graph, the PKK-inspired incidents of conflict steadily 
increased from 2004 to 2009, which is the period when the AKP Government 
continuously initiated reform policies that I have listed under the title ‘story of 
multiculturalism in Turkey’. This evidence supports the view that multicultural policies 
rekindle and bring about further radicalization in Turkey. It does so because reforms 
                                                79 The Chronological account of PKK attacks I used in generating this graph is available at the 
PKK Terrorism blog (http://www.pkkterrorism.org/) and Usak Research Report (2009). 
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have the potential to work against the mobilization effect that the environment of 
insecurity has created in Turkey. At those times it is more crucial for the ethnic 
insurgency to remind its constituency that the state is still their enemy.  
 The low conflict profile in 2009 and 2010 is also consistent with the argument in 
the sense that AKP policies started to reverse for a while after what happened in 
Habur on Monday 19th October 2009. The oppressive policies of the AKP government 
since April 2009 did the job for the PKK and gave the Kurds a reason to mobilize 
around the radical nationalist cause. The backstory to this turning point on 19th 
October 2009 is crucial to understand why the weak multiculturalism, albeit ideal from 
a liberal point of view, is far from being a realistic and viable option in Turkey.  
 The story goes as follows: ‘The Turkish authorities and the PKK leadership had 
negotiated the arrival of 34 Kurds as an initial step toward the PKK’s ‘coming down 
from the mountains’, that is, ending their insurgency’ (ICG Report 2011: 8). Eight PKK 
fighters and 26 people from the PKK refugee camp in Northern Iraq came, and they 
were welcomed by a group of DTP officials and hundreds of people who walked and 
shouted slogans to celebrate. Their ostentatious celebrations were broadcasted in the 
media and interpreted by the majority as the victory for the PKK.  The PKK’s killing of 
24 troops near the Iraqi border on the very same day confirmed and strengthened this 
message (Hurriyet Daily News).  After the event a poll showed 51 per cent of the 
population opposed to the Democratic Opening and that the AKP’s popularity plunged 
7.1 percentage points between August and November 2009 (ICG 2011: 9, Aydoğan 
2011).  
 The continuation of ethnic terror and the increasing numbers of casualties 
simply prompted the nationalistic sentiments of the majority community that in turn 
halted the feasibility of furthering the multiculturalist projects. The backfire that 
resulted in the closure of the pro-Kurdish political party DTP was on the grounds that 
it was associated with the PKK. Its hawkish leaders were barred from politics for 10 
years. The BDP succeeded the DTP with the same set of goals and the party 
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program but the same continuous circle of provocative relationships between the 
activists and the state has since repeated itself. ‘According to the announcement of 
the BDP, 7748 party executives and employees were taken into custody and 3895 
were arrested between 14th April 2009 and 6th October 2011’xxi. This process blocked 
the democratic ways and means of negotiating further possibilities for a pluralist 
democracy.   
 The observation suggests anything that is short of the strong ethno-centric 
multiculturalism will not suffice to subdue the violent ethnic conflict in Turkey. Yet the 
strong multiculturalism, this chapter has showed, is also bound to exacerbate the 
inequalities and limit the individuals’ freedom in Turkey.  It is not my aim to explain the 
causes of ethnic conflict in Turkey. The political oppression and many other factors 
including the density of the elite’s effort, financial resources and geopolitics can be of 
help in explaining the occurrence and endurance of the ethnic insurgency.  None of 
these accounts can fully explain why the ethnic conflict in Turkey continued in such a 
violent fashion when there was a real chance of success for political deliberation and 
the politics of recognition was closer than ever before  
I argued that when the terror is primarily aimed at mobilizing its constituency 
rather than protecting its rights, radicals will see the weak multiculturalism as another 
strategic action of the state to challenge their authority. As I suggested earlier, if the 
group is already negatively defined by the ethnic nationalism of the majority 
community that excluded or discriminated against it, there would be no need for the 
ethnic terrorism to mobilize the members of the minority against the majority. This is 
not the case in Turkey as both chapter III and chapter IV have explained and 
demonstrated.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
All in all, I argued that the ethno-centric multiculturalism of Kymlicka is not 
likely to promote equality or freedom in Turkey. The argument was supported by the 
egalitarian critique of multiculturalism and its application in Turkish case. In what 
followed, however, this egalitarian account was shown to be an excessive concern 
with the principle of equality at the expense of the freedoms of the people. Those 
whose understanding of injustice is primarily informed by their experiences of 
historical suppression then come to prioritize cultural freedom over equality.  For this, 
the difference-blind egalitarianism is seriously inoperative in the environment of ethnic 
conflict. Turkey is a clear example of this. In most cases where there is so much 
historical baggage and memories of violent conflict, it is next to impossible to find a 
common legitimate public objective which, according to Barry, can be the only 
justification for the law that commands equality.  Nevertheless, the egalitarian critique 
of multiculturalism in Turkey is important because it helps us understand the failure of 
multiculturalism in generating equality as a source of motivation for people to opt into 
the society. Moreover it is important because even those who prioritize freedom over 
equality use the rhetoric of the latter in the sense that they want to be ‘equally’ free, in 
most cases, to live their culture the same as everyone else does in the country. 
 At the end of the day it is the primary role of the state in liberalism to secure an 
impartial system, where individuals are free to follow their own conception of good to 
the utmost extent, insofar as that does not contravene someone else’s freedom to do 
the same. Barry’s suggestion, that education should be given in mother language so 
that children are equally equipped with qualifications opening the exit door to the best 
opportunities available in the society, is an eloquent argument. It becomes even more 
consistent with equal citizenship when it is complemented with a bilingual education. 
This is the proposal of liberal culturalists whose understanding of opportunity is 
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informed by a positive liberty and therefore is conducive to multiculturalism. 
 The cultural relativist argument becomes very relevant for the discussion on 
multiculturalism in Turkey but it differs from the multiculturalism of the Kymlicka type. 
Post-multiculturalists find ethnocentric multiculturalism dependent on Kymlicka’s 
erroneous definition of societal culture, and restrictive of individual freedom because it 
essentializes, reifies, and stigmatizes the identity. 
 Both cultural relativist and egalitarian critiques of ethno-centric multiculturalism 
proved to be relevant in Turkey only because the societal culture of the Kurdish 
community is more fluid than is suggested by Kymlicka.  
  When it comes to the recognition of rights that derive from membership to a 
group, I showed that the disparity between groups becomes even more relevant in 
Turkey where the system has not already been dominated by the categories of 
ethnicity and where the individuals across ethnic groups have different sources of 
political behaviour. Group autonomy seems to be more likely to limit individuals’ 
autonomy when their multiple identities are very hard to confine into one.  My focus 
on the context represented by Turkey in this sense can be criticized on the grounds 
that the fluidity of societal culture is not exclusive to one case or another. It is by 
definition relevant for every group whose members are individuals with dynamic 
interests and a changing motivation to follow their non-ethnic particularities in different 
times.  I agree with this.  What is relevant as shown by Kymlicka is, however, the 
willingness of people to put their differences aside and merge around one ethnic 
particularity. Kymlicka’s strong inclination to prize the ethno-cultural approach to 
identity in his demand for self-government rights to national minorities seems to be 
deriving from his observation that most of the time most of the national minority 
members are just unwilling to relegate their ethnic particularity to a private discourse. 
Willingness is of the utmost importance in his theory and therefore attention to this 
should be paid.  
 In the rest of my argument, I brought these two different sets of approach 
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(fluidity of societal culture and willingness) together by introducing the inter-subjective 
paradigm of identity according to which the autonomous self is primarily informed by 
its relation to the significant other and space that surrounds it. In application of this 
understanding of the ‘self’ to the group psychology I argued that if any opposite 
categories of binary distinction are not readily available, any recognition claim on 
them has to generate the meaning of the distinction first. This recognition thereby 
transforms this collection of individuals into a group. In Turkey the only difference that 
is readily available between Kurds and others is the language and it is the primary 
concern for the parts claiming autonomy to use their language freely. However the 
distinction does not itself create a binary opposition.  Kurdishness and Turkishness 
are not mutually exclusive categories and individuals can be both Kurdish and Turkish 
so long as they speak both languages and especially because the latter is rather a 
broader and inclusive category of citizenship.  Moreover the level of significance 
attributed to the use of the mother tongue in public life is only a matter of individual 
choice that may be informed by many independent variables other than the value of 
the language as a good in itself.  What is complex about the language question 
however, is that those who prioritize the use of their mother tongue in public life is 
dependent on the participation of others. This is because the language has a function 
only, in a dialogical environment where one needs one another person to speak it. 
One’s freedom to use it in public is, therefore, wholly dependent on the participation 
of others.  
  As was shown in the case of Turkey and suggested by the theoretical literature, 
the consent of people to ascribe meaning and value to the use of their first language 
in public should not be taken for granted. When it is an option, learning, using and 
living in another language may be even more liberating than imbibing what we are 
already given by birth and by our parents subsequently. This argument however 
totally depends on the definition of the receiving culture one may assimilate into. In 
Turkey, Kurds are accepted as peers in the society; a society in which they are not 
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only equal by citizenship but also equal in a way that they share the religious 
characteristics which primarily define the symbolic boundary of Turkish nation. 
   In such a context it is quite possible for one to preserve his Kurdish identity in a 
private discourse and assimilate into Turkish identity as a public phenomenon. 
Nevertheless those who challenge that fabric of pluranationality (Keating 2001) or 
hyphenated identities (Miller 1995) should be equally free to use their language in 
public if this is what they want to do. As I have argued in theory and illustrated in the 
case of Turkey their freedom to use their first language in public is wholly dependent 
on their ability to generate an awareness or belief that it is crucial for all Kurds to use 
their mother tongue in relation to the state.  What has been shown in this chapter is 
the ways in which this generative model of recognition with ethnocentric 
multiculturalism is bound to limit the individual autonomy, exacerbate the disparity, 
and perpetuate the conflict in the society.  What follows will show that these 
contextual deficiencies lose their relevance in countries where the national minority 
has been constantly marked out by its ethnicity or excluded from the mainstream in a 
way that led its members, in turn, to merge around their ethnic identity. 
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Chapter 6: Comparative Politics and Ethno‐centric 
Multiculturalism 
 
The third chapter of this study has examined many of the arguments against 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism theory.   All critiques suggested that cultural groups 
comprise individuals with different interests and that ethno-cultural categorization of 
individuals cannot account for the complex networks of their overlapping group 
identities.   I have also illustrated in empirical Chapters IV and V how these critiques 
might hold true in practice. Departing from critiques of multiculturalism, however, I 
focused on Kymlicka’s point about the willingness of minority members to identify with 
ethno-politics. I argued that what complicates ethno-centric multiculturalism is neither 
the diversity itself nor the fact that the groups consist of individuals with different 
interests.  Diversity becomes problematic only if people are not willing to overcome 
their conflicts of interest or confirm a collective attachment to ethno-national politics. 
This is however not a major problem for either the Francophone in Canada or the 
Flemish in Belgium who are exemplary of groups whose members are by and large 
attached to ethnopolitics.  
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Yet, I have also departed from the scholars of ethno-centric multiculturalism 
who ‘base their case on a somewhat simplistic model of the support of ethnic 
minorities on a purely cultural level’ (Rex 1997:31). Kymlicka for example takes it for 
granted that most people of the same ethno-culture will most of the time support 
ethnic politics that claim to represent their culture. He then focuses on whether this 
culture is institutionally developed ‘enough’ to exercise self-government rights and 
offer good lives for its members. Increasing debates on the accommodation of Kurds 
in Turkey, however, illustrated that the majority of a group like Kurds80, can still be 
found unsupportive 81 of ethno-nationalist politics.  
Interestingly both sides of the discussion on multiculturalism neglected a huge 
literature on motivations for ethnic/non-ethnic voting/mobilization and what it means 
for their studies. It is my aim to bring the theory of ethno-centric multiculturalism to a 
more realistic conception of ethno-nationalism that would go beyond a purely cultural 
explanation.  
Based on the case study of Turkey, I argued that the most important reason 
why most Kurds do not share the same ethno-political orientation is because they 
                                                80 The Kurds in Turkey comprise the majority in their historical homeland although 40% of 
their whole population lives across the country. They are not assimilated in the sense that their 
members still hold their Kurdish identity on a cognitive level although they might not be literate 
in Kurdish. Its population is as sizeable as 15% of the whole population in the country. 
81  Ali Carkoglu (2011: 55) states that’ Although the independent candidates supported by the 
BDP have expanded their support, this expansion came primarily in the smaller Eastern and 
Southern Anatolian Provinces where the AKP was still able to hold on to a significant electoral 
support’. The BDP claim rights to the autonomy and to the state funded education in the 
Kurdish language in 15 East and Southeast Anatolian cities with a significant Kurdish 
population. In the 2011 general election, however, the independent candidates supported by 
the BDP could only win the majority of the votes cast in 5 out of these 15 cities. 52.12% in 
Mardin, 72.69%  in Sirnak,  79.88 % in Hakkari,  58.72  %  in  Diyarbakir,  51.84% in Batman, 
17.3% in Sanliurfa,  42.79%  in Siirt,  26.04% in Bitlis,  44.50%  in  Mus,  24% in  Bingol  
41.02% in  Agri, 48.7% in  Van,% 19.29  in  Kars, 12.29% in Ardahan, 31.53%  in Igdir. 
(Hurriyet 2011–Turkey’s 2011 General Election Results). I also had extensive discussions with 
Kurds in the cities of Diyarbakir and Mardin. From this emerged a different emphasis than was 
indicated by the numerical data on the 2011 election results in these two cities. This was that 
even those who voted for the BDP do not have an agreed upon definition of what exactly is 
meant by the regional autonomy that its leaders voraciously claim. The striking theme of my 
observation in the region is that the demands of the conciliatory Kurds’ are not actually 
reflected by the hawkish MPs from the BDP despite having voted for them.  See Chapter 5 
especially the Chart 7, p.178 and Chart 12, p. 183 for more details.  
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were never recognized as an ethnic minority that could have otherwise developed a 
sense of shared ethno-political identity. The state approached cultural groups as 
‘equal’ Turkish citizens and denied them any political right to freedom of association 
on the grounds of their ethnic particularities. Their experiences of state nationalism 
varied depending on their choices, cultural values, income or education levels and 
whether they experienced assimilation forcibly or voluntarily. Kurds not only remained 
culturally divided but also diverged in terms of their political orientations because of 
this variety of experiences.  On one hand there is an increasing Kurdish nationalism 
in Turkey and the radical faction PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has been fighting 
against the state armed forces for thirty years. On the other hand, most Kurds do not 
support ethno-nationalist politics in a militant sense nor do they accept separatism or 
the exclusive claims of an overarching ‘Kurdish’ culture in the region. It is not only 
because their dialectic and sectarian differences are still more important for them but 
also because of the fact that most Kurds have integrated into the majority.  Nearly 
40% are scattered across the country because they voluntarily moved in addition to 
those forcibly moved to other parts of the country. They shared the same religion and 
similar physical characteristics with the majority and could easily integrate and 
assimilate into it. They were given equal opportunities and, as Turkish citizens, 
reached all walks of life and attained influential positions throughout society. 
I argue it is the absence of such an historical relationship between the minority 
and the state (like the one between the Kurds and the state in Turkey82) that provides 
a more suitable context for the applicability of ethno-centric multiculturalism theory. 
This context is suitable for the autonomy models that Kymlicka defends in his theory 
for two reasons. First, the absence of such an historical account has facilitated the 
institutional development of the minority culture, as in Canada and Belgium. This also 
provided a base for the concentrated settlement of the minority members like Muslim 
                                                82 See chapter 4 for more details of this historical narrative of the relationship between the 
Kurds and the State in Turkey.  
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Turks in Greece most of whom live in Western Thrace. Secondly, it provided a 
framework in which national minorities were more likely to develop a shared sense of 
positioning against the majority and subsequently support the ethno-nationalist 
politics of identity. I showed that Kymlicka has reduced popular support for ethno-
nationalism to a natural outcome of cultural-attachment. I argued that for this very 
reason his theory could not explain why most Kurds did not identify with ethno-
nationalist politics in Turkey.  I came to this conclusion from a detailed study of the 
Kurds in Turkey, but for the reliability and external validity of my argument, this 
hypothesis should be tested, and this chapter fulfils this goal. The test has two 
missions. First is to verify that ‘when the state has historically used ethnicity as a 
political tool for better or worse the national minorities in that state are more likely to 
stick to the politicization of ethnicity and support the ethno-centric multiculturalism’ 83 
 Some argue that there may be other, more important, reasons for ethno-
nationalism84 in these cases than the historical narrative I suggested. Economic 
development, material interests or incompatibilities of the cultures involved are some 
of the alternative factors suggested to explain ethno-nationalism.  For this reason the 
second mission of the test will be to show why the particular narrative I offer is more 
relevant than other explanations for understanding the lounge durée nature of mass 
mobilization for ethno-nationalist politics. In what follows I will first explain why popular 
                                                
83 This is not to say that groups who are forced to assimilate are less likely to develop an 
ethno-nationalist orientation than those who have been ethnically differentiated by the state. 
On the contrary the theoretical chapter showed that the forced assimilation policy is one of the 
reasons why people are more likely to support ethno-nationalist politics. However generalizing 
this account and ignoring those segments of the minority who voluntarily assimilated in the 
majority would be to overlook the permeability of the cultural boundaries under the 
integrationist ideal of civic state nationalism in those cases. In the absence of such a social 
closure, there is more space for individuals to go beyond ethnic boundaries. It is this cultural 
mobility and the lack of social closure that makes those minorities more heterogeneous and 
less supportive of the ethno-politics than other minorities whom the state has ethnically 
differentiated and segregated. 84 Ethno-nationalism in the rest of this chapter will refer to a mass movement rather than an 
ideology, which may be limited to a group of elites who do not necessarily represent the 
majority of their community. At the core of my argument lie the popular sovereignty and 
willingness of the people and this chapter is only concerned with reasons why peoples support 
and follow ethno-nationalist ideology in masses. I am, therefore, not going to attempt to 
explain why ethno-nationalism as an ideology emerges in the first place and why it translates 
into opposition and ethnic conflict. 
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support for ethno-nationalist projects makes multiculturalism theoretically consistent 
and practically feasible. Secondly I explain why the historical approach I provide is 
more relevant in explaining ethno-nationalist mobilization than purely cultural or 
economic factors. I will illustrate this with examples such as the Flemish of Belgium, 
Quebecers of Canada and the Muslim Turks of Greece. This chapter will explain how 
this has impacted positively upon the applicability of ethno-centric multiculturalism in 
these cases. 
 
6.1 Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization and Multiculturalism  
 
Studies in contemporary political theory (Young 1995, Kukathas 1992, 
Benhabib 2002, Barry 2001, Phillips 2007), nationalism and ethnicity (Brubaker 2003), 
human rights law (Jones 1999, Jackson Preece 2005), electoral behaviour (Huber 
2012), and ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993, Horowitz 1985) all indicated the difficulties with 
ethno-centric projects of self-government such as consociational, legislative and 
administrative autonomy. For example, it is argued by Young (1995) that societal 
culture as defined by Kymlicka (1995) is hard to pinpoint. It is a dynamic concept and 
reaching unanimity is impossible due to multiple agencies that constantly compete to 
define it. Kukathas (1992) similarly argued that groups are composed of individuals 
who have different interests; representation of one interest group over the other 
creates further inequalities between them. Hutchinson (2005) in his historical account 
of nations, although similar to the societal cultures as defined in Kymlicka’s work, 
argued that the elevation of particular cultures to define the nation in a totalizing 
manner would have the effect of creating zones of conflict. Liebich (1995), Burg (1993) 
and Choudhry (2007:621) suggested that as a form of multiculturalist policy 
‘multinational federalism had the perverse effect of fuelling precisely those political 
forces it was designed to suppress in Eastern and Central Europe’. The Marxist 
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critique of multiculturalism (Zizek 1997, Pavlov 2011), the post-modernist critique 
(McLaren 1993) and gender studies (Davis 2011, Phillips 2007) provided examples of 
cases where other social divisions, like class and gender, are obscured by 
overarching claims of ethnicity.  From the perspectives of ‘civic patriots’ (Habermas 
2005), ‘civic republican individualists’ (Rawls1993), or cosmopolitans (Waldron 1992) 
ethno-centric multiculturalism is ‘responsible for exaggerating the resilience of ethnic 
divisions, and for interrupting the human capacity to generate new cross cutting 
identities’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). These arguments hold true in most cases 
given that all cultural societies have always been fragmented. This has been evident 
especially in the age of globalization where both state-centric and ethno-centric 
conceptions of nation are constantly challenged by emerging, crosscutting and 
multiple identities (Fetherstone 1995).  Exponents of this paradigm are also critical of 
the role attributed to ethnicity in arguments of collective action:  even if the collective 
representation is shown to be consistent with electoral democracy, the critics still 
argue it is not clear why people who are entitled to use their ‘collective will’ in the 
political realm should primarily be regarded as members of an ethnic group but not as 
equal citizens (Carens 2000).  
These critiques have proved to be evident in the cases of Turkey and France 
where, respectively, the Kurds and Corsicans have never been recognized as a 
minority. One who wants to regulate the relationship between the minority and 
majority in such cases has to create this distinction before anything else. In Turkey 
and France everybody who is tied to the state by citizenship is equal before the law, 
and therefore cannot be recognized as a minority on the ground of ethnic 
distinctiveness. In these cases cultural boundaries are fluid and the structure has 
allowed for crosscutting identities to emerge very easily and become politically 
relevant at the same time. Under such circumstances Kymlicka barely acknowledges 
the various agents of assimilation and he does not even attempt to explain what it 
means to actually be assimilated. Also problematic is his lack of a good argument 
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when the separatist nationalists within the minority group do not represent the 
integrationist majority of their community.   Critics argue that these problems remain 
to complicate the process of deciding what groups are not assimilated and who 
should be entitled to self-government rights. 
Critics of multiculturalism, however, have very little to say in cases like 
Quebec in Canada and Flanders in Belgium, where the ethno-national divisions do 
produce representative blocs. 85  De-constructivist critics of multiculturalism whose 
focus is on internal diversity cannot come to terms with such cases where national 
minorities are evidently mobilized around their ethno-national identity in democratic 
and peaceful ways.  
 This collectivist tendency 86 , exemplified by national minorities such as 
Quebecers and Flemish, cannot be explained by de-constructivist analysis of ethnicity. 
As seen earlier, critiques of multiculturalism mostly center on its essentialist and 
totalizing tendency where there is actually not a unanimous group to be recognized 
as such (Benhabib 2002, Phillips 2007). Any attempts to recognize group rights would 
necessarily require the construction of an overarching identity for that group; and any 
attempt to construct such an identity will, in one way or the other, exclude and 
oppress differences.  As explained before, the critical literature comes from various 
schools of thought including cosmopolitanism (Waldron 1992), egalitarianism (Barry 
2001), and liberal culturalism (Young 1995). Despite their differences there is an 
overarching doubt about the term ‘collective identity’.  For them, the activists who 
base their self-government argument on this very concept of collective identity ignore 
                                                85 For such cases critiques generally focus more on wrongdoings with the institutional forms 
and practices of the multiculturalism theory than its fundamental premises to accommodate 
national minorities through self-government rights.  I will touch upon those issues later in this 
paper. 
86 Here there is no insinuation that these groups are not internally diverse. What the collective 
tendency refers to is the mass movement of people who are different on many levels, yet still 
want to be primarily recognized as an ethno-cultural group and derive their political rights from 
this recognition. 
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the conflicts of interest among people who are expected to lead the collective action 
(Kukathas 1992). 
 However, in Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism it is not the very ‘suspected’ 
collective identity per se that legitimizes the self-government claims of minority 
nationalists. What matters in his theory is rather the commitment of people to gather 
around their ethno-cultural identity. Popular sovereignty and collective-will87, therefore, 
are the cornerstones of his theory that is thereby in parallels with the oldest and most 
literal definition of democracy.  Kymlicka does not reject the possibility of crosscutting 
identities or their changing impacts on electoral behaviour but he recognizes that in 
spite of their differences most people do choose to support ethnocentric politics when 
it comes to regulating the relationship between minorities and the majority. Critiques 
lose ground to ethno-centric multiculturalism especially when conflicts within the 
minority are too insignificant to cast shadow on the collective will of the group. I 
suggest that ethno-centric multiculturalism should not be discounted because of the 
diverse and conflicting nature of people’s interests. People’s cultural belongings and 
interests are and will always be diverse. The problem, I suggest, is whether or not the 
members of ‘national’ minority are disposed, ready and able to overcome their cultural 
differences and conflicts of interest for the sake of creating or maintaining an 
overarching ethno-cultural boundary.  
 The consistency of self-government projects is by and large dependent on the 
loyalty and consent of those who are involved in those projects. Hence I suggest it is 
critical to know under what circumstances a minority group almost unanimously 
adheres to the ethno-cultural politics and self-government solution.  In the first part of 
what follows I will elaborate on such cases and explore five factors put forward to 
                                                87 For the earlier discussion on ‘willingness in Kymlicka’s theory’ see pp. 75, 198. 
                                                                                                                
 211 
explain why there is popular support88 for ethno-centric multiculturalism and the self-
government rights for national minorities that it offers. 
 
6.1.1 Why Ethno-Politics: Longue Durée and En Masse? 
 
First, the pre-existing homogeneity of ethnic groups is usually given as the 
most important factor explaining ethno-nationalist mobilization. The myth of pro-
existing homogeneity, however, has already been refuted by earlier accounts of de-
constructivism and post-modernism. All ethnic communities are internally segregated 
by linguistic, religious, gender, class-related, geographical or political divisions. The 
Muslim community in Greece is, for example, not ethnically homogenous. ‘There are 
an estimated 120, 000 Muslim Turks in Greece’ (Bahceli1987: 109), yet 
approximately 35.000 of them are Pomaks 89  whose mother tongue is actually a 
Bulgarian dialect and there are nearly 5000 Muslim Gypsies who are of Romany 
origin.  Although the Muslim community in Greece is fragmented as shown they still 
find it more appealing to classify themselves as Turkish (Demetriou 2004, Adamou 
2010). Alexis Alexandris (2003: 126) states that ‘in fact most of the nationalistic 
                                                88 The popular support for ethno-cultural movements or ethnic partisanship itself cannot be 
taken as the ultimate variable to explain the prospects for ethno-centric multiculturalism in the 
long run because factors that generate ethnic partisanship within the minority community can 
be more salient at particular times for certain factions and their temporary significance may not 
in any case last as long as suggested. For example Reilly and Reynolds (1999) and Wilkinson 
(2004) found a correlation between institutional design and ethnic voting (as an indicator to 
support for ethno-politics) suggesting that the proportional system politicizes ethnicity. Huber  
(2012:1) in his statistical work on measuring the voting of ethnic groups argued that ‘economic 
development is associated with higher levels of ethnic voting behavior’. The problem with 
these studies is that variables they offer are changeable over time and they cannot explain 
cases where the popular support for ethno-politics remains stable across time. Similarly Long 
(2012) in his study about the determinants of ethnic voting suggested that the extent of in-
group attachment and fear for the opposing ethnic groups are the drivers and causes of ethnic 
voting, however this  approach overlooks the reasons why group attachment or fear for the 
opposing ethnic group arises in the first place.  To omit an overarching framework that 
facilitates the salience of all these explanations above prevents us from understanding longue 
durée nature of the popular support for ethno-politics in some cases. Therefore we need to 
find a more comprehensive explanation as to why ethno-nationalism constantly resonates to 
varying degrees with minority members en masse in some cases but not in others. 
89  ‘The latest official estimate of the number of Pomaks in Greece was given by the 
Coordinating Office of Minority Schools in 1994, and was 35,000’(World Directory of Minorities 
and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Rights Group  2013). 
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(Turkish) minority figures in Thrace are of Pomak or Roma descent’   Similarly In 
Quebec although ‘the Liberal Party and the Parti Quebecois, differ dramatically on 
some policy issues, the degree to which, they are in agreement regarding culture 
policy is quite striking’ (Kresl 1996: 499).   
This is not to say that all Quebecois are nationalists in the sense that, for 
example, members of the independentist Parti Quebecois are; even the Parti 
Quebecois in power since 1976 and the most successful by far of all 
Quebecois nationalist political parties, was unable, in 1980, to win a 
referendum concerning the independence of Quebec from Canada. In a less 
militant sense, however, most French-speaking Quebecois-even those loyal 
to Canada-are Quebecois nationalists, for most of them are at least nominally 
committed to their identity as French-speaking Quebecois (Handler 1984: 59).  
 
This part of the chapter will explain why the majority of a group such as the 
Muslim Turks in Greece, Flemish in Belgium, or Quebecers in Canada are likely to 
overcome their internal divisions and appeal to the ethno-political representation en 
masse and why the groups like the Kurds in Turkey or Corsicans in France do not.  
Second, political repression is assumed to be another reason why members of 
an ethnic group develop a resistant mobilization (Olzak 2006; Marshall and Gurr 2003, 
Birnir 2007). However, this is not particularly relevant in the context of this study 
because the research is only concerned with cases where ethno-centric 
multiculturalism, with varying degrees, has already been introduced as a solution for 
the problems of national minorities.  The political domination, which may account for 
the emergence of the conflict in the first place, can no longer have an explanatory 
power for continuing and increasing levels of support for ethno-nationalist politics in 
places such as in Basque, Catalonia, Flanders or Quebec.  
Third, ranked systems: It has been argued by the literature on political 
domination that the people are more likely to mobilize around ethno-cultural identity if 
their hosting state has systematically discriminated against them on the basis of their 
membership to an ethnic group. This is, as suggested by Horowitz (1981), particularly 
                                                                                                                
 213 
relevant where there is a significant overlap between ethnicity and class.  
Rupesinghe’s (1987) account of Horowitz’s approach to the issue is relevant 
Horowitz (1981) makes a distinction between ranked and unranked ethnic 
groups. He sees the distinction as resting upon the coincidence of social class 
with ethnic group. When the two coincide it is possible to speak of ranked 
ethnic groups. Where groups are cross-class, it is possible to speak of 
unranked ethnic groups. In unranked systems, on the other hand, parallel 
ethnic groups coexist, each group internally stratified. Ethnic conflict, however, 
impedes or obscures class conflict when ethnic groups are cross class, as 
they are in unranked systems (Rupesinghe 1987). 
 
I agree that in cases where members of an ethnic group also share a common 
social class, the depth of separateness between them and other ethnic groups cannot 
be perceived of as simply a fabrication or an overstatement by ethno-nationalist 
projects. Although all national or collective identities are imagined and can be 
interpreted as an outcome of political projects, some are by no means imaginary and 
will strongly resonate with many people for different reasons. Clear-cut competition 
between ethnic groups, bureaucratization of ethnicity and material inequality are 
some of the reasons given to explain the strong boundaries between ethnic groups 
and their members’ support for ethno-cultural politics (Cornel and Hartman 1998).  
These elements are strongly associated with what Horowitz calls ‘ranked societies’.  
The ranked systems and hierarchical relationship between groups explain why 
minority members’ electoral behaviour can primarily be motivated by their ethno-
cultural identity. What it cannot explain however is the en masse support for ethno-
national politics in cases like Catalonia, Flanders and Quebec, where the national 
minorities are now doing fairly well and their persistent claim to self-government or 
even independence, is no longer grounded on class-ethnicity correlation or a sense of 
economic discrimination and injustice. In Canada, for example, Saphiro and Stelcner 
(1997), Breton (1998), Belan (2003) all showed in their research that the 
Francophone wage gap in Quebec had disappeared by 1985. Albouy (2006: 1212) 
has illustrated statistically that actually, ‘in Quebec, Francophones now earn 
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significantly more than similarly skilled Anglophones.’ Yet the nationalists’ claim for 
independence is still an on-going issue. It is also the case in Belgium where the 
Dutch-speaking Flemish people with a claim to independence are doing financially 
outperforming the French-speaking Walloons90.  
       
Table 3 Flanders and Wallonia Relative Weigh in Economy (Row percentages)  
 Flanders Wallonia 
1955 44.2 34.2 
1965 51.4 30.4 
1975 55.6 27.9 
Population %(1970)  56.0 32.3  
Figures do not add up to 100 because Brussels has been omitted (Covell 1986:265).  
 
Stemming from this change in economic balance, Flemish people, who make 
up the 60% of the population in Belgium, are resentful about ‘exorbitant and inefficient 
financial transfers amounting to over 10 billion Euros per year (about 1,734 Euros for 
each Flemish person)’ that they are required to make to Wallonia and Brussels 
(Mnookin and Verbeke 2009:152-153). The Flemish people’s persistent call for 
independence can thus better be explained by their desire to get rid of what they see 
as a burden (Covell 1986:261-281).  
Fourth, at this point ‘the material interests’ argument appears relevant in 
explaining the popular support for ethno-cultural politics with its capacity to maximize 
the material interests of its followers. Richard Jenkins (2009) argues that ‘identity and 
                                                90 It is a common mistake that regional disparity is usually seen as an outcome of ethnic 
discrimination. It is important to stress here that the economic disparity is not primarily 
between ethnic groups, but the regions dominated by those groups.  Regional disparities, that 
may be due to various demographic factors like population ageing (Covell 1986) or geography 
(Gidengil 1989) cannot be alone an indication of an ethnically ranked society where the social 
classes would necessarily coincide with ethnic groups as explained by Horowitz earlier. 
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ethnicity do not, sui generis, cause people to do things. They must always be 
understood in political and economic contexts in particular with respect to the pursuit 
of local material interests’. For example, salience of an overarching Protestant identity 
in Northern Ireland that, Jenkins thinks, is only possible because of the socio-
economic benefits and advantages that its community has enjoyed in the UK. 
Similarly Hale (2008) in his relational theory suggests that, ‘ethnicity has no intrinsic 
motivational implications; instead, it determines the strategies that individuals use to 
maximize their life chances by pursuing ends such as wealth, power, security, self-
esteem and status’ (Breuilly, Hale, Sasse and Hechter 2011: 683). 
This perspective is also often used to explain why more prosperous and 
relatively self-sufficient former USSR countries like Ukraine were first to leave the 
Union whereas more economically dependent Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan 
were unenthusiastic to endorse the fall of the Union and leave its collectivized 
economic structure (Strokov and Paramonov 2006).   
However, this approach does not seem to be able to account for some other 
cases. It cannot, for example, explain the cases where members of minority, who 
comprise the less prosperous group, almost unanimously support the ethnic cause 
when in theory whole or partial assimilation into the majority (adopting the majority 
language to benefit future employment prospects for example) would leave them 
better off. Muslim Turks in Greece fall in to this category. ‘Western Thrace is the least 
developed and the poorest region in Greece’ (Bahceli 1987: 114) and the Turkish 
language does not offer any prospects for having a good career beyond that of a 
farmer in rural Greece. The instrumentalist utilitarian approach, therefore, cannot 
explain why the Muslim community of Western Thrace is increasingly following an 
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ethno-cultural politics when speaking the Turkish language does little to maximize 
their material interests in Greece. 91 
Fifth, binary cultures: starting from the relationship between Muslim Turks and 
Christian Greeks, the microcosm of Huntington’s ‘global clash of civilization thesis’ 
suggests that, independent of their instrumental roles, cultures will inherently be 
positioned and defined in relation to each other and that those members of mutually 
exclusive cultures will always support their own cause against one another.  This 
difficulty at the national level is exemplified by, amongst others, the Catholic French 
who want to fully assimilate into Protestant Anglophone culture in Canada and have 
to give up their Catholic traditions, because Protestantism is primarily defined in 
contrast to Catholicism.92 A reflection of the same duality was observed in Northern 
Ireland where the conflict between unionist Protestants and separatist Catholics was 
primarily defined by the presumption that Protestantism and Catholicism are mutually 
exclusive categories. Under similar conditions the Muslim minority in Western Thrace 
cannot become Greek without giving up their Islamic identity, as historically to be 
Greek is to be Orthodox Christian. So the argument suggests that mutually exclusive 
nature of the cultures in relationship may have an explanatory power for the 
persistence of boundaries between them.  
Duality of the cultures has an explanatory power to some extent in cases such 
as exclusive categories of religion.93 It cannot explain, however, why that boundary 
                                                91 The ‘Material interests’ argument may still hold true if we account for that ‘a great number of 
Turks from Thrace immigrate to Turkey which, they think provides more opportunities than 
Greek cities for Turkish speaking Muslims’ (Bahceli 1987: 112).  For two reasons, it does not 
make any sense to think that the Muslim Turks of Thrace would be financially better off in 
Turkey. First, living standards in Greece used to be much higher than they were in Turkey; ‘the 
per capita  income in Greece [was] four times that of Turkey [in 80s]’ (Ibid: 112). Second, the 
majority of those Turks who are not educated to university degree level in Greece are not 
likely to be qualified for a well-paid employment in Turkey either (Wilson 1980).  
93 Even this can only be true to the extent to which the state makes the religion politically 
relevant as a criterion for exclusion. Religious similarities do, of course, have a power to 
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between mutually exclusive categories should be politically relevant anyway. Neither 
can it explain the reason why members of linguistic cultures, which are not mutually 
exclusive, do still have persistent support to keep the boundary between them. For 
example, it is quite possible to argue that in Belgium linguistic difference between 
Catholic French-speaking Walloons and Catholic Dutch-speaking Flemish does not 
constitute a barrier for members of either group to assimilate into one another or 
generate crosscutting bilingual identities. However we see that the historical 
separation between the two communities in Belgium has always been made politically 
relevant by the state; popularly supported; and increasingly strengthened by Flemish 
claims to independence.  
The hierarchical ranking systems, ‘power differentials between individuals of 
different ethnic backgrounds’ as suggested by Horowitz (1981), Cornell and 
Hartmann (1998) cannot explain ethno-nationalisms in unranked communities of 
Canada and Belgium. ‘The pursuit of material interests’ as Jenkins (2009) suggested 
does not seem to be a relevant motivation for Muslims in Greece to classify 
themselves as Turkish, which has low utilitarian value in the country. Duality of the 
                                                                                                                                       
explain why it is easier and more likely for some minorities to assimilate into the majority 
community like the Muslim Kurds mixed with the Muslim Turks and the Scots did the same 
with the English (Keating 2001; Somer 2008). It is by no means, however, generalizable that 
the religious difference would make it especially difficult or inevitable to assimilate. The 
Aboriginal people of Canada assimilated well through the policies of the Anglican Church in 
Canada (Woods 2012). Similarly, non-Turkish speaking Muslims were, albeit very occasionally 
and in small numbers, converted to Orthodox Christianity (Poulton 1997). The duality of 
cultures argument on its own, therefore, cannot explain the situation of those people who may 
still be willing to convert and leave their culture of their birth in order to become socially more 
acceptable. When this happens what becomes more important is whether the majority 
welcomes the assimilation of others and whether the state policies are regulated in a way to 
make this possible.  As the thesis has shown earlier, some groups like the Uyghur Turks in 
China are not allowed to assimilate into the majority community no matter how hard they 
worked to make this possible. Besides, the relationship between cultural groups cannot be 
explained as a fixed mechanism because the culture always has a socially constructed 
meaning and it can be challenged and changed. For example, the non-conformist eight million 
people in the UK who identified with both Catholicism and their English ethnicity at once 
challenge the dominant Protestant characteristic of Englishness (2001 national census). 
Therefore this argument for the duality of cultures is yet to explain how the relationship 
between different cultures can be stably fixed and highly predictable if the meaning of the 
culture is volatile and unstable in the first place. 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religious cultures involved cannot explain the separatist tendencies of linguistic 
groups who share the same religion like the Flemish and the Walloons. My goal is not 
to refute the points made by previous studies to explain ethnic mobilization. Each of 
these arguments has its own merit to explain particular dimensions and some cases 
of ethno-centric mobilization, but none can individually provide a general logic as to 
why ethno-cultural politics of multiculturalism is widely supported by most members of 
the national minority in some cases but not in others.  
I suggest that what all these cases have in common, and what explains the 
political persistence of a cultural boundary between the two communities is the state 
discourse94 that has facilitated it. This can be observed in all the cases above where 
the state has historically facilitated the ethnic distinctions through either exclusion in 
the forms of discrimination and deportation, or de facto and de jure recognition of 
ethno-cultural groups in public. It is not to suggest that ethnic boundaries are only 
driven by state policies. In fact it could be argued from an ethno-symbolic angle, that 
language and religion, as well as memories and early mobilisation, are critical. What 
the thesis rejects is Kymlicka’s presumption that ethnic and cultural identities will 
almost inevitably translate into politics. A remarkable number of those Kurds in 
Turkey and Corsicans in France who refused to politicize their ethnicities can be seen 
as  proof that not all cultural nationalisms are also political. As Hutchinson (1987) 
suggested, cultural ‘national identity’ does not necessarily translate into the kind of 
nationalism that Gellner (1983:1) defines is ‘primarily a political principle which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent’. This thesis criticized 
                                                
94 The state discourse refers to a hegemonic power that regulates the way in which the body 
politic and social life is organized. In the context of my study it refers to the modern state 
starting with the 1648 Westphalian system that gave it the monopoly of force within its own 
territory. However, it is also possible to apply this to the Empires of pre-modernity where 
subjects were most often recognized by their cultural particularities. The millet system in the 
Ottoman Empire is a powerful case in point. The hegemonic power (of the Ottoman Empire) 
facilitated ethnic separation through the method of religious differentiation and later itself came 
to an end with the rise of ethno-nationalisms of those Non-Muslim communities it had 
differentiated. 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Kymlicka’s overemphasis on the political nature of nation and tried to understand 
under what circumstances a national minority is more likely to politicize its cultural 
distinctiveness. 
6.1.2 Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism: A Prolonged Differentiation of Ethnicity  
 In what follows, I pick up on a multidisciplinary approach of political 
anthropology that explains the salience of ethnicity through a discursive context in 
which ethnic identity is made politically relevant by the state in both direct and indirect 
ways. Despite their varying focuses on different aspects of ethnic boundary-making 
all political anthropologists such as Barth (1969) Geertz (1973), Cohen (1985), 
Eriksen (1993) and Jenkins (1997), Wimmer (2008) emphasized the foundational role 
of socio-political interaction and cultural differentiation in explaining the emergence, 
survival and cohesion of ethnic groups. All these studies of cultural boundary-making 
in their attempts to epitomize this socio-political interaction, suggest that exclusion 
and assimilation are two methods widely used by states in their relations with cultural 
groups.  
This distinction between assimilation and exclusion has also been associated 
with the difference between civic and ethnic nationalisms in this study, suggesting 
that the civic nationalism, in a constructivist fashion, uses assimilation, and the ethnic 
nationalism, in an organic sense, appeals to exclusion.95 This dichotomy requires 
further elaboration through the lens of political anthropology because the instrumental 
                                                
95It is evident that most nation states have used different methods in their relations to different 
groups. For this reason I specifically clarify that I focus only on the individual relationships 
between the state and particular minorities in point; and that I do not try to classify state 
nationalisms as entirely civic, ethnic, assimilationist, or exclusionist. For example ‘The courts 
stress that there is no Macedonian minority in Greece’ (Kalampakou 2009: 2), whereas the 
Muslims were recognized as a minority according to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and 
were evidently discriminated against in the country (Oran 1986).  Similarly non-Turkish 
speaking Romani and Pomak Muslims have occasionally been converted to Orthodox 
Christianity and deported to other regions in the country for integration; whereas Turkish 
speaking Muslims have always been left out of these projects. ‘This was the case of Bishop of 
Florina who in the 1970’s had initiated a church mission to convert Muslim Roma (non-Turkish 
speaking) to Orthodox Christianity’ (Poulton 1997: 91).  
                                                                                                                
 220 
value of the dichotomy between assimilation and exclusion in boundary-making is 
mostly drowned out by the normative baggage of civic-ethnic dichotomy (Brubaker 
2001). Nationalism studies are generally concerned with defining what the dichotomy 
is about and whether it can be usefully applied to categorize nation-states. In their 
totalizing tendency to make normative categorizations, they fail to account for varying 
forms of associated concepts such as assimilation or exclusion. For this reason they 
also ignore the impacts of these varying degrees of assimilation and differentiation on 
the subsequent design of societies. Mindful of this, my analysis will be sensitive both 
to the heterogeneity/collectivity of personal assimilation experiences (Eriksen 1993), 
and to the differences between voluntary, forcible, additive and absorptive forms of 
assimilation as associated with civic nationalism (Zolberg 1997).  Similarly exclusion 
as a method used by ethnic nationalism is mostly understood as a negative concept 
and associated with discrimination, deportation, extermination and population-
exchange (Jackson Preece 2005). I will show that exclusion is also relevant for cases 
where the state did not force but allowed groups to exclude themselves from the 
majority along the lines of ethnicity. This kind of exclusion or differentiation, as 
Brubaker (2004) calls it, coincides with cases like Canada (Quebecers) and Belgium 
(Flemish) that have always left room for voluntary assimilation to the majority. As the 
cases in point suggest, categorizing the state-minority relations on a simple 
dichotomy of exclusion and assimilation as binary oppositions would be erroneous. 
For this reason I will focus on forcible assimilation in cases that still represent the 
ideal of integration and civic nationalism.96 I still put an emphasis on the civic ideal of 
state nationalism because it is actually what characterizes the permeability of the 
                                                96 These cases still represent this ideal of integration because their policies are aimed at 
incorporation, and not exclusion or differentiation. To remind the reader, the difference 
between civic and ethnic nationalisms in this study is not founded on a normative criterion. 
Illiberal state nationalisms that practice forced assimilation can still be civic if they are aimed at 
integrating and incorporating the minority instead of differentiating or discriminating those 
minorities. 
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borders and openness of the dominant socio-political entity to which the minority is 
expected to assimilate into.  
In my account of the cases where the minority has not been forcibly 
assimilated I will illustrate that assimilation was merely an underused option or that 
there was exclusion or promotion of groups on the basis of ethnicity.  Even when 
there were signs of forcible linguistic assimilation, as in Greece, I will show that it was 
not aimed at integrating the Muslim Turk minority to the mainstream but intimidating 
its members to leave the country which had not been welcoming to Muslims anyway. 
What becomes relevant here is also the distinction between additive and 
absorptive assimilationist policies. I have explained and used these two types of 
assimilation many times throughout this thesis. The former refers to a type of 
acculturation that does not expect one to lose previous cultural membership while 
obtaining a new one (Baubock 1996), and the absorptive category assumes that ‘the 
identity formation is a constant-sum game, whereby the acquisition of a new identity 
occurs at the expense of the original one’ (Zolberg 1997, Barry 2001: 81). In what 
follows I will show that none of the culturally united and politically mobilized ethnic 
groups had been assimilated in the sense that some Kurdish people were forced to 
become Turkish in an absorptive fashion. Forced deportation of the minority, legal 
barriers to speaking the minority language in public or the legal framework banning 
the establishment of ethno-cultural associations are some of the forcible and 
absorptive assimilationist policies. In my analysis I expect to see that the minorities 
whose absolute majority support the ethno-centric multiculturalism as defined by 
Kymlicka are the ones that have never been exposed to these policies of forced 
absorptive assimilation and integrationist ideal of civic state-nationalism at the same 
time.   
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Once more I will repeat that this is not to say the other explanations such as 
material interests, ranked systems or cultural incompatibilities are completely 
irrelevant to understand the popular support for ethno-centric multiculturalism in 
masses. On the contrary, the explanations I examined earlier are helpful to see why 
and when they become important. Exemplary cases for each argument help me bring 
them all together and find out what they all have in common.  I have observed that 
material interests correlate with ethnic identity; the ranked systems or 
bureaucratization of ethnicity occurs; and cultural incompatibilities become relevant at 
times when ethnic nationalism in the form of discrimination is a barrier facing minority 
people who could have otherwise assimilated; when influential positions are 
systematically exclusive to the dominant group; when ethnic separation is recognized 
positively (autonomy federation, self-government) or negatively (ghettoization) to be 
effective at different levels of society and politics. What follows is an illustration of 
such cases.  
6.2 Case Studies: Ethnic State Nationalism and Multiculturalism 
6.2.1 The Flemish in Belgium 
Before Belgium detached from the Kingdom of the Netherlands a dialect of 
Dutch, which is called Flemish, was the dominant language in Flanders and had 
already been institutionalized. However under the hegemony of France it was 
downgraded and confined to the private interactions of people who lived in that region. 
That is to say, Flemish citizens already had the right to use their own language when 
communicating with each other in private or public meetings or when publishing 
magazines. Notwithstanding the existence of French as the official language, Flemish 
people were allowed to maintain their distinct economic and cultural unity and, 
therefore, a national political identity. They were never exposed to violent assimilation 
that would try to make them integrated with another dominant linguistic community. 
Flemish people could gain limited recognition to the extent that they had the chance 
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to lift their cultural unity up to a level where societal institutions in that language were 
gradually constructed. Flanders was also an economically developed region and, in 
spite of the oppressive policies of state nationalism, it remained so. Therefore the 
Flemish group enjoyed a developed industrial economy where its members could 
enjoy in practice the right to work in their own language when allowed: 
Antwerp, dominated by the Antwerp Meeting Partij was the first province to declare 
Flemish as the official language of Antwerp in 1866. This was followed by the printing 
of parliamentary documents in both languages in 1879, and in 1888 speeches in 
Flemish were finally authorized. Flemish courts were subsequently set-up and 
reached even in the Francophones region in 1908 with a Flemish assize court set up 
in Brussels. The year 1878 saw the use of Flemish in administrative documents, but it 
was only after 1893 that pressure started to build up significantly with the demand of 
officially making Flemish a national language, which was achieved in 1898 thanks to 
the Flemish activists in Parliament. Laws in 1883, 1890 and 1914 extended the use of 
Flemish in schools in the Flemish Brabant. A Royal Flemish Academy for the Flemish 
culture (language and literature) was eventually set up in 1886 and the ‘Flemishization’ 
of the Belgian culture was pressed as a key issue for creating a Flemish University 
(Varin 2006: 6). 
Throughout the nineteenth century, language legislation in Belgium included a 
personality principle according to which, in Flanders, people had the permission to 
speak Flemish in every stage of the public sphere. ‘The language laws of 1873 (court), 
1878 (administration) and 1883 (education) enforced language rights for speakers of 
Dutch in Flanders. In 1898 the Equality Law was passed, which made Dutch an 
official language of Belgium alongside French’ (Linn and McLelland 2002: 125). In the 
1930s, Dutch gradually became the sole language of administration and education in 
Flanders.  
All members of the Flemish group without any detrimental fragmentation 
wanted to use their freedom of association and self-government rights. Moreover, as 
their ethnic identity in public has long been recognized, Flemish people have never 
needed to resort to violent conflict to earn their cultural rights. Such an example 
supports the view that the absence of forced assimilative policies creates a context, 
under which multiculturalism seems more likely to be viable. 
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Even the most enthusiastic egalitarian (Barry 2001) thinks that if a linguistic 
group maintains ‘an entire economy and polity within a state’ (as in Belgium and 
Canada) then it could be given autonomy and the right to govern its education system. 
I argue, however, the viability of ethno-centric multiculturalism is more than a simple 
adaptation of the demarcation between economically equal ethnic groups. 
6.2.3 The Muslim Turks in Greece  
When members of an ethnic category self-identify and are identified by others as 
‘belonging’ to’ a group’ with little ambiguity, ethnic identity will be thicker than in other  
cases, and group members will be prepared to incur high costs to defend the culture 
and honour of their community (Wimmer 2008: 1004).  
The Muslim Turks in Greece, like the Flemish in Belgium, have been labelled 
by their ethno-cultural identity but with striking contrasts in terms of the way this label 
has impacted upon their lives. After the Lausanne Peace Treaty 1923, Muslims in 
Greece have been recognized as a minority and were given the right to education in 
their mother tongue. Muslims, however, were discriminated against in Greece in 
parallels with non-Muslims in Turkey, who were discriminated against at the time.  
They have been excluded from the body politic and mainstream community in daily 
life. 
‘The field research conducted by a number of observers such as Oran and de 
Jong indicate that many Thracian Muslims leave to escape the discriminatory and 
oppressive treatment they experience at the hands of Greek officials’ (Bahceli1987: 
112). Discriminatory policies regarding the Muslim Turks in Greece are many. For 
example ‘in accordance with a 1952 law, land holdings that exceeded the legally 
allowable five hundred donums [fifty hectares] were expropriated for subsequent 
distribution to landless peasants virtually no landless Muslims have benefitted from 
such re-distribution’ (Bahceli 1987: 113, Oran 1986: 122). Another discriminatory 
policy directed against Muslim Turks was clear in section 19 of Greek Nationality Law 
No 3370 dated 1955, ‘a person of non-Greek origin who leaves Greece with the 
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intention of not returning, may be declared as having lost Greek nationality’ (Bahceli 
1987: 116, Alexandris 1992: 315, Tsitselikis 2006: 154).  
In addition to the legal documents and state policies, social life, economic 
development and settlement patterns of Muslim Turks also give us a picture of 
discrimination and exclusion that has been persistent in the modern history of Greece.  
In theory Muslims can move to more affluent Greek cities to improve their conditions. 
However the observation shows that ‘in practice this is not a credible option, since life 
for a Muslim Turk is not easy in any part of Greece… Oran suggests that in 1986, it 
was very rare to find any Muslim student enrolled in any of the universities in Greece’ 
(Bahceli 1987: 114). 
The exclusionist policies directed against Muslims in Greece were not 
inherently because of the mutually exclusive nature of religions.  It is evident that 
Non-Turkish speaking Muslim minorities have been, albeit very seldom, exposed to 
missionary projects and occasionally converted in Greece. The target of the exclusion 
in Greece was especially the Turkish speaking Muslims.  Yiakoumaki (2006: 148) 
also suggests that ‘throughout their modern history, relations among the populations 
of Thrace were strongly shaped by Greek-Turkish relations’. As an outcome of this 
historical path, Muslim Turks are found territorially concentrated. Although the 
Muslims in Thrace have been internally fragmented as Pomak, Roma and Turkish, 
they generally identify with Muslim Turkish culture in the region (Yiakoumaki 2006: 
148). I argued that group cohesion, shared attachment and voluntary support for 
ethno-nationalism in this case can only be explained with reference to this 
exclusionary and discriminatory narrative in Greece that marginalizes all different 
groups of Muslims in her territory as one united group. Recognition, I think, does not 
create or further the essentialization and reification of the group when people identify 
with one group on a voluntary basis. In an historical context where minority members 
have already been stigmatized as the ‘other’ and dragged to the margins of the 
country I do not see any way that positive recognition and autonomy solutions would 
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make their situation worse.  Egalitarians are concerned that the material inequality 
between the minority and the majority will deepen in cases where the minority has a 
backward economy and a limited institutional capacity to provide good opportunities 
for its members. This is a completely materialistic point of view and does not account 
for the popular sovereignty of people who may be ready to embrace this economic 
burden, especially when compared to the injustices that they experienced in the past. 
It is not logical to suggest that recognizing their claim to autonomy would really be a 
problem if the people are fully aware that their chances to prosper with Turkish 
language is low in any other parts of the Greece, yet still ready and willing to pay the 
cost of their cultural autonomy (Alexandris 2003: 126).   
6.2.4 The Quebecers in Canada 
Similarly in Canada the contemporary relationship between Francophones and 
the State can be characterized as the continuation of a long historical state discourse 
that has always accommodated an ethnic boundary between Francophone and 
Anglophone communities as a politically relevant marker. As Choudhry (2007: 619) 
stated, ‘although the Canadian model continued to evolve well into the 1980s, many 
of its key features had been in place since the mid-nineteenth century’. 
The United province of Canada, a British Colony, was founded by merging two 
previous colonies of Upper Canada (Ontario today) and Lower Canada (Quebec 
today). Francophone citizens have dominated the latter and the former has been 
largely populated by Anglophone citizens (McRoberts 1997). By the rights given to 
them in Constitution 1867 Act these two groups elected the same number of 
representatives to legislative assembly.97 The official language of the assembly was 
                                                
97 Constitution Act 1867, 22: ‘In relation to the Constitution of the Senate Canada shall be 
deemed to consist of Four Divisions:1. Ontario;2. Quebec;3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island 4. The Western Provinces of Manitoba, 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta; which Four Divisions shall (subject to the 
Provisions of this Act) be equally represented in the Senate as follows: Ontario by twenty-four 
senators; Quebec by twenty-four senators; the Maritime Provinces and Prince Edward Island 
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English and Francophone people were given no option but to use it if they wanted to 
participate in the assembly. Federalism was, however, soon introduced and ‘Quebec 
has been granted a mix of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction over a wide range of 
policy areas that give it the tools to ensure the survival of a Francophone society’ 
(Choudhry 2007: 613). The federal solution created linguistic dualism and French was 
soon added as official language in addition to English. The Constitution Act 1867 21-
24 has allowed the use of both English and French in the Quebec National Assembly 
and required legal provisions to be decreed and practiced in both languages. Through 
the enactment, the Charter of the French Language in 1977 the Parti Quebecois even 
endeavored to legislate and make French the only official language of the region.   
The Supreme Court of Canada, which is the ultimate arbiter on provincial matters, 
was also designed to guarantee regional representation and it secured three out of its 
nine seats for the judges from Quebec (Kymlicka 1998: 114, Hogg 2007, Thomson 
and Carswell 2007).  
The voluntary assimilation into the Anglophone community has always been 
an option for Francophones in Canada but in practice it has mostly remained an 
underrated symbolic option amongst most French speakers. There are of course 
exceptions.  One of them is those Francophone people who live in Alberta where the 
only official language was English (Bouchard 1994). Even in the North West, though, 
French has been recognized by the state to constitute an important role in education 
of Franco-Albertans.98 Franco-Albertans have rights to separate schools and other 
                                                                                                                                       
by twenty-four senators, ten thereof representing Nova Scotia, ten thereof representing New 
Brunswick, and four thereof representing Prince Edward Island; the Western Provinces by 
twenty-four senators, six thereof representing Manitoba, six thereof representing British 
Columbia, six thereof representing Saskatchewan, and six thereof representing Alberta; 
Newfoundland shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by six members; the Yukon 
Territory, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut shall be entitled to be represented in the 
Senate by one member each’ (Department of Justice Canada: 2013).   98 Section 11  of North-West Territories Act of 1875; 1901 amendment to 1892 Ordinance No. 
22, Section 83; Section 184 of the School Ordinance in 1925 all facilitated teaching French in 
primary course.  Association des instituteurs bilingues de l'Alberta (AIBA) was founded in 1926, 
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poly-ethnic rights, but the reality is one of large-scale assimilation to English. One has 
to acknowledge that the right to separate schooling that Franco-Albertans enjoy is 
quite different from the autonomy regulations in Quebec where French is the 
compulsory medium of instruction and business. This also supports the argument in 
this thesis that when integration and assimilation is a realistic option, there is no 
reason to presume that ethnic distinctions will keep determining political behaviour. 
Although they have been obliged to learn English language in Alberta those Franco 
Albertans have never been forced to become English in an absorptive fashion. 
However the state’s benign neglect of their culture in public life for long time actually 
increased the extent of their exposure to the predominant English culture. 
Subsequently Franco-Albertans have emerged as a strongly bilingual community in 
support of the multicultural Pan-Canadian idea.  Today, diverse cultural and political 
orientations of Franco-Albertans constitute an example for arguments that question 
the presumptions of cultural homogeneity within Francophone community (Bergeron 
2007, Abu-Laban and Couture 2010, Dallaire 2000,2003, Thompson 2012). As has 
been suggested by the example of Franco-Albertans the integrationist ideal of civic 
nationalism in Canada has facilitated a limited heterogeneity within the Francophone 
community of Canada.  The same structure also allowed the emergence of a small 
English-speaking community as well as pan-Canadian nationalists within Quebec.  
Regarding the heterogeneity argument, Schertzer and Woods (2011: 207) suggest 
that today ‘some French Quebecers simply are not Quebec nationalists and some 
French Quebecers are even pan-Canadian nationalists in the same way that many 
English Canadians are’. 
                                                                                                                                       
Association des éducateurs bilingues de l'Alberta (AEBA) was introduced in 1946. In April 
1968, the Government of Alberta had legislated to allow French-language instruction for up to 
half of the school day. In 1988, six years after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
were introduced. Alberta initiated a new school legislation that facilitated separate French 
schools. In 1993, the Alberta government reformed the Alberta School Act and Francophones 
ultimately secured the right to govern and control their own schools. 
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However for the sake of comparison made here between Turkey and Canada, 
I should emphasize that the Francophone Quebecers who detach themselves from 
ethno-nationalism comprise only a small minority that does not pose an existential 
threat to the operational capacity of majority Quebec nationalists within their 
community.  In such cases those marginal groups should and can be protected by a 
broader human rights framework that allows them to use their right to exit or freedom 
of association as suggested by Kukathas (1992). After all, Kymlicka too, accepts that 
multiculturalism as a normative framework, no matter how much it purports the 
cultural group rights, is fundamentally based on human rights and as such it should 
facilitate intra-group democracy, dynamic debates and on-going struggles over the 
way identities are recognized.  
I argue that in some cases, where group rights and individual rights are in 
conflict, trying to bring them together in the way Kymlicka suggested creates an 
impasse. The Kurds in Turkey exemplify this. The evidence (Konda 2010) shows that 
notwithstanding their shared claim for cultural recognition, political reflections of this 
recognition take very different forms in their opinions. For example, the number of 
southeastern Kurds (56%) who want to have Kurdish only as an elective course, and 
25% who think that some courses could be taught in Kurdish, far exceeds the number 
of those nationalist Kurds (19%) in the region who insist on the education of all 
grades to be offered in Kurdish. In that case, the nationalist leadership is numerically 
the minority within their group, and the practicality of their project is existentially 
dependent on the participation of the remaining group majority who oppose it. In the 
absence of majority participation within the group any sort of autonomy given to 
nationalist leadership would fall far short of the self-government model that Kymlicka 
thinks is the right solution to the problems of national minorities. This was supported 
by the example of Corsicans, whose majority voted against the extended autonomy 
solution and thereby deciding that Corsica remain French in the 2003 referendum.  
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 In Kymlicka’s theory the rights are given to a cultural group rather than to its 
nationalist leadership. He suggests that once the minority language has been 
constellated as the official language of the minority region, deliberative democracy 
can then be used to manage differences among the people who speak the same 
language.  This is problematic because, for the most part, while the masses of a 
cultural group seek greater autonomy, only the elites of the group can participate in 
broader political life. Furthermore, they do not go and consult with their constituency 
each time they need to make a decision about the community (Kuzu 2010).  Besides, 
Kymlicka fails to recognize the possibility that unlike the majority of Quebecers or 
Flemish, some minority group members might not reach an agreement on the 
language issue in the first place. Kymlicka supports deliberative democracy as a 
solution for the management of internal diversity. Deliberative democracy, however, 
seems to be out of question in earlier stages of his project.   He thinks no deliberation 
is necessary to manage the diverse views of minority members on the role that their 
language should play in constitutional reforms, social and political life. It is not 
necessary because the language is a common denominator for all who identify with 
the same ethnicity. Thus, he thinks that the culture and a shared language in 
particular constitute the basis of the claims to greater autonomy. As convincingly 
explained by Barry (2001), the case of Scotland in the UK demonstrates that national 
identifications may not always have to hold strong cultural linguistic components and 
as such cultural traits do not necessarily have to define the primary basis for political 
national autonomy.  
For the United Kingdom is without doubt a multinational state, but one in which 
national identifications have a very low cultural component. In particular, Scottish 
nationalism is a well-established phenomenon whose political success is indicated 
less by the vote for Scottish National Party than by the Labour party’s reluctant 
electoral commitment to a referendum in Scotland on devolution and the large majority 
in favour of Scottish devolution in that referendum. Yet the key to the pervasiveness of 
national sentiment in Scotland has been the way in which Scottish identity has been 
carefully detached from any distinctive language and customs. To be a Scot in good 
standing it is not necessary to speak Gaelic (or even regret the inability to do so), to 
wear a kilt or to enjoy the music of bagpipes (Barry 2001: 309). 
                                                                                                                
 231 
 
 
Similarly like the Scots in Britain, the Kurds in Turkey share the idea that their ethno-
national identity should be respected and recognized by the state.  However Kurds 
within their group differ extremely from each other on the forms that they think this 
recognition should take.  As explained earlier, some Kurds are more concerned with 
their micro particularities like linguistic dialects (Zazaki-Kurmanci), religious sect 
(Sunni-Alevi), material interests, education and social status than their Kurdishness.  
For this very reason, Kurds are in an incommensurable disagreement with each other 
over the degrees and ways their ethnic identity should be recognized in the body 
politic. Based on this complexity, and so far as the principles of equality and freedom 
are concerned, the argument follows that any regional government as a political 
project should not be based on ‘Kurdish’ culture. Since the definition and ‘political’ 
relevance of Kurdishness differs from one actor to another, such a project both limits 
the freedom of those who do not want to take part in it at all and creates inequalities 
between those who incommensurably disagree on its possible forms.  For the Kurdish 
case I therefore suggest that the Scottish model, which does not have strong cultural 
components, seems to have much more to offer than the Quebec model, which is 
based on the rule of culture and commands that children of those Quebecers who 
were not educated in English must attend French public schools.   
 
 
 
 
6.3. Remaining Questions: Not a Coup de Grâce 
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First, I argued that the popular support for ethno-centric multiculturalism stems 
from a relational context and that it changes depending on state-minority relations.  
Picking up on this point the critics suggest that it would be unjust to make people 
permanently liable to a system that they only consented to on the basis of an unstable 
and temporal context. Similarly a well-known constitutionalist argument directed 
against the original social contract theory becomes relevant. Famously, D. Hume 
(1748) and A. Smith (1762) argued that the contractual foundation for government is 
not sufficient to generate political obligation since a contract of one generation would 
not be able to bind any other.  
In the light of this critique, I shall argue that the popular support for ethno-
nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon and its rule is subject to constant interpretation 
and contestation by those who take part in it. Kymlicka suggests that it should be 
acceptable if the minority ‘nation’ decides to separate from the broader state. With a 
similar logic, but from the other end of the discussion, I also argue that the minority 
‘nation’, if its majority desires, must be able to downgrade the political relevance of its 
cultural basis, amend its character or indeed dissolve itself in the future. The direction 
of this relationship would, as I suggested earlier, be subject to the relational context of 
dialogical nationalisms. From a liberal perspective, it does not matter whether 
nationalism gets weaker or stronger so long as the individuals’ right to freedom of 
association and disassociation is protected. I illustrated that the freedom of 
disassociation does not necessarily indicate an existential threat to Kymlicka’s model 
of self-government in cases where the minority enjoys legislative autonomy and 
acknowledges the constitutional right of its members to bow out. This is especially 
relevant when the group is consistently put in a disadvantaged position on the basis 
of something that is not objectively legitimate.  This is, after all, exactly the microcosm 
of the model that Kymlicka suggests so far as the relationship between the minority 
nation and the broader state is concerned. In cases like Quebec, Flanders and 
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Western Thrace, individuals whose ‘freedom of exiting is publicly safeguarded’ can be 
free to bow out of such projects and this does not pose a threat for the existence of 
the national autonomy of their ethnic fellows (Casals 1999). The point I am making is 
that the changing nature of nations and nationalisms can be well represented by a 
responsive system. Establishment and maintenance of such a system however is a 
matter of subsequent and continuous regulation rather than being a reason to refute 
the current state of popular sovereignty at a given time. 
Second, from the egalitarian perspective, the idea of giving self-government 
rights to minorities where the majority have mobilized around their ethnicity is 
problematic.  It is problematic because that would further the inequality between the 
powerful majority that has rich resources to offer and the minority that does not have 
complete economies and polities. Muslim Turks in Greece are an example of this 
because their economic activities in Greece are mostly confined to rural and small or 
medium sized business in Western Thrace.  In his argument Barry overlooks two 
things. One is that the people may not always prioritize their material interests over 
their right to govern themselves. Second is that economic development is subject to 
the possibility of progress and decline in the future. Besides, the economic welfare of 
people does not have to be solely dependent on resources and jobs available within 
the territory of a self-governing group.   External opportunities that are offered by kin-
states or supranational organizations such as the European Union set up a strong 
example for this. Any egalitarian critique of multiculturalism must account for the 
conditional state of economic welfare and its complex nature which operates across 
boundaries.  
As regards the second point above, however, it is argued that the role of the 
state should be to protect the equality of its citizens if things go wrong. It makes 
sense to think of what would happen if the kin state did not open its borders to its 
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nationals, or if the European Union ceased to exist and provide job opportunities 
across state boundaries. Regulations that protect the equality of the people cannot be 
left to probability, fortune and good luck so the state must be responsible for providing 
its citizens with equal access to the highest opportunities available within its 
boundaries (Barry 2001: 318). When this happens, the majority’s language that offers 
the greatest opportunities in the country becomes more important. This may not be 
desirable for those who voluntarily choose to pay the cost of their choice. It is, 
however, still a valid point for children who cannot make decisions on their own behalf.  
As I suggested earlier, everyone should be publicly safeguarded to have the freedom 
to exit. However having freedom and being able to use it are different things. If the 
children are not equipped with necessary qualifications (linguistic, educational) to 
leave their community and enjoy the opportunities provided by the broader state then 
we cannot read their membership to the community as a free decision. The problem 
becomes about the role of the liberal state when there is a conflict between the 
equality of children and cultural freedom of parents to make choices on behalf of their 
children. There is a huge literature on the transfer of parental authority to the state 
(Schoeman 1980, Gregory 1999, Minow 1986) and the common wisdom is that 
The natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 
Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it 
involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the 
parents to some agency of the state (Rohlf 2009, Parham v. J. R., 442 US. 584 US. 
Supreme Court).  
This is another field entirely, and goes beyond the scope of this study. However, I will 
suggest that when the risks are too high to be ignored, then the state and parents can 
share the responsibility. The best balance for sharing power on that matter, so far as 
national minorities are concerned, is the facilitation of bilingual education.  Again, 
there is no reason why that would pose a great problem to the autonomy of the 
national minority or equality of individuals provided that the community members’ right 
to exist is publicly safeguarded. In these cases there is always the possibility of 
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developing an economically mature societal culture in minority vernacular gradually, 
this is more likely to be achieved in the absence of radical reaction to weak 
multiculturalist policies that hampers the prospects for multiculturalism in cases like 
Turkey and France. Chapter 3 has given a theoretical explanation for this and 
Chapter 5 has illustrated in detail through the case of Kurds and Turkey. The next 
section will also elaborate further on this matter through a comparative study of 
Northern Ireland in the UK and Corsica in France. 
Third, another criticism might be that I am too focused on the group and its 
internal dynamics and that I ignore the relationships between different groups, and 
the asymmetric relationship between the majority and the minority in the model 
Kymlicka offers. It is important to acknowledge that in most cases various ethnic 
groups were treated differently by the same state. Canada is an example of this 
where Aboriginal people who were long exposed to assimilation policies of the Indian 
Act (Bartlett 1988) and the Anglican Church (Woods 2012) lived next to the 
Francophones who were accommodated by ethno-cultural policies of language rights 
and federalism. Would it now be just to give political legislative autonomy to 
Francophones on the one hand and individual cultural rights and administrative 
autonomy to the Aboriginal people on the other? Similar to Kurds in Turkey and 
Corsicans in France, Aboriginal people of Canada were also assimilated by force and 
integrated by inclusive civic nationalism in to the mainstream community. Prohibition 
of the use of Native languages by students was only one of the tools employed to that 
effect (Hawthorn, Tremblay and Bownick 1967). They were also left, scattered, and 
financially weak.  
As an outcome of this long historical assimilation and inclusion policies the 
Aboriginal people of Canada (First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples) could not 
develop a shared sense of belonging as I explained earlier in the second chapter. 
Besides, Aboriginals’ diverse, often contentious, relations with the Canadian state 
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resulted in high variety of political orientations on their part. Today in Canada no one 
is forced to assimilate, but as the outcome of historical assimilation the majority of the 
native Indians are choosing to opt in to the Pan-Canadian idea instead of prioritizing 
their ethno-cultural ‘nationality’ in politics.  Some Aboriginal groups, like some 
nationalist Kurds and Corsicans, have supported the autonomy solution but the 
number of them scarcely comprises 1% of the population in Canada (Leslie 1988). 
Government policy actually granted autonomy in the form of reservations and land 
rights. The self-government rights that most Aboriginal peoples claimed and acquired 
in Canada mostly concern land rights and administrative competencies with an 
economic dimension. However none of these rights are similar to the cultural 
autonomy that has been granted to French Quebecers. The reality is that the policies 
of cultural assimilation with respect to the Indians have never stopped in Canada. A 
closer look at the education policy shows this clearly. McCue (2006) argues that 
policy directions in aboriginal education have barely changed in practice. 
Despite the constitutional reform in Canadian society, Aboriginal languages 
and knowledge are not yet flourishing in the education systems. The 
Canadian education system has not empowered the enormous creativity of 
Aboriginal languages and First Nations schools have not used them widely 
(Battiste 2012: 277). 
 
  The symbolic power they have in the area of education does not translate 
into the kind of cultural autonomy that we observe in Quebec and Flanders. The main 
language of education is still either English or French in most First Nations schools.99 
The majority of Aboriginal people in Canada have already got their acclaimed right to 
                                                
99 See also Fallon and Paquette (2012: 11)  ‘In spite of the emergence of a policy discourse 
promoting autonomy and control of aboriginal education by First Nations within a pluralistic 
society, the reality is that … the education clauses in these agreements [SGAs] clearly 
indicate that the federal government still supports their 1950 policy of integration – every one 
of the SGAs referred to [The Federal Framework for Transferring Programs and Services to 
Self-Governing Yukon First Nations, 1998 (YFN); Mi’kmaq Education in Nova Scotia, 1997 
(ME); The Manitoba Framework Agreement, 1994 (MFA); Nisga’a Treaty Negotiation: 
Agreement in Principle, 1996 (NTM); The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
(JBNQA); The United Anishaabeg Councils Government Agreement-in-Principle, 1998 (UAC)] 
includes a clause or clauses that in effect say that the education that the affected First 
Nation(s) provides as a result of the SGA must be comparable to the provincial system, or that 
students must be able to move from the First Nations education program to a provincial school 
[at any time] without penalty’. 
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enjoy their culture in public and private spheres freely. And as such the autonomy of 
Quebecers does not necessarily put any parts in a disadvantaged position. I agree 
with Kymlicka (1998: 142) who argued that ‘critiques have failed to identify the nature 
of the inequality–to determine who gained an unfair advantage, or suffered from some 
unfair burden, as a result of asymmetry’. Barry (2001), however, clarifies the 
remaining inequality with the following account of asymmetrical power. ‘This is that 
representatives from Quebec take part in voting in the national parliament on issues 
that do not affect their constituencies, because whatever legislation is enacted will not 
apply on Quebec’ Barry (2001: 311).100 This can, however, be regulated by further 
reformations that limit Quebec’s power to its own sphere.  As can be deduced from 
the account of remaining problems, I am not arguing that Kymlicka’s propositions or 
the Canadian model itself is perfectly flawless as there is an on-going debate about 
the asymmetric federalism and its unequal implications for the parties involved. 
Moreover Schertzer and Woods (2011) argue that what Kymlicka presents as a 
blueprint for other cases of ethnic conflict is not even good for Canada. Like Barry, 
they too think that Canada should maintain its judiciary system as responsive as 
possible to represent the diversity within two mainstream communities of the country 
and among all ten provinces.   This goes beyond the scope of this study but the point 
I make by mentioning these is that all the problems regarding ethno-centric 
multiculturalism in cases such as Canada and Belgium are of secondary importance 
and that they can be reformed within the structure of ethno-cultural autonomy solution.  
Fourth, the last critique would come from Kymlicka who is more concerned 
with cases where I suggest that his proposal for strong self-government rights to 
national minorities is normatively inconsistent and practically infeasible.  
When the conditions are not mature enough for his proposition to work, 
Kymlicka thinks that having the right to enjoy one’s culture or administrative autonomy 
                                                100 This is known as the Midlothian question and applies to Scottish MPs in Britain, as well. 
                                                                                                                
 238 
instead of having self-government right or exclusive power of jurisdiction and 
legislation can be more realistic for national minorities (Kymlicka 2004[b]: 13). He 
insists, however, that his proposition should be implemented gradually in such cases 
by recourse to relatively weak multiculturalism policies until the conditions are mature 
enough for the national minority to exercise self-government rights. After all, the 
context where I see multiculturalism not fitting is the outcome of a particular historical 
path.  In cases where policies of forced assimilation have been the norm, reversing 
the process has its limitations. However I am not arguing that path dependency is a 
deterministic concept. As suggested by Wimmer himself (2008: 1004) ‘under certain 
historical circumstances a path may be abandoned and change becomes possible’.101  
The feasibility of this change in practice is however very low for cases like Kurds in 
Turkey and Corsicans in France.  But Kymlicka thinks that his theory should be taken 
seriously as a stepping-stone to reach a solution for ethnic conflict as well.  
The reason why he insists on the multiculturalist direction in such cases is 
because the alternative would most probably be the continuation of a difference-blind 
egalitarianism. I have explained in earlier chapters that the entirely difference-blind 
version of egalitarianism is not to be a panacea for inequalities, which it is primarily 
concerned with. Neither can it be a solution for violent conflict. Kymlicka argues his 
position remains relevant not only because nationalists or communitarians’ right to 
cultural freedom is of importance in his multiculturalism theory, but also because, he 
thinks, the violent conflict that militant nationalist factions have created will not easily 
fade away until their group rights are granted.  
                                                101 Patterns of boundary making and strategies of actors involved in these processes are 
usually determined by exogenous or endogenous shifts in the power politics. (Wimmer 1997, 
2008)  Intervention of international organizations to the ethnic politics of countries has been 
important in facilitating this change. The EU’s minority protection conditionality for the 
accession of candidate countries in Eastern Europe (Kymlicka 2003), or the UN’s protection of 
indigenous rights in Latin American countries are evidence of this. (Conklin and Graham 1995, 
Warren 1998)  Similarly in the case of Kurds and Turkey the role of the EU has been 
undeniably important to start a reform process and challenge the state centric view of nation 
(Kuzu 2010).  
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6.4 Multiculturalism as a Conflict Solving Mechanism? A Comparative 
Analysis   
Although deeply rooted in liberal theory, Kymlicka’s stance on multiculturalism, 
and his justification for exporting various forms and levels of self-government rights to 
national minorities in a generic sense, therefore comes from a broader observation.  It 
is an observation that ethnic minorities’ call for autonomy is still at the centre of on-
going conflicts all over the world. Drawing on Connor (1999: 163-4), Kymlicka (2007) 
suggests that the  
Phenomenon minority nationalism is a truly universal one. The countries affected by it 
are to be found in Africa  (for example Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Eastern Europe 
(Romania), Western Europe (France), North America (Guatemala), South America 
(Guyana) and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries that are old (United 
Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia) as well as small (Fiji), rich 
(Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan) authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic 
(Belgium), Marxist Leninist (China) as well as anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also 
includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), 
Hindu (India) and Judaic (Israel) (Connor 1999: 163-4). 
 
Kymlicka (1995) and Connor (1999) implicitly suggest in their accounts that ethnicity 
is the cause of the conflict because it happens everywhere under many different sets 
of circumstances. Ethnic conflict, according to them, can therefore only be explained 
by itself. Their view is also supported by various scholars who come up with an 
answer as to why ethnicity is a common denominator for conflicts. For example 
Hardin (1995) interpreted ethnicity as a focal point that does let people locate the 
outsiders to cooperate with or fight against.  Similarly Tajfel, Billig and Bundy (1971) 
argued that ethnicity structures actors’ preferences in masses; that it is the ethnicity, 
which provides the shared language of reciprocity among fellow members of a group 
(Bates 1983). ‘Much of this literature fails to specify the mechanisms that link ethnicity 
to political action, but studies that do typically build their accounts around the ability of 
ethnic groups to solve collective action problems’ (Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein 
2002: 4). Kymlicka characterizes a similar failure in his suggestion that any attempts 
to resolve conflicts of national minorities have to find a way to recognize and 
accommodate ethnicity as a politically relevant category.  Even though the societal 
                                                                                                                
 240 
culture of the minority in conflict is fluid and nebulous, as suggested earlier by Young, 
Kymlicka thinks that the societal culture based on ethnicity should be supported and 
nurtured so that national minorities get their differentiated self-government rights; 
those historical injustices can simply be rectified; and the conflict arising from ethnicity 
would eventually be subdued. 
Various scholars have challenged Kymlicka’s perspective on the role of 
ethnicity in the conflict and its capacity to offer a solution. Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
Laitin (2007) and Chandra (2004, 2006) claim that ethnic diversity per se is not a 
cause for the conflict as implicitly suggested by Kymlicka and Connor and ‘peaceful 
and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is 
large scale violence’ (Fearon and Laitin 1996).  Therefore those who think that 
ethnicity is the cause of conflict do not have a factual basis to support their argument. 
Similarly Reinares (2005: 119) argued that ‘Nationalist separatism does not in itself 
explain nationalist separatism terrorism‘. He suggests that independent political 
objectives and an ample variety of organizational purposes can be more relevant than 
ethno-nationalist ideology to explain the emergence and survival of the terrorist 
organization (Reinares 2005). Tezcur’s (2010) study of expanding PKK activities at 
the time of reformation revealed that most of the nationalist-separatist guerrillas’ 
attacks ironically targeted the facilities in their homeland and harmed the members of 
their own community which they claimed to represent.  It is therefore not logical to 
think that the radicals are really fighting for ‘the good’ of their people and that they will 
stop once that ‘good’ has been achieved.  The idea that ethnicity is not the cause of 
conflict has also been supported by studies showing that its recognition will not be the 
solution either.  
According to McGary and O’Leary (2006), most of the best examples of 
peaceful ethnic decentralization, like Quebec in Canada, South Tyrol in Italy, and 
Sami in Finland, have never been subject to violent conflicts as intense and wide as 
those in Kurdish, Palestinian, Corsican or Tamil questions. Hence the ethnic 
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decentralization and autonomy in peaceful disputes do not present good examples of 
solutions for the cases of violent conflict. McGarry and O’Leary (2006: 249) also 
argued that  
 
Consociationalists have overly focused on peaceful disputes. This has led to a 
concentration on the design of legislative and executive institutions, and insufficient 
attention to matters that are profoundly salient in transitions from war to peace, such 
as military and policing reform, demilitarization, human rights reform and the treatment 
of prisoners and victims. 
 
Earlier studies by Nordquist (1998) and Heintze (2002) also suggested that 
issues, which are salient in transitions from war to peace, complicate the feasibility 
and durability of autonomy as a solution in cases of violent conflict.  ‘Practice 
indicates that the higher the degree of militarization of a conflict preceding the 
establishment of an autonomy regulation, the less likelihood there is of durable high 
autonomy’ (Hans–Joachim Heintze 2002: 334).  
This account of the critiques against ethnic multiculturalism provides us with 
two general hypotheses about the prospects for multiculturalism and the autonomy 
solution, which is presented as a conflict solving mechanism. Firstly, autonomy as a 
conflict solving mechanism is more likely to endure and solve the problems of national 
minorities in cases where democratic tradition has been strong.  Secondly, autonomy 
is more likely to be a solution when militarization of the conflict that preceded the 
solution has been low profile if any at all (Nordquist 1998, Heintze 2002: 325-343). 
However this argument is at odds with some cases. The terror atmosphere 
that the IRA created in the UK, for example, was quite violent with almost 2000 
casualties until the late 1990s (Reinars 2005: 121). Despite the bloodshed the 
solution that came with the devolution of power by the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998 has endured quite successfully (McGarry and O’Leary 2006: 259).    
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 Why the solution in the UK has been durable and rewarding is explained by 
some with the strong tradition of democracy in the country. (Przeworski 1999, 2000, 
Davenport 2007) Some others also suggested that the dedication of the central 
government to initiate and maintain the autonomy as a solution was the key to 
success.102 
However this cannot account for the remaining conflict between radical 
Corsicans and the state in France.  France has a strong democratic tradition yet its 
attempts to give gradually more autonomy to Corsica since 1982 failed in so many 
respects to satisfy the radicals and that conflict has remained to be a major problem 
in the politics of both the island and the mainland.  
Kymlicka would suggest that multiculturalism in the extensive form of self-
government rights and legislative autonomy was successfully established in the UK 
and only for this reason the violent conflict came to an end in Northern Ireland. 
However, according to him, this was not the case in France where the Constitutional 
court has constantly prevented a similar agreement from emerging and thus Corsican 
nationalist demands remained unaddressed.103  This account of centralized French 
weak multiculturalism vs. pluralist UK strong multiculturalism is, however, overly 
simplistic.  
  The Northern Ireland conflict was a religion-based conflict between the 
Republican Catholics and the Protestant Unionists as opposed to Irish vs. English.  If 
                                                
102 Also the role of the Irish Republic is important in ensuring that the irredentist ambitions of 
the IRA were not viable. However this lack of support for the IRA from the Irish Republic 
cannot be used on its own to explain why it came to an end. If we take this factor as having an 
explanatory power then we cannot come to terms with stateless nations like the Kurds and the 
Corsicans and with their radical factions who maintained a violent conflict although they have 
never had support from a kin state.  
103  This argument follows from the ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index’ generated in Queen’s 
University in Canada. The project categorizes the countries from 0 to 6 according to their 
multiculturalist policies, 0 being the least multicultural and 6 is the most. In this study as of 
2010 the UK gets a 6 and France 2.  
For more details see http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/minoritynations/Tables.html  
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we are to explain it using the analogy of minority Francophone against majority 
Anglophone in Canada, the Catholic Republicans in Northern Ireland were the 
minority whose cultural autonomy would be recognized and guaranteed by the self-
government rights against the domination of majority Protestant Unionists. Rights of 
Catholics were guaranteed by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 April.  However, 
the Good Friday Agreement ensured that any constitutional changes regarding the 
autonomous decisions of the region including the Catholic Republicans would be 
subject to the consent of the majority (in this case the Protestant Unionists).   
The most important constitutional provision in the GFA is the acceptance of the 
unionist veto over Irish unification. Against the republican movement’s long held 
arguments regarding national self-determination (i.e. the entire island North and South 
must decide together), both governments affirmed that constitutional change in the 
North will only come about through the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland…. 
the devolved political power promised by the agreement will remain in the hands of 
the pro-British unionist majority By accepting this provision, the republican movement 
agreed to administer a state they had spent thirty years trying to demolish. (O’Connor 
2004)  
 
Thus all that the Catholic Republicans could get out of the Good Friday 
Agreement in the end was consociational power sharing, administrative autonomy, 
the parity of esteem, and equal opportunities guaranteeing that they will never be 
discriminated against again. The limited legislative autonomy given to the Northern 
Ireland assembly by the central government therefore had only a symbolic meaning 
for the Catholic Republicans whose absolute cultural autonomy on the constitutional 
level is still dependent on the consent of the majority Protestants.  Catholic 
Republicans in Northern Ireland therefore do not have an exclusive power of 
jurisdiction on the Island.  For this reason it is indeed fallacious to assume that the 
IRA achieved what it aimed for and the most ideal form of self-government for the 
Catholic Republicans was installed, as Kymlicka suggested.  As such the situation of 
Republican Catholics in Northern Ireland is far from representing the level of self-
government rights as idealized in Kymlicka’s theory. Actually it resembles a rather 
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weak multiculturalism that characterizes more the situation of Corsicans in France104 
than Quebecers in Canada. Corsica has an executive council and a regional 
assembly with decision-making powers, four deputies and two senators guaranteed at 
the National Assembly (Loughlin and Letamendia 2000: 157). ‘The Assembly was 
earlier given the authority to adapt national decrees on the basis of the 1991 Statute 
and reaffirmed in 2002 by statute. Assembly has regulatory powers to define and 
implement policies with expanded spheres of competence (educational and fiscal 
matters)’ (Tkacik 2008: 382).  Considering the equality of all citizens before the law, 
however, Corsica was prohibited from developing asymmetric solutions in the sense 
that their policy decisions are still checked and balanced by the central government 
(Ibid). Having remained controlled by the consent of the majority Protestants, the 
position of Catholic Republicans of Northern Ireland is, I suggest, similar to Corsicans 
in France. For this reason I suggest that although their rhetorical powers diverge on 
paper, these two national minorities are similar in terms of the levels of autonomy 
they enjoy in practice.  
In spite of this similarity, the two cases differ from each other in terms of the 
ways their similar levels of autonomy have impacted upon the conflicts that they were 
designed to resolve. While the IRA in Northern Ireland agreed to ceasefire, the FLNC 
(Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu: National Liberation Front of Corsica) 
                                                
104  ‘The regional Assembly of Corsica has the power to make certain decisions and 
regulations. Its powers are derived first from the 1991 Special Statue (as modified by the law 
of January 2002) The powers were reaffirmed in Article 72 of the French Constitution and 
include a limited right to dissent from the central French Parliament. Article 72-1 added in 
2002 that local referenda can be organized in Corsica and since 1991 ‘ the opinion of Corsican 
Assembly must be sought on proposed changes to the island’s status. Additionally, pursuant 
to the 1991 Special Statute, the centre must consult with the Corsican Assembly if ‘ the draft 
laws or decrees’ will affect Corsica. The people of Corsica elect the Corsican Assembly that 
has been granted the right to adopt programs for teaching the Corsican language and 
culture… Corsica has also an increased control over fiscal affairs since the beginning of the 
autonomy process in the 1980s. Constitutionally laws may be passed by which tax revenues 
are provided to the periphery’ (Tkacik 2008: 382).   
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conversely increased its operations as a response to the limited autonomy solution.  It 
is not my aim to find out the causes of ethnic conflict in Corsica or suggest a panacea 
for ethnic conflict by looking at the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, which 
is a very exceptional case. My aim is rather to show how the limited autonomy 
solution, as a form of ethno-centric multiculturalism, affected the conflict in these 
cases. As I explained earlier a long tradition of democracy, low profile of violence and 
higher levels of power devolved to the minorities have been suggested to explain the 
higher probability of autonomy to be a solution to the ethnic conflict. However these 
explanations cannot come to terms with the variance of outcome between Corsica 
and Northern Ireland, which are both located in democratic countries; had engaged in 
violent conflict; and were given similar levels of autonomy as a solution. I suggest the 
historical narrative of recognizing105 ethnicity as a socio-political marker in different 
ways has also an additional explanatory value to understand how ethno-centric 
projects of multiculturalism affect violent conflicts. I will argue that if the minority in 
conflict has been pejoratively or positively recognized on the grounds of its ethnicity in 
the past, the weak consociational or administrative autonomy solution will be more 
likely to settle the ethnic conflict, when implemented.  
6.4.1 The IRA and Northern Ireland - UK 
The case of Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland is exemplary of a context 
where the minority members were de facto recognized, discriminated against and 
systematically excluded from the mainstream community before the Good Friday 
Agreement.  ‘Throughout the existence of devolved government in Northern Ireland 
there were allegations of discrimination against Roman Catholics in all areas of life’ 
(Leopold 1998: 232). The internal solidarity of the Catholics in Northern Ireland has 
been facilitated by the historical boundary that state discourse maintained between 
                                                
105 The recognition as I used in earlier parts of this study does not have to be positive. In order 
for the state to differentiate, discriminate against or exclude a group, it first has to recognize 
the group de facto or de jure. For this reason discrimination, extermination, federalism, cultural 
rights and autonomy regulations all will be used as indicators for recognition.  
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mutually exclusive categories of Catholicism and Protestantism. As O’Leary and 
McGarry (2006: 254) suggested  ‘For over a century, historic Ulster and then the 
Northern Ireland that was carved from it, has been divided electorally into two rival 
ethno-national blocs and there has been no swing voting between the two ethno-
national blocs over the last three decades’. Once the parity of esteem has been 
guaranteed by a constitutional reform and when the boundary between these ethno-
national blocs were recognized as to be effective in the new regulation of the body 
politic, the IRA was no longer in need of furthering the violent conflict. In cases like 
Northern Ireland where the autonomy is introduced as a solution, separatist 
nationalists do not need to continue their violent tactics as a means of mobilization. In 
such cases the majority of minority members are already found to be mobilized by the 
exclusion they suffered in the past and a possible compromise with the state does not 
undermine their support for nationalist leadership. ss This is also supported by 
scholars of ethnic-conflict (Birnir and Inman 2010) and democratization studies  
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Busman and Schneider 2007) suggesting that 
mobilizing groups pose a greater risk for ethnic conflict than already mobilized groups 
do.   
6.4.2 The FLNC and Corsica - France 
The historical relationship between Corsicans and France before the 
autonomy solution is quite the opposite of what happened in Northern Ireland. Unlike 
Republican Catholics who were de facto recognized as different and constantly 
discriminated against in public, Corsicans have been denied the status of minority 
and treated as equal citizens by the state. In France the extremely centralized state 
discarded both institutional and ethno-cultural pluralism in politics. It is also a 
historical fact that the ‘British tradition of liberal pluralism which accords places to 
social orders, classes, and particularistic communities, has been opposed by the 
unitary French conception of citizenship’ (Safran 2003: 439).  In all its attempts to 
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incorporate citizens with different background into the majority, the French state tried 
to fuse nationality and citizenship. Assimilation has been the fundamental method 
used to this effect for a century (Hargreaves 2000, Daftary 2008: 273-312). As a 
result 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most Corsicans identified with the 
French state. They joined the army, the police, customs and other branches of the 
French civil service. Identification with France reached its apex during the First and 
second World Wars, when thousands of islanders gave their lives for la patrie 
(Loughlin and Letamendia 2000: 155).  
In cases like Corsica, minority members are found to be cooperating with the state 
that has assimilated and treated them on par with everyone else in the country. The 
loyalty of Corsicans can lie across the ethnic boundaries in France, as these possibly 
overlapping boundaries are very fluid and the state discourse is conducive for cross 
cutting identities to emerge.   
Starting from the 1950s however, radical groups emerged and fought against 
the French state, especially at times of economic crises. However, the majority on the 
island supported none of the radical Corsican factions, the last of which was FLNC 
(Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu). In time the minorities have been openly 
admitted in France. Since 1968 Regional languages were allowed to be taught at 
school in Brittany and Corsica (Withol de Wenden 2011: 45-53).  
With the heyday of Socialist power between 1981 and 1986, it was aimed to promote 
ethno-cultural pluralism by protecting and developing the cultures and languages of 
regional minorities. Affirming the ‘right to be different,’ policies included the 
subsidization of ethnic-language publications, ethnic museums, films, and music; the 
teaching of ethnic-minority languages at various levels of the educational system and 
the training of teachers for this purpose; the maintenance of ‘multicultural’ community 
centers and research programs; and the promotion of a variety of cultural activities 
(Safran 2003: 444). 
 
Similar to Turkey, in France too ‘the ethnic violence increased in both quantity and 
intensity’ at times of reform and progress (Loughlin and Letamendia 2000: 157).  
Nevertheless, in 1991 a further action was taken and the 1991 bill was passed to 
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establish a regional Corsican assembly on the island. This assembly was given 
authority to define and implement policies on fiscal matters and education.  
Notwithstanding the recognition of their cultural differences in public, the 
aforementioned autonomy provisions have been given to Corsicans as a right to 
freedom of association and their group right to govern themselves on the island was 
based on this principle.  The constitutional court’s persistent opposition to giving 
Corsican nationalists an exclusive power of jurisdiction on the island actually further 
radicalized the FLNC (Daftary 2008). This limited autonomy is justified on the basis of 
the fact that it protects the rights of individuals and the majority of the island’s 
population who voted against a higher level of autonomy for Corsica in the July 2003 
referendum (Serrano 2007, Michelucci 2008, Filippidou 2007).    
The IRA listened to the majority of its constituency and agreed to a ceasefire, 
although the autonomy that they can enjoy in practice is quite similar to the limited 
autonomy that Corsican people have on the island.   The reason for this of course 
was that the IRA understood that not only were they unable to depose the British, but 
also that the Protestant Unionist mobilization blocked their hopes of achieving a 
united Ireland (Hutchinson 2013: personal communication). This is however, the 
same impasse faced by the FLNC in Corsica. Central French governments 
persistently fought against separatist factions in Corsica and the Corsican supporters 
of union with France have blocked their hopes of achieving an autonomous Corsica.  I 
rather argue that why the IRA accepted shifting its battle to the political level when the 
opportunity arose is because they knew that their nationalist leadership in the political 
arena was not to be challenged by a possible cooperation between its constituency 
and the Protestants. This was not the case in Corsica.  
The FLNC, unlike the IRA, increasingly continued its violent approach 
between 1990 and 2006 (Minorities at Risk Project 2013).  This was observed to be 
evident especially at times of reforms that only helped to increase the support of 
Corsican people to mainland France. In the election immediately after the 
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establishment of the Corsican Assembly, the separatist candidate could win less than 
13% of the vote (Hossa 2004: 416). ‘In December of 1984, 25,000 Corsicans 
marched through the streets in favor of French unity. Their banners read: “No to 
Separatism, No to Terrorism”’ (Walker 2013: 25). 
 In such cases, the nationalists constantly need to make ethnicity a politically 
relevant distinction especially in times of relative liberalization that may render the 
cultural boundaries a lesser problem for the majority of their community. It has been 
suggested that, as in cases of FLNC, ETA and PKK, minority nationalists achieved 
this by accelerating an environment of insecurity and increasing the sense of 
victimization among their supporters (Reinals 2005: 125, Akcam and Asal 2005). 106 It 
is suggested that those who have this sense of victimization, in return, are motivated 
further to support the ethno-nationalist cause. Sanchez and Aguilar (2009) have also 
tested this hypothesis in the context of Spanish transition to democracy. Their dataset 
clearly confirmed ‘that terrorism erupted in Spain when participation in 
demonstrations started to decline’ (Sanchez and Aguilar 2009: 428). Evidence 
suggests that the conflict in such cases continues until the majority of the minority 
begins to identify with ethno-nationalism, or the state eliminates terror by force.  
As seen, to introduce limited autonomy or power sharing solutions is not 
helpful in moving the violent conflict into the political democratic arena in cases where 
the minority is not mobilized and the cultural boundaries between communities have 
always been blurred by the state. In such cases the liberal state has two options: 
either oppress the terror and provide its citizens with cultural rights defined as weak 
multiculturalism by Kukathas or compromise with terrorists’ claim to exclusive power 
and sacrifice the freedom and equality of the minority whose majority does not 
support its militant factions. To some, compromising with militant radicals is 
                                                106 Snyder (2000: 37-39) suggests the increasing terrorist campaign is facilitated by fertile 
conditions that democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes usually create. This does not 
however explain the case of either the PKK or ETA whose activities were strongly opposed by 
the governments of Turkey and Spain at the times of liberalization.  
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acceptable if it is the only possible course to get the peace installed in cases where 
the violent conflict has been persistent for decades.  However, it is questionable if 
such a peace arrangement would be enduringly sustainable and fruitful where the 
original causes of the minority’s support to the conflict still remain. At this point, a 
careful security paradigm seems to be in agreement with a liberal perspective 
suggesting that ‘inequality is intolerable even if it would lead to more stability’ 
(Baubock 2001: 2).  
The capacity and possibility of the state to ‘liberalize’ its system and fight 
against ethnic terrorism at the same time is a matter that needs to be researched 
separately and it goes beyond the scope of this study. However the dilemma shows 
that it is very likely to cause a bottleneck and render the ethno-centric multiculturalism 
practically infeasible.  
6.5 Conclusion 
As illustrated in the cases of the Kurds in Turkey and the Corsicans in France, 
I argued that granting cultural groups exclusive power of jurisdiction and legislation is 
not compatible with liberalism in cases where the minority were exposed to forcible 
assimilation and the ideal of civic nationalism at the same time.   
This is not a normative tautology defending the egalitarian bias of civic 
nationalism over the cultural freedoms that multiculturalism theory aims to promote. I 
argued in earlier chapters that a completely difference-blind egalitarianism can 
promote neither the equality of outcomes nor the freedom of cultural groups. It is also 
far from being capable of establishing the peace in countries where too much blood 
has been shed over ethnic conflicts. Assimilation and civic nationalism, independent 
of their normative values, were analysed in this study in terms of the impact that they 
have had upon the maintenance and politicization of a cultural boundary between the 
majority and the minority communities.   
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One may also think that there is a tautology in the argument that 
multiculturalism is only a solution where multiculturalism already has a history of 
being in place, i.e. Quebec, Belgium, but not where it doesn’t, i.e. Turkey and France. 
The argument is not that multiculturalism is only a solution where multiculturalism 
already has a history of being in place, but that it is normatively more consistent and 
practically feasible in cases where the minority has always been differentiated along 
ethnic lines. As explained earlier this is not only limited to more liberal cases such as 
Quebec and Belgium where multiculturalism has already a history of being in place 
but also includes illiberal cases such as Muslim Turks in Greece and Non-Muslims in 
Turkey who were both assimilated and socially excluded at the same time. My 
argument holds true only in cases where the policies of assimilation and integration 
have been implemented together. In such cases politics of group identity is more 
likely to be in contradiction with individual equality and freedom because when the 
scale of separation is low as Wimmer argued (2008: 1011), ‘classificatory ambiguity 
and complexity will be high and allow for more individual choice’. 
Following a multidisciplinary approach of political anthropology, I argued that 
assimilation and civic nationalism when implemented on a consistent basis reduces 
the political relevance of ethnic boundaries between the majority and the minority. 
Evidence suggests that when ethno-cultural boundaries are easy to cross and socio-
politically irrelevant; and when the scales of separation and hierarchy are low as 
Wimmer argued (2008: 1011), ‘classificatory ambiguity and complexity will be high 
and allow for more individual choice. Accordingly boundaries will change more easily.’  
This mechanism, I argue, creates an impasse that makes it impossible to find one 
single ‘people’ on a consistent basis. Ethno-centric multiculturalism relies on the 
unanimity and singularity of ‘the people’ in terms of their attachment to ethno-
nationalist politics and is therefore not realistic for such cases (Kurds in Turkey, 
Corsicans in France).  The salience of ethno-national identity proves to be very 
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powerful when the minority has never been forced to assimilate in the past, but 
ethnically recognized one way or the other as belonging to a group that is distinct 
from the majority. In such cases as Kymlicka suggested ‘when [ethno] nationalist 
parties compete in free and fair elections, they often do gain the support of the 
plurality or majority of the group on a consistent basis (in Flanders, Quebec, 
Catalonia, South Tyrol etc.)’ (Kymlicka 2011: 285).  
I showed in the theoretical background to this study that diversity and 
conflicting interests of individuals are a problem to the extent to which ‘the people’ are 
not willing to overcome their differences and conflicts. Differently from Kymlicka I 
showed that agreement on ethno-politics within the community is not a natural 
extension of ethno-cultural attachments. This study has elaborated on why ‘the 
people’ are more likely to support ethno-politics. Comparative disadvantage, ranked 
communities, cultural incompatibilities, political repression and pre-existing group 
cohesion were some of the factors I have controlled for in this study.  Later I provided 
an overarching framework that encompasses these various causes of popular support 
for ethno-politics. Drawing on this framework then, I presented popular support for 
ethno-politics as a basis for deciding where ethno-centric multiculturalism can be 
normatively consistent and practically feasible. I suggested that assimilation and civic 
nationalism policies or their absence provide us with a more sophisticated and 
realistic basis in locating the cases where multiculturalism fits. First of all the absence 
of forcible assimilation and an ideal of civic nationalism implies ethnic exclusion, 
discrimination or differentialist projects such as administrative autonomy and 
federalism.  This broad category of minority-state relations did not only facilitate the 
concentrated settlement of minorities, but also substantiated the belief in shared 
culture, history and feeling amongst minority members. This belief is translated by 
repeating practices of ethnic differentiation so that they are positioned in contrast to 
the majority who already defined them with ethnic terms in the first place.  Thus, I 
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suggested that this relational situation also explains the minority’s popular support to 
projects of ethnic nationalism.  Through this criterion not only could I come to terms 
with cases like the Kurds and the Corsicans the majority of whom has absented from 
militant ethno-nationalism but also rendered the critiques of ethno-multiculturalism 
null and void in cases where the majority of the minority members support ethno-
nationalist politics on a consistent basis.  
It is important to emphasize that my aim was not to argue that Kymlicka’s 
theory or the Canadian model is flawless and can be exported with no revision to the 
cases where, I suggested, it fits. I elaborated on the remaining problems with theory 
in most ideal contexts. The context I provided is based on the popular sovereignty 
and mass nationalism, and the critiques of multiculturalism in this context came from 
egalitarianism (Barry 2001), and constitutionalism (Hume 1748). This chapter argued 
that all of the remaining problems that egalitarians and constitutionalists raise can be 
corrected through institutional reforms. I explained that none of those reforms 
necessarily pose a fundamental problem for the implementation of self-government 
rights in the contexts I provided. However my argument is not necessarily valid from 
the perspective of Kymlicka either. This is because he thinks that the self-government 
rights can be applied in all cases of national minorities as a generic category. On the 
contrary I argued that his theory is not likely to be a fit with cases that lack mass 
support for ethno-nationalism although they are developed ‘enough’ and not 
assimilated. I gave the historical path of forcible assimilation and civic nationalism as 
the reason why such minorities do not have popular support for ethno-nationalist 
politics.  Kymlicka and Wimmer who worked on ethnic-boundary making and un-
making suggest that this path dependency is not deterministic and thus it can change. 
Therefore it is suggested that if we start to recognize the cultural rights of the minority 
members in a weak fashion, minority members will gradually develop a common 
cause.  I argued that the weak multiculturalism as suggested can be the best 
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approach in such cases because it neither creates further inequalities nor constitutes 
a barrier to the individuals’ freedom of exit. 
 It is observed that, however, this approach would be likely to rekindle 
radicalism and conflict. In what follows, I tested this argument through the 
comparative study of weak multiculturalism and its impact on ethnic conflict. It is 
found out that the weak multiculturalism can move violent conflict to a political arena 
in cases where the cultural boundaries between the majority and the minority have 
always been made relevant by the state’s discourse. The ethno-centric 
multiculturalism in such cases is just an adaptation to the divisions that have already 
been relevant on the ground.  On the contrary, in cases where the minority members 
and the majority have been mixed and integrated by assimilation and civic 
nationalism, terror has the task of mobilizing its ethnic community. So long as there is 
a democratic competition over the minority constituency and that different parties with 
a non-ethnic agenda claim to represent them, radicals will be likely to see weak 
multiculturalism as a state manoeuvre for further assimilation and integration. As their 
aim is the mobilization rather than recognition, radicals are likely to maintain their 
violent approach to achieve it, even if they are then politically recognized and granted 
better rights.  
In the previous chapters both normatively and practically I showed that the 
ethno-centric multiculturalism is not viable for cases with a historical path of forcible 
assimilation. This chapter has tested and verified my argument in the contexts that 
constitute a contrast to the historical path in Turkey. This chapter has not only brought 
the ethno-centric multiculturalism theory closer to a more realistic conception of 
ethno-nationalism but also established a new basis to locate the cases where the 
ethno-centric multiculturalism would be normatively consistent and practically feasible. 
I suggested that the distinction made between immigrant minorities and national 
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minorities is not sufficient. We also have to make a distinction between national 
minorities who were differentiated on the basis of their ethnic differences and those 
who were forced to assimilate and integrated to the society by the means of civic 
state nationalism.  I argued that Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism is an ethno-centric 
approach and can only be applied to national minorities who have been recognized, 
differentiated or discriminated against along ethnic lines. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 The Central Argument in Précis   
This thesis argued that national minorities differ from each other depending on the 
state nationalism they have experienced in the past. The second chapter explained 
this variation according to different impacts that civic assimilationist and ethnic 
exclusionist nationalisms had on national minorities and their societal culture. The 
thesis operationalized the degrees of ‘societal culture’ not only with objective 
indicators such as economic development, institutionalization of the culture, 
concentrated settlement and size of its population, but also with subjective indicators 
such as whether minority members who are the majority in their historical homeland 
share an ethno-political orientation.  To be more precise, minority members’ will to 
follow a politics of ethnic group culture has also been considered by this thesis as an 
indicator of the societal culture in the national minority. The chapter concluded that 
those national minorities have been forced to assimilate into the majority culture have 
been more heterogeneous in terms of these indicators than national minorities who by 
contrast experienced differentiation.  
The third chapter suggested that Kymlicka’s strong view of multiculturalism is 
ethno-centric and therefore is mostly problematic in cases where the national minority 
represents high levels of political and social heterogeneity across ethnic boundaries. 
In demonstrating this, the chapter explained that some minority members voluntarily 
assimilated into the majority resulting in the emergence of hyphenated identities like 
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the American Latinos, the French Corsicans and the Turkish Kurds.107  However, the 
policies of assimilation radicalized some of the other segments of the minority that 
resisted this process for various reasons and promoted an ethnic unrest. 
Multiculturalism and legislative autonomy in the form of regional governments 
are not practically and normatively viable in such cases, because there are too many 
conflicts of interest both across and within the ethnic groups. No project of 
decentralization along lines of ethnicity would be able to correspond to this 
heterogeneity.  Equally problematic in such cases is egalitarianism that is blind to 
differences and the ethnic particularities of the national minority as it is usually near to 
impossible to find a consensus on any matter between the state and radical factions 
of the minority. As Brian Barry suggested, all decisions that the liberal state makes 
are justified so long as the objective that the decision is grounded on is a publicly 
legitimate one. However this view is problematic in countries where some members of 
the national minority have lost or have never had a sense of belonging to the same 
public realm as the majority. Those who are less able to integrate with the 
mainstream public for various reasons are naturally more prone to developing a 
sense of isolation. Moreover the policies of denial and assimilation as I mentioned 
above also ignited and radicalized the ethnic strife between the state and those who 
resisted its policies of suppression. In this sense, radicals represent a deep line 
between the minority and the majority culture and hence pose a much more serious 
problem to the egalitarian presumption of the common good. Difference-blind 
egalitarianism is also far from being a reasonable option where ethnic differentiation 
                                                107  This pluranationality as Keating (2001) suggested is also the case for Canadian 
Francophone, British Scots and Belgian Flemish who most of the time have been ethnically 
marked out and recognized by the state. (Keating 2001) Unlike the first group the deep split 
between ethnic groups in this second category can however be traced better when looking at 
the minorities’ support for political autonomy. Keating’s work ‘Pluranational Democracy’ clearly 
showed that in Quebec and Flanders, sovereignty arrangements and self-government rights 
that fall slightly short of the options of secession and independence are supported by the 
minority population. On the other hand almost all the Kurds want to be recognized culturally 
but only the 16.8% of them in the Southeast Turkey want to be governed under an 
autonomous administration. Similarly, more than half of the Corsicans voted No in the 2003 
referendum that asked them whether they would like to be autonomous. 
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has been pervasive and the minority members en masse support territorial autonomy. 
This does not come down to the reductionist ‘solution’ of majoritarian democracy on a 
sub-state level. Those minorities whose majority population support cultural autonomy 
are still diverse and their judicial systems need to be responsive to this diversity. The 
egalitarianism that Brian Barry fervently supported provides a range of critiques that 
are still relevant for the further configuration of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism in such 
cases. However the egalitarian critique of multiculturalism in these cases is not quite 
as serious as in cases like Turkey and France where the minority members are not 
even in agreement on the levels and forms of the autonomy.  
 
7.2 Significance for the Applied Political Theory of Multiculturalism  
The most significant contribution of this study is in the field of applied political 
theory of multiculturalism by dwelling on the conundrum of what could be the best 
way to accommodate the national minorities.  My perspective has been context 
sensitive and the thesis argued there is no universal ‘best’ solution applicable to the 
diverse range of problems faced by national minorities. The model of multinational 
federation in Canada has been prescribed by Kymlicka as a universal panacea to the 
problems of all national minorities with a societal culture.  Kymlicka has suggested 
that: increasing  ‘rights’ consciousness; consensus on human rights; free political 
mobilization; and de-securitization of ethnic relations are preconditions for the policies 
of multiculturalism to take shape in any context. On the other hand he also promoted 
multiculturalism as a stepping-stone to end ethnic conflict and liberalize countries in 
transition.  This extraordinary claim is the main reason why his work has drawn so 
much attention from scholars all over the world. Will Kymlicka took part in most of this 
research and edited several books on the topic such as ‘Can Liberal Pluralism be 
Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe’ 
(Kymlicka and Opalski 2001), ‘Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa’ (Kymlicka, Eyoh 
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and Berman 2004), ‘Multiculturalism in Asia’ (Kymlicka and Baogang He 2005), and 
‘Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World’ (Kymlicka and Pfostal 
forthcoming).  
Although it is widely asserted that ‘one size does not fit all’,  scholars and 
policy makers alike accepted the fundamental premise of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, 
that national minorities with their own societal culture should be given self-
government rights one way or another. Many have studied the topic from a case 
specific perspective; and in finding out the peculiarities about their primary examples 
they have suggested necessary configurations in institutionalizing this approach. To 
my knowledge, however, no study has attempted to explain systematically why ethno-
centric multiculturalism is more successful in some cases but not in others.108  
Political sociology has offered many studies of the conditions under which 
ethno-cultural distinctions translate into politics. The boundary studies contributed to 
our understanding of how the relational nature of identity shapes relations between 
ethnic groups. There are a few studies (Turner 1993, Cohen and Rogers 1995) that 
contextualized these perspectives in a historical fashion to look at the past and see 
how cultural communities have become national minorities.  Except for Zimmer (2003) 
                                                
108 The only exception to this is ‘Universal Minority Rights?  A Transnational Approach’ by 
Yasutomo, Fumihko and Tetsu (eds.) (2004), in which commentaries on Kymlicka’s theory of 
multiculturalism have made a distinction between the Western and the Eastern communities  
wrongly suggesting that his theory is not applicable in the latter category where the countries 
have not adopted liberalism. The thesis has already showed that the theory is not only 
problematic in the Eastern communities, but also in liberal democracies such as France and 
America. The minorities-problem is universal but its nature and solution vary. I demonstrated 
that this variety is due to the type of the relationship between the minority and the state, which 
is hard to categorize geographically. Moreover this dissertation ascertains that multiculturalism 
is not only the convention of some Western communities who already internalized liberalism to 
some extent and in different forms but also a potential model for some countries in transition 
both in the East and the West. The state of being liberal is not a dichotomous variable but a 
matter of degree that can be advanced in every country including ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ ones 
where all individuals are striving for more freedom and equality. It is, however, the tension 
between the fundamental principles of liberalism itself–equality and freedom–that makes 
problematic both extremes of ethno-centric multiculturalism and difference-blind egalitarianism 
under certain circumstances. The question therefore is not about whether liberal pluralism can 
be exported to ‘illiberal’ countries, but about which interpretation of multiculturalism, 
libertarianism or egalitarianism one should take on under certain circumstances if the goal is to 
advance liberalism.     
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and Wimmer (2008), however, none of these studies viewed civic and ethnic 
nationalism through the lenses of boundary making mechanisms (Barth 1969, 
Wimmer 2008, Jenkins 2009). Neither did they explain the variance of national 
minorities in terms of the civic or ethnic state nationalisms they have experienced in 
the past. This study, in agreement with Zimmer (2003) and Wimmer (2008), 
reconceptualised the civic and ethnic state nationalisms as boundary making 
mechanisms and examined their impact on minority societal cultures. In doing so this 
thesis also examined the prospects for multiculturalism that is supposed to promote 
the representation of these societal cultures. This study is important for its approach 
by bringing together studies on boundary making mechanisms, nationalism and 
theories of multiculturalism.  As has been illustrated in this thesis, it is not adequate to 
differentiate between immigrant minorities and national minorities. When deciding 
what rights should be given to certain minorities from the liberal perspective we need 
to differentiate between national minorities that experienced ethnic state nationalism 
on the one hand and civic state nationalism on the other.  
 
7.3 Contribution to Studies of Nationalism 
 Why this has also been neglected so far in the studies of nationalism is 
because the study of nations and nationalism is dominated by an approach that is 
aimed more at understanding what these concepts really mean than at explaining 
what the implications of their various manifestations are. The dichotomy of ethnic-
civic nationalism has long been refuted on empirical and normative grounds. I have 
reconceptualised the dichotomy and worked out how it can still be analytically useful 
to understand the varying nature and problems of national minorities. This is surely an 
important contribution to the studies of nationalism which most of the time engages 
only with questions such as what nation, or nationalism, is. Departing from this 
conventional approach, this study has used nationalism as an independent variable, 
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and in doing so has shown one of many ways in which nationalism studies in general 
and the civic–ethnic dichotomy can be analytically useful.  It is also useful to scholars 
who dwell on whether state nationalism and multiculturalism are compatible on 
theoretical and practical levels. The thesis explained that one who tackles this 
question would necessarily need to be sensitive to the different types of nationalism 
and their implications for different interpretations of multiculturalism. The comparative 
approach of this study has showed that the ethno-centric interpretation of 
multiculturalism is only compatible with cases where state nationalism has always 
been ethno-centric with respect to its national minority. 
 
7.4 Significance of the Study for Policy Makers 
A more significant contribution of this study is for the policy makers who used 
applied political theory to inform the solution of their minorities-problem. The 
argument that each case has its own unique circumstances holds true, and policy 
makers should be sensitive to those individual circumstances when dealing with 
problems of each national minority. Beyond this, however, the thesis has showed that 
it is possible to categorize the national minorities and their problems according to the 
state policies they have been exposed to in the past.  It is hoped that with the help of 
this finding, policy makers and theoreticians may have an initial grasp of what 
approach is more likely to be a solution for the type of national minority they are 
concerned with and save both time and money. The latter is especially important for 
international and supranational organizations as well as NGOs who are engaged in 
extra efforts to finding a solution for national minority problems. The United Nations, 
the European Union, the OSCE and the European Council are just a few examples of 
these. More importantly, however, this study is useful for countries and national 
minorities that have been looking for alternative examples of the successful solution 
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to find their own way forward. In this sense the thesis’s contribution to Turkish studies 
is very important. 
  
7.5 Contribution to Turkish Studies  
 There are many studies criticizing the unequal treatment of minorities in Turkey 
especially highlighting the need to improve equality between Kurds and Turks. Turkey 
is still a candidate country for EU accession and is therefore endeavouring to fulfil the 
conditions the EU has set for the protection of minorities. However, the means by 
which the improvement should be achieved in Turkey has not been argued on a 
theoretical basis from a comparative perspective.  None of the academic studies pay 
sufficient attention to the new inequalities emerging from the multicultural discourse in 
Turkey. To what extent multiculturalism affects the ethnic conflict between the Kurds 
and the Turks has not been studied fully either. Recognition of minority identities and 
the viability of accommodating diversity in a liberal democratic system have been at 
the centre of argument in Turkey. But the most appropriate path to equality and peace 
in this context was not discussed with reference to systematic analysis of the effects 
of multiculturalism and egalitarianism.  
  In Turkey, as a country in transition to liberal democracy, ‘liberalism’ has been 
idealized by Turkish scholars, some political actors and institutions, but it has not 
been clarified which liberalism they are talking about or which principles of liberalism 
they defend. Neither is it argued what the limitations and consequences of the liberal 
principles they defend are in relation to the equitable accommodation of Kurds in 
Turkey. This study provided a detailed discussion on this matter. It followed the idea 
that ‘In cases where we regard the basic principles not as holding unconditionally but 
as standing in trade-off relationships to one another, some amount of liberty may be 
sacrificed in order to achieve greater equality, say empirical evidence will be needed 
to tell us what the optimal mix of values will be for the society we are considering’ 
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(Miller 2008: 30) This study also provides that empirical evidence for Turkey. The 
problematic relationship between the Kurds and the State in Turkey could not be 
peacefully and equitably settled, although influential political actors and institutions 
representing these two perspectives have tried to solve the Kurdish question in their 
own ways.  
 If neither ethno-centric multiculturalism nor difference-blind egalitarianism is a 
viable option, then what appears to be the most viable liberal approach to the 
problems of national minorities under this context? The thesis concluded that it is 
necessary to recognize elements of many variants of liberal thought that should be 
incorporated in the process of accommodating the Kurds in Turkey. The thesis 
suggests that institutional reform in Turkey should be done in a manner that assures 
a particular model of liberalism would not dominate the process as a whole. As 
neither ethnocentric multiculturalism nor difference blind egalitarianism is a viable 
option in Turkey with respect to the Kurds, this thesis suggests focusing on an 
alternative liberal view in which neither equality nor freedom can be sacrificed to the 
other. 
  I suggest that such a liberal view should be based on the concepts of neutrality 
and non-domination. This alternative view is seen as too ideal to be realized but I will 
suggest that commitment to this ideal is indeed the most appropriate way to 
accommodate the cultural diversity in Turkey. It was not my aim in this thesis to give a 
rigorous description of what should be done with regard to the Kurdish question in 
Turkey, or what institutions should be developed and how the power should be 
ultimately distributed. The success of any multiculturalist or egalitarian project is 
conditional, and reading a future solution through abstract principles cannot do justice 
to the environment of socio-political change taking place in Turkey. In this thesis I 
rather presented a rigorous argument about what the liberal solution should not be 
like under current circumstances. From that account, however, it can be safely 
asserted that what is more suitable for Turkey from the liberal perspective is more 
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akin to a weak version of multiculturalism than the strong multiculturalism that blindly 
claims that the cultural distinction is the only source of political legitimacy.109 As the 
cultural boundary between the Turks and the Kurds in Turkey is very fluid, institutional 
arrangements and distribution of power must be made in a way that takes into 
account regional disparities rather than cultural distinctions. In this sense 
decentralization can be designed in a way that is more similar to Scotland in the UK 
than to Quebec in Canada. The focus should be directed on territorial needs and 
empowering the local administrations with economic competencies than legislative 
autonomy with an exclusive power of jurisdiction on culture, finance, security and 
education. Pushing a reform agenda too far risks the pendulum being swung only 
from one extreme to the other.  Whatever institutional change takes place, it should 
be designed in a way that is sensitive to the tension between freedom and equality as 
this thesis has portrayed.  At the time of writing this thesis a new reform process has 
begun in Turkey. As of late 2012 the government has initiated talks with 
representatives of both political and violent factions of the Kurdish movement. 
Abdullah Ocalan, the honorary leader of the Kurdish movement and currently in 
prison on the island of Imrali, wrote a roadmap for the solution and government 
representatives have met with him a few times.  The autonomy solution that the 
ethno-centric multiculturalism promotes is now much closer to being realized in 
Turkey than ever. For that reason, it is now even more important for Turkey to 
                                                109 This is not to say that the strong ethnocentric multiculturalism will not 
 
 emerge in Turkey. This depends on many factors.  The government in Turkey has a religious 
vision, by which, the Prime Minister thinks, it will also be easy to hold the Muslim Kurds and 
Muslim Turks together in harmony even if the former is granted the regional autonomy. 
Another view is that the Government in its attempt to bring the presidential system to Turkey 
needs the support of Kurds and for this reason it is ready to compromise with radical Kurds on 
many issues that have recently dragged the country to the verge of civil war in October 2011. 
Moreover changing international dynamics in the Middle East and increasing tensions with the 
neighboring countries such as Syria and Iran are an important factor. It is suggested that the 
Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Syria will play an important role in the region and it is this dynamic that 
the government considers when approaching the Kurdish question in Turkey. The ethno-
centric multiculturalism, for all these reasons can soon become the reality in Turkey. Yet it is 
completely another question whether this change will be a liberal one. This study has rather 
provided a theoretical and a sociological insight on this matter. 
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consider all the discussions that this thesis has portrayed.  
 The problem, however, in Turkey is that nobody has a clear idea of what the 
Government’s plans are and that meetings with Kurdish leaders are kept confidential. 
When there is no transparency and the platform is not open to the public, it limits the 
way in which people with different concerns on equality and freedom can negotiate 
their ideas and balance each other. It took many years and lives to see that policies 
and politicians representing the extremes of difference-blind egalitarianism and ethno-
centric multiculturalism have not brought justice to Turkey, and now it is only the 
radicals and nationalist Kurds with demands for strong multiculturalism with whom the 
government is negotiating. The prime minister ‘Erdogan declared that ‘if drinking 
poison hemlock is necessary, we can also drink it to bring peace and welfare to this 
country’  (Gunter 2013: 94).   
 7.6 Potential Future Research  
 As the thesis argued, however, the strong version of ethno-centric 
multiculturalism contradicts with equalities and freedoms in too many respects under 
the current circumstances of Turkey. One of the findings of this thesis is that the 
‘weak multiculturalism’ which incorporates the egalitarian and post-multiculturalist 
critiques into its own thread is ideal from a liberal perspective. Yet, it is at the same 
time what radicalized the PKK in Turkey. What appears to be the optimum liberal 
solution under current circumstances rekindles radical thought and resurrects 
‘terrorists’ who call themselves freedom fighters in Turkey. This is the potential 
research topic that can flow from this work. What is the relationship between 
liberalism and terror, or is it possible, from a liberal perspective, to make a choice 
between peace and justice when the two are in conflict? 
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